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The outline that follows this section indicates all
the headers that are contained in the thesis. It includes
the page numbers that are applicable to each thesis section
and the subsections contained in that section. It is pro-
vided to assist the reader to follow the development of
the thesis. Further, it assists the reader who desires to
browse and focus only on the content that is relevant to his
or her particular interests. Finally, the outline assists
the reader to refer back (or forward) to other sections that
may be related to the material currently being examined.
The development of the thesis proceeds as indicated below.
Essentially, two primary processes are required to
determine how to meet the threat in a conflict situation.
These are threat detection/perception and crisis decision
making. The purpose of Chapter I is to introduce the prob-
lems associated with these processes at the macro level of
the system of international politico-military activities
and the national politico-military systems that monitor,
respond to and participate in these activities. The chapter
presents the concepts, models and methodologies that will
be applied in the remainder of the thesis. They have been
extracted from the following areas of research: threat per-




Chapter II steps down in focus from the system of
international politico-military activities monitored and
perceived by management components of national politico-
military systems discussed in Chapter I to the smaller
system of international naval interactions. These inter-
actions are monitored and perceived by management com-
ponents within the U.S. naval system. The chapter places
primary emphasis on the intelligence component within that
management system and how it functions to serve the com-
ponents of the larger naval system. It also details the
participation of the intelligence officer in the intelli-
gence system. Its purpose is to develop a systems analy-
sis of how naval intelligence and the intelligence officer
function in support of naval system objectives. This
analysis seeks to provide the foundation for an under-
standing of how the design of the information system devel-
oped through the Naval Warfare Analysis Experiment offers
automatic data processing support capabilities that can be
applied to improve the role performance of both the intel-
ligence system and the intelligence officer. The chapter
concludes with a systems model for problem solving that
provides the structure and approach for the remainder of
the thesis. The components of this model include: the
reality situation, the conceptual model, the scientific
model, and the solution.
Chapter III then provides a threat assessment of the
xi

particular reality situation addressed by the Naval Warfare
Analysis Experiment. It describes the development of the
Soviet Navy since the mid 1950s and indicates the expan-
sion in naval activities conducted in direct support of
Soviet security and foreign policy that has occurred with-
in this period. It describes how these activities have
escalated and delineates the potential threat they pose to
the security interests of the Unites States and the Free
World. Its purpose is to provide an understanding of Soviet
naval activities as a foundation for later illustration of
how the capabilities developed through the Naval Warfare
Analysis Experiment enhance the processing, analysis and
production of intelligence concerning these activities.
Chapter IV develops the conceptual model of an ex-
perimental information system for improved intelligence
performance. This model specifies that the operational
intelligence process should focus on nine key questions
suggested by the requirements of the operational components
of the naval system for the intelligence product. It then
goes on to specify that the institutionalized requirements
for reporting on foreign naval operations provide the
analytical framework necessary to addressing the key opera-
tional intelligence questions . These reporting requirements
are based upon consideration of the aspects of naval war-
fare. The chapter then establishes quantitative variables
that may be measured as the result of the observation of
naval activity and relates them both to the aspects of
xii
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I. THREAT DETECTION/PERCEPTION AND CRISIS
DECISION MAKING
The Threat of War
The threat and actual conduct of war consuming the
major nations of the world has been a dominant problem of
the twentieth century. The rapidity with which this threat
can manifest itself and the awesome destructive power that
can be unleased are what differentiate the twentieth cen-
tury problem from that of previous eras . Modern technology
continues to provide an ever widening range of means for
one nation to inflict violent physical force upon another.
The actual conduct of war, however, is but one end
of a specturm of activity or interaction conducted by
nations as they proceed along the scale of conflict with
one another. The theory of deterrence rests upon the
capacity, preparedness and will of the defending nation to
resolve the threat of conflict with an aggressor nation in
the defender's favor, or at the very least, to minimize
the direct impact of the conflict upon the life and
security of the defender's people. Further, this theory
must assume not only that the defending nation has the
capacity and political will to inflict unacceptable damage
upon an aggressor nation should the aggressor initiate war,
1

2but also that the defender can detect escalating activity
on the part of the aggressor, preceive the threat that it
implies, and respond in sufficient time by mobilizing the
resources required to meet the potential threat.
Relevant Research
The system that decides how to respond to a threat by
mobilizing and directing the nation's resources to meet that
threat is the national politico-military management sys-
tem and the process is known as crisis management. The
system that detects and perceives the threat is the intel-
ligence component of that management system. The Naval
Warfare Analysis Experiment is a project that seeks devel-
opment of an experimental information system in order to
demonstrate improvements that can be made to components of
the U.S. intelligence system that will enhance their capa-
bilitiy to detect and perceive potential naval threats to
the nation's security and interests.
The purpose of Chapter I is to review the areas of
research that have been examined in the project to date in
order to present the concepts and methodology found in this
relevant research which will be applied both to analysis of
the intelligence system's functions and performance and to
the design and development of the experimental information
system that will suggest how that performance can be im-
proved. These areas of relevant research include those
applicable to threat detection and perception, crisis

management, systems analysis and management information
systems
.
The chapter first examines Russell Ackof f ' s devel-
opment of a perception model. It discusses the concepts
of stimulus-reaction-response, sensitivity and sensibility,
and consciousness and memory that form the basic elements
of this model. Then, the chapter builds upon these con-
cepts by discussing the applicability of the model to the
politico-military problems associated with the threat
detection and perception process. These problems include
Roberta Wohlstetter * s concept of noise; time sensitivity
and perishable data; cover and deception; and various fac-
tors that can complicate the defender's intelligence
efforts
. These factors include the dictates of security
requirements, bureaucratic blocks to communication, organi-
zational status and prestige, and predominant beliefs
concerning enemy behavior
.
From threat perception, the chapter proceeds to ex-
amination of the crisis management process. It reviex^s
Graham Allison's three models that illuminate the socio-
logical/organizational aspects of crisis decision making.
Then it provides examples of these models and concepts
from other research as they apply to the politico-military
aspects of crisis management. The problem areas addressed
in this discussion include those related to political pres-
sures, organizational inertia, influence of the participants,
alliance commitments, military capabilities, strategy and

4doctrine, and crisis management imperatives.
Upon completion of the presentation covering the
concepts, models and problems relevant to the threat
detection/perception and crisis management process, the
chapter turns to discussion of the concepts and models
associated with the primary methodology that has been
applied in the Naval Warfare Analysis Experiment, systems
analysis
. This section first defines the system as a
holistic concept. Next, it outlines C. West Churchman's
criteria that should be adhered to when conducting sys-
tems analysis. Continuing with Churchman, it emphasizes
the three broad areas of responsibility with regard to
management's role in the performance of a system. These
include setting goals, allocating resources, and control-
ling system performance. Then, it describes the four
functions management components perform in order to meet
these responsibilities: Identifying problems; making
decisions; controlling the decisions made; and providing
the information required to perform the first three.
Finally, it discusses concepts and models related to the
development of information systems that can perform effec-
tively the last management component function. The dis-
cussion of design criteria highlights what Ackoff calls
erroneous assumption that designers make about information
systems which result in ineffective performance. The sec-
tion concludes with a presentation of an information system

5that has been developed by Professor Ronald G. Sherwin
at the Naval Postgraduate School to support the threat
detection/perception and crisis management processes.
The Threat Detection/Perception Process
As a Psychological Problem
The perception process
Russell L. Ackoff developed a model of an individual
psychological system that offers several concepts that are
useful to explanation of the perception process. This pro-
cess involves a stimulus produced in the environment, a
reaction comprised of a change in the structural properties
of the respondent to that stimulus, which in turn leads to
the respondent choosing a course of action as his response.
This model, shown in Fig. 1, is in the form of a basic
systems diagram with the stimulus as the input, the reaction
representing the transfer function performed as a result of
the stimulus, and the response as the output resulting from
that transfer function.
Ackoff sees an individual's or a system's perceptive-
ness as being based upon the concepts of sensitivity and
sensibility. The degree of sensitivity is the probability
that the respondent will react to the stimulus in the given
The perception model and the concepts that follow are dis-
cussed in greater detail in Russell L. Ackoff and Fred E.
Emery, On Purposeful Systems
,
(Chicago and New York: Aldine-
































































7environment. Sensibility depends upon the respondent being
in a purposeful state and its degree is defined as the prob-
ability that the respondent will respond to the transforma-
tion in his structural properties produced as his reaction
to the given stimulus as a result of his being in that
purposeful state. Ackoff then relates both these concepts
to mathematical functions. The sensitivity function he de-
fines as that function that relates the respondents degree
of sensitivity to the stimulus produced by the environment
and to the structural properties of that environment. The
sensibility function he defines as that function that re-
lates the respondent's degree of sensibility to the inten-
sity of his reaction and to the properties of his purpose-
ful state.
The concepts of consciousness and memory
Ackoff offers two other concepts as his final refine-
ments to this process. Consciousness is the awareness of
another's and one's own mental state, which he defines as
any one or a combination of the functional properties of an
individual's purposeful behavior. Memory is the factor that
permits an individual to respond at one moment in time to
something he sensed earlier. Consciousness then becomes
dependent not only on perceiving the behavior that produces
the stimulus, but also upon perceiving the mental state that
contributed to the behavior. The memory function becomes a

8a coproducer of one's present observations and conclusions
by allowing both retrieval of past experiences related to
the present stimulus and a more purposeful response as a
result of this retrieval.
As Policito-Military Problems
The problem of noise
Building upon Ackoff ' s model of perception, the
concepts associated with that process may be applied to
particular problems that exist in, but are not necessar-
ily unique to, the politico-military environment. Roberta
Wohlstetter, in her book Pearl Harbor: Warning and Dec i-
sion
,
draws particular attention to the significant amount
of "noise" that exists in the politico-military environ-
ment. This problem involves the sorting out of the mean-
ingful signal from the abundance of irrelevant information
2
existing in the environment. The meaningful signal rele-
vant to a particular threat, which seems so perfectly
clear given hindsight after the manifestation of the threat
it indicates, comes to the observer imbedded in current
noise. This noise includes an abundance of both meaningless
signals and meaningful signals that are relevant to a
o
The concept of noise and other problems observed as cited
in the passages that follow are taken from the section in
"Retrospect and Perspective" in Roberta Wohlstetter, Pearl
Harbor: Warning and Decision
,
(Stanford, California:




variety of other activities that are being conducted simul-
taneously. The sheer volume of activity may be sufficient
to obliterate the single signal relevant to a particular
threat even if the observer is looking specifically for
such a signal. Thus, the characteristics of the struc-
tural property of noise in a given environment has a sig-
nificant impact upon the degree of sensitivity toward
given signals that can be exercised by even qualified
observers
.
With regard to Pearl Harbor, Wohlstetter indicates
that signals pointing to an attack on the forces there
had to compete with a far greater number of more ominous
signals pertaining to the European theater that were im-
pacting upon Washington at an alarming rate. The Pacific
Command gave credance to numerous signals that pointed to
attacks northward against the Soviet Union rather than
southward into the Pacific. Tasking of Japanese espio-
nage agents in the Hawaiian area was intercepted, but
similar intelligence requirements were observed being
levied upon Japanese agents in a plethora of other loca-
tions including Panama, Vancouver, Portland, San Diego
and San Francisco.
As these examples illustrate, a multiplicity of
situations are active simultaneously. What applies to one
area may be even more descriptive of another. The variety
of signals do not build necessarily in any consistent

10
pattern that can be discerned without long and careful
analysis. Even then, the pattern may become clear only
with hindsight. In this regard, the evidence Wohlstetter
compiled in her research indicated a significant increase
in the frequency of espionage tasking from Tokyo concern-
ing both Manila and Pearl Harbor. If an analyst in Far
Eastern Intelligence had noted this frequency and been
able to make a comparison to the relative frequency of
such tasking for other port cities, this might have added
an important piece to the warning puzzle.
Problems of time sensitivity
and perishable data
Time factors related to evolving crisis situations
have a dual effect on the analysis of incoming data. The
dynamics of crises are such that the demand for accurate
assessments becomes more pronounced as the crisis escalates.
When a multiplicity of events unfolds in rapid fashion,
this effect is reinforced to the point where the decision
maker's demand for equally rapid analysis exceeds the ca-
pacity of the system to sort the facts from what is known
about the multiple events. The key fact that would place
the need for particular decisions in perspective may not have
filtered through the system. Thus, in one sense, the
pressures of time related to the degree of urgency for a
critical decision contribute directly to the amount of un-
certainty with which the analyst still must contend.

11
Graham Allison in his analysis of the Cuban Missile
Crisis provides some classic examples of this effect of
time. With regard to one of the principal sources of in-
telligence on Cuba, refugee reports, he noted that the
processing of an individual report might take up to two
weeks. While these reports yielded volumes of informa-
tion, most of it was of low reliability and some of it
contained disinformation. Thus, an individual report had
to be cross-checked and compared painstakingly with thou-
sands of others before it could be accurately assessed.
In another example, he cited the case of a CIA agent in
place who observed a strategic missile in Cuba on 12
September. Requirements for clandestine security, protec-
tion of sub-agents, and concealment of agent networks dic-
tated that the norm for information from such a sensitive
source in Cuba to reach Washington was nine to twelve
days. Thus, the estimate produced by the United States
Intelligence Board on 19 September that the Soviets would
not place missiles in Cuba did not have the benefit of this
3
actual missile sighting.
In another sense, the passage of time often dilutes
the continuing impact of key reports upon the current ap-
preciation of the situation. Returning to the agent
o
Department of Defense Appropriations, Hearings, pp. 63-64
as quoted in Graham Allison, Essence of Decision: Explain -
the Cuban Missile Crisis
,






tasking against Pearl Harbor that Wohlstetter reported,
the last reference to these requirements was made by the
Japanese on 24 September. The fact that a follow on at-
tack by the Japanese against any United States possession
did not materialize prior to 7 December may have had a
cushioning effect on the continuing impact of the 24
September message. Wohlstetter also cites in the same
chapter the reports of the Soviet master spy, Richard
Sorge, who had cabinet level access in Japan. In July,
he warned that the offensive would be southward. In
September and early October, he became even more alarmed
about the movements of Japanese forces in Manchuria and
predicted attacks against the Soviet Union with such fre-
quency that these radio reports were finally intercepted
and fixed by the Japanese Secret Police leading to his
capture
.
Problems of cover and deception
The fact that most aggressors take active measures
to conceal their true intentions prior to launching a
sudden attack adds further complications to the threat
detection and perception process. The measures taken may
be to ensure that pertinent signals remain as quiet as pos
sible, or deliberate disinformation may be made to stand-
out against the general noise. Wohlstetter ' s work abounds
with such examples. Even within the Japanese cabinet, the
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plans for the Pearl Harbor attack were known only to the
Navy Minister and the Prime Minister, who was also the
Army Minister at the time. Japanese commanders in the
field were sent false war plans concerning possible ac-
tion in the China Theater, which were only changed at the
last possible moment to coincide with the true southward
thrusts that the high command intended. Prior to the
departure of the fleet for Hawaiian waters, the Japanese
employed both active and passive measures against the
United States communications intercept network. They
used false transmissions to convince Navy intercept oper-
ators that key major combatants remained in Japanese home
waters, while the radio silence maintained by the Japanese
aircraft carriers precluded tracking by the United States
high freqeuncy direction finding network during the latter
part of November and early December.
Problems of the defender
The principal problems regarding the defender's
perception of the situation as cited by Wohlstetter in-
clude those related to security requirements, bureau-
cratic blocks to communication, organizational status and
prestige, and current beliefs concerning enemy behavior.
The United States code name for the interception and de-
cryption effort targeted against Japanese communications
was "MAGIC". Due to security requirements, MAGIC inter-
cepts were closely held within the United States politico-
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military community, i.e., only disseminated to a few key
officials. This security requirement thus decreased the
number of pertinent signals heard by all responsible
parties to the point that those represented by the MAGIC
intercepts were barely audible to crucial segments of the
system
.
Wholstetter believed that the Army/Navy rivalry at
the time of Pearl Harbor contributed to their limited
sharing of intelligence data and impeded the communica-
tion between the services concerning the portions of the
intelligence puzzle that each held in-house. She also
felt that prejudice at the time against specialists and,
in particular, intellectuals within the establishment,
made it difficult for these personnel to communicate
their assessments to and be heard by the crucial decision
makers involved. A more serious factor she cited as
being a reflection of prestige was the low budget for the
services in the pre-war years. She specifically mentioned
the limited resources made available to intelligence in
that period as decreasing the amount of success it could
have achieved had it enjoyed greater prestige.
Finally, Wohlstetter pointed to the all too human
tendency to focus greater attention on signals that con-
form to current expectations of enemy behavior. She in-
dicated that the belief that Pearl Harbor was an improbable
target may have been in itself a key factor in making it
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difficult for attack signals to be heard.
Crisis Martag em en
t
The Sociological/Organizational Aspects
Graham Allison developed the three models shown in
Fig. 2 to explain the crisis assessment and decision
making process. The basis for his Model I is the con-
cept of a unitary rational actor. Model II he calls the
organizational process. Model III is a governmental pol-
itics model. He believes that these decision making
models complement one another. None provide all the
answers. Each frames the questions in a different manner
and provides leads to different portions of the picture
of a particular decision making process. The models thus
reveal how each portion contributes to the total picture.
Problems with Model I analysis
Model I explains a government's choice of an aggre-
gate action by constructing a calculation according to
which the government in question might reasonably have
chosen to make the particular move. This is a game of
maximization under some set of constraints, which finds
its basis in modern economics, statistical decision theory
and game theory.
While Allison finds the rationality of choice model
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a good clue to individual behavior, he points to major
difficulties that arise when the behavior to be explained
is not individual, but one of large organizations. Soci-
ologically, it is even more difficult to apply such a
model to the behavior of nations. Thus, with regard to
Model I, Allison concludes that "the present hiatus in
thinking about problems of foreign affairs derives in
large part from attempts to pursue Model I reasoning, with-
out much self -consciousness , as the single form of
analysi s .
"
This conclusion recognizes a need to incorporate
additional factors. One prime factor is the. interplay
between individuals within organizations during the de-
cision making process. On the national scale, this would
equate to interaction within the politico-military deci-
sion making system. Other variations of Model I do bring
multiple actors into play, primarily to compensate for
the reduced view of the process as being the product of a
single unitary actor. Even in these versions, however,
the response produced as the result of an initial stimu-
lus, still is viewed as essentially one produced by
unitary consensus. Beyond the reality that national de-
cision making is essentially system decision making, the






when trying to explain behavior associated with imple-
mentation of the plan. Thus, while the final decision
might conceivably be attributed to unitary consensus,
translation of that decision into action requires the
participation of numerous organizations and smaller
groups within the politico-military system. Model II
is particularly relevant to this phase and also illus-
trates organizational action that poses constraints for
the initial decision making process.
Model II analysis
Allison developed Model II using contemporary or-
ganizational theory as a basis. In this model, he em-
phasizes the bureaucratic structure of the government
involved in the crisis. The model seeks to identify
which components traditionally act upon the type of prob-
lem precipitated by the crisis concerned and to determine
what is the relative influence of these components within
the government. Once these components have been iden-
tified, the model examines the repertoires, programs
and standard operating procedures that each has for dis-
seminating information about the problem to decision
points, for generating alternative courses of action, and
for implementing these courses of action.
Model III analysis
In model III, Allison incorporates consideration of
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governmental politics into his analytical framework. The
model examines the channels for producing action on the
problem concerned and focuses on the participating players
to determine how job pressures, past stances, and the per-
sonality of the various key actors affect the execution
of their roles in the crisis management process. Then
the model is used to determine what deadlines will force
the issue and what foulups might result. Thus, time fac-
tors and situation dynamics are also brought into play.
Contributions of the models
Model I's utility is that it fixes the broader con-
text within which reactions to the crisis may be viewed.
This includes the larger national patterns and the shared
images of the decision makers involved. Model II oper-
ates within this context to highlight the organizational
mechanisms that produce the course of action. These
mechanisms include those that produce the information de-
fining the problem, those that formulate and propose
alternative solutions, and those that are charged with the
implementing process. Model III adds further refinement
to the process through the development of detail concerning
the principal leaders of the government and the politics
between them.
Allison's application of the models was for post-
crisis analysis. He was thus able to take advantage of
historical data to gain his insights. These sources were
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rich and abundant with regard to United States decision
making and the intelligence that supported that effort.
The same could not be said for the conduct of the same pro-
cesses by the Soviet politico-military system. In parti-
cular, his comments with regard to interaction pertinent
to Models II and III had to be inferred from the histor-
ical events that represented the results of that inter-
action, rather than from intimate knowledge of the interaction
itself
.
Use of the models in a current crisis situation to
determine how an adversary might react to the evolving
situation poses an entirely different problem. Employment
of the rational decision making model would have to be
made with care to ensure that the rationality used was
that appropriate to the adversary's culture and way of
thinking, rather than using a mirror image of one's own
appreciation of the situation. The data required for
employment of Models II and III is extremely difficult to
collect from a closed system such as the Soviet Bloc.
This is not to imply that the United States Intelligence
Community does not collect information relative to the
concepts expressed in the Allison analytical framework,
only to imply the difficulty of penetrating the Soviet
system with regard to these requirements. Every bit that
becomes available is collected and analyzed as the op-
portunity presents itself. Analysis of the organizational

21
process within the Soviet military-industrial complex has
received particular attention in conduction with techno-
logical forcasting efforts, while political and military-
personalities are the principal subjects of an extensive
biographic intelligence collection and production effort
conducted by the community.
The Politico-Military Aspects
Examples pertinent to Allison's models are included
in the discussion that follows concerning the politico-
military aspects of the crisis management process. These
examples are intended to highlight some of the constraints
that channel both decision making and implementation ef-
forts toward particular courses of action in a crisis
situation. The discussion addresses the following prob-
lems: political pressures, organizational inertia, in-
fluence of the participants, alliance commitments, military
capabilities, strategy and doctrine, and crisis management
imperatives
.
For an example of the role of bureaucratic organiza-
tional analysis in technological forecasting, see Dimitry
N. Ivanoff and Frank M. Murphy "A Methodology for Techno-
logical Threat Projections of Soviet Naval Antiship and
Surface to Air Missile Systems", Paul J. Murphy, ed., Naval
Power in Soviet Policy
,
(Washington, D.C.; United States
Air Force" 1973J , pp. 136 - 137. Similar work incorporating
a more detailed emphasis on the bureaucratic structures and
politics of the Soviet research and development community
has been conducted at the Naval Postgraduate School since
1975 under the direction of Professors Russell H. Stolfi




The Kennedy Administration was in a particularly
vulnerable position with regard to the Cuban situation in
1962. The failure of the Bay of Pigs had left them
seeming indecisive and public consciousness relative to
United States security interests vis-a-vis Cuba had been
heightened. The Republicans were quick and long at point-
ing to his Bay of Pigs failure and to the need for sterner
measures concerning the current Soviet military buildup
in Cuba.
Allison cites the Republican reaction to the evolv-
ing events as the classic illustration of the effect of
the "backdrop". In this instance, it took the form of the
loyal opposition and Congressional committees on policy
making. The Administration became pinned down on the
issue of. a response to the Soviet initiatives narrowing
the President's options to the point where he had to decide
to go beyond responding with only diplomatic moves.
Organizational inertia
President Kennedy may have believed that he was a
unitary decision maker and that all of his decisions would
be translated into comparable action. Prior to the Cuban
Missile Crisis, he twice had ordered the removal of Jupiter
medium range ballistic missiles from Turkey. He was
Allison, Essence of Decision, pp. 189-190.
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absolutely dismayed when during the crisis he discovered
the missiles were still in place. Politico-military ma-
neuvering between United States government agencies and
Turkey was the cause. This included significant poli-
tical pressure by Turkey to maintain the missiles' pre-
sence. Given this circumstance, he was now faced by the
question: If he struck the Cuban sites and the Soviets
replied in kind in Turkey, would he be forced to escalate
the situation more rapidly? Had the Jupiters been removed
in accordance with his orders, this issue would no longer
have been relevant to the current crisis.
Influence of the participants
Robert Kennedy and Robert McNamara were gravely
concerned over the potential nuclear consequences of the
situation. Would this be the time that Khrushchev would
force an insane reaction bringing severe consequences to
the entire world? On the other side of the issue were the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, who believed that now was the time
to deal with the issue of ridding the Americas of Castro's
Communism. Other advocates of military action, such as
Dean Acheson, Paul Nitze, Douglas Dillon and John McCone,
saw the security of the United States and this nation's
leadership of the free world as the issues dictating prompt







blockade. He was joined by both Robert Kennedy and
Theodore Sorenson. It was these three men with whom the
President had the greatest affinity. This affinity, added
to the belief by the Joint Chiefs that a surgical air
strike was impractical because there were no guarantees
that all missiles would be neutralized, plus consideration
of the military alternative of massive offensive action,
all lead to the active consideration of a blockade and
its eventual implementation.
Allianc e commi tments
Ole R. Holsti, one of the principal researchers in-
vestigating international interaction during crises over
the last thirty years, points out that alliance commit-
ments are another factor that can compound an immediate
situation. Such commitments may present a "heads you win,
tails I lose" dilemna. Holsti feels that two separate
distinctions should be made by decision makers with regard
to such commitments. First, he strongly believes that pre-
existing commitments should be differentiated from those
desperately taken to bolster the credibility of one's own
policy. Second, and more important, he states that pledges
to nations both willing and able to defend their own
security should be taken more seriously than assistance






and popular support. Thus the relevant issues with regard
to alliances are where and when to take the stand.
Military capabilities
Holsti also points out that military capabilities,
be they either awesome or vulnerable, contribute signifi-
cantly to the intensity of a crisis situation. With re-
gard to the attributes of modern weapons of speed, range
and destructive capacity; he believes they stimulate an
inclination for a first strike in order to destroy the
adversary's capacity to respond. Vulnerable forces, on
the other hand, provide no incentive to policy makers what-
soever to delay a response. The pressure is to employ them
before they are destroyed by the enemy. He also cautions
that policy makers must recognize that the military in pro-
viding advice have the responsibility to project beyond
the confines of the current situation to what should be
done should the crisis evolve to actual hostilities. Thus,
they must plan so that their forces will not be caught at
a disadvantage and must seek actions that will gain the
advantage over the other side, or at least neutralize
enemy forces before it is too late.
Factors that Holsti believes can mitigate against
these pressures include increases in quantities of
The examples presented by Holsti in this chapter were
drawn from his section on "Policy Options" in Crisis Es -
calation War
,
(London and Montreal: McGill-Queen' s Uni-




weapons, dispersal of forces, hardening of retaliatory
sites, concealment and mobility of strategic weapons
systems. He goes further to state, however, that while
these steps may be necessary for deterrence; he does not
regard them as sufficient. The key factor does not de-
pend upon the capacity of a nation's forces, but on the
intentions of the nation's leaders with regard to their
use. He believes that policy makers must perceive that
the risks of immediate military response in a given
situation are outweighed by the value of a delaying strat-
egy. They must also credit their adversary with the
same perception. Otherwise, an inclination for haste in
employing the military option will only be reinforced by
the perceived military capacity to achieve one's objec-
tives or secure the initial advantage.
Strategy and doctrine
These factors can act as serious constraints on
the numbers of options that policy makers have available
to them. This proposition goes directly back to Allison's
Model II. The capabilities and programs developed by
the military are tied directly to the prevailing strategy
and doctrine. Evolving technology also contributes by
rapidly rendering current plans and programs obsolete.
Thus, the repertoires and standard operating procedures
in place may not provide the policy maker with flexible
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response in a crisis. Holsti contrasts the locked step
escalation tied to the prevailing strategies and doctrine
in 1914, which led to World War I, with the wide range of
means that both President Kennedy and Premier Khruschev
had at their disposal to convey their will and intent with-
out provoking direct nuclear confrontation in 1962.
Defensive strategy and doctrine are plagued with
particular problems. Wohlstetter points out that both
intelligence predictions may be in error and enemy moves
may be reversed when detected. These factors exact a
heavy price on the capacity of the defense to react to
every indicator. Full alerts are costly measures. Their
continuous exercise not only dissipates available re-
sources, but also they detract from the significance
attached to succeeding alerts by participating personnel.
Strong defensive action, on the other hand, may be taken
by the enemy as an overt aggressive act. In 1914 according
to Holsti, the act of mobilization meant war as the next
logical step in the escalation process. Thus, this op-
tion was denied effectively to the decision maker who con-
ceived of it as a defensive measure to indicate prepared-
ness to an adversary.
Crisis management imperatives
Holsti offers six imperatives which he believes
nWohlstetter, Pearl Harbor, pp. 394-395.
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lead to effective crisis management. The first is that
sensitivity should be directed toward the enemy's frame
of reference. This means empathy, not appeasement. Such
sensitivity should include consideration of the following
factors: his motivation, possible bureaucratic pressure
that may impinge upon his decision making, and operational
codes that may dictate his strategies. The second im-
perative he believes is the real diplomatic test. Do not
take steps that will seal off escape routes. Related
tasks include convincing the enemy that gestures of good-
will are genuine and devising stragegies of coercive
diplomacy that precipitate deescalation, rather than es-
calation. The third imperative reinforces the second.
Remember that reducing the enemy's incentive to escalate
will probably require both threats and inducements in com-
bination to produce the desired effect. The role of de-
terrence is to convey to opponents that certain options
are unacceptable, while that of diplomacy is to define
the alternatives and persuade the opponent that these are
in his self interest. The fourth imperative directly
supports the third. In crisis diplomacy, as in other
forms of communications, actions tend to speak louder than
words. For maximum impact it is useful to orchestrate
declarations of intent and action. In doing so, employ
multiple channels of communication to convey the same mes-
sage whether it is one of deterrence, conciliation, or a
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combination of the two. The fifth imperative relates to
the intense pressures decision makers feel in the crisis
environment. Both sides should make every effort to slow
the pace of events. The sixth imperative is that respon-
sible policy makers should be in control of not only stra-
tegic decisions, but also of the details of implementa-
tion. This dictum is to ensure that those who must im-
plement the decisions are in consonnance with and do not
detract from formulated objectives, strategy and tactics
when executing the policy maker's orders.
Holsti remains optimistic that crisis management
can proceed rationally. He concludes by outlining fac-
tors that make a crisis manageable:
"In summary, the pressures of time in crisis
and consequently the probabilities of uncon-
trolled escalation, may be reduced if both
sides possess weapons capable of withstanding
any first strike, if military doctrines stress
the importance of delay rather than haste in
the employment of military force, and if both
sides possess sufficiently varied capabilities
that each military deployment need not be in-
terpreted as a prelude to attack. "12
The Systems Approach
Definition of a System
A system is a holistic concept. The key to its or-
ganization is based upon the interrelationships between
the whole and its separate component parts and between
Holsti, Crisis, p. 237.
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the individual component and all other components
. A
system is conceived in terms of a holistic organization
whose parts are arranged or positioned within a dimen-
sional domain. It is not a question of whether the whole
is greater than its parts, for this implies an aggre-
gating process. System formulation is of an entirely
different genre. In aggregates, it is significant that
parts are added. In systems, it is significant that parts
are arranged. The dimensional domain not only separates
the parts, but also it particpates in the formulation of
the system. Thus, the system cannot be derived from its
parts because it is an independent framework into which
the parts are placed. The parts do not enter into connec-
tion based upon their inherent qualities, but primarily
by means of their positions within the system. It is the
fact that parts participate on the basis of their posi-
tional value rather than their inherent qualities that
makes the whole relatively independent from the nature of
its parts. The relevance that the inherent qualities of
the parts takes depends upon the requirements for speci-
fic attributes. In fact, while some attributes of a part
make it particularly suitable for a position within the
system, other attributes that it may possess may be en-
tirely irrelevant to the needs of the system. The greater
the organization of the whole, the greater the role the
inherent qualities of the parts assume toward becoming
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co-determinates of positional values. The concepts of
the whole and the system are distinguished as follows:
The whole designates the concrete, organized object. The




C. West Churchman, a principal advocate of the sys-
tems approach, states that its purpose is as follows:
"The management scientist's aim is to spell out in
detail what the whole system is, the environment
in which it lives, what its objective is, and how-,/
this is supported by the activities of its parts."
Churchman goes on to outline five basic considera-
tions that one must keep in mind when seeking the meaning
of a system. These included (1) the total system's objec-
tives and performance measures; (2) the system's environment,
the fixed constraints; (3) the resources of the system;
(4) the components of the system, their activities, goals and
performance measures; and (5) the management of the system.
System objectives
Churchman contrasts two categories of system
13 These concepts were developed by A. Angyal and are





(New York: Penguin Books, 1978), pp. 17-19.
The purpose of and analytical criteria for the systems
approach were extracted from C. West Churchman, The Sys -
tems Approach
,




pp. 29-30 . Churchman's discussion of the analytical cri-




objective, the stated versus the real. This dichotomy
corresponds to the sociological concepts manifest and
latent, which normally apply to the analysis of functions.
Real objectives may become obscured by stated ones due to
the motivation of the organization and its spokesmen.
The stated objectives are usually couched in such terms
so as to make them as palatable as possible to the pub-
lic or whatever audience in the environment from whom
the organization is seeking support. The best way to dis-
tinguish between the stated and the real is to focus upon
the system's activities rather than relying exclusively
on the pronouncements of its spokesmen.
As illustration of these concepts, Churchman offers
the following examples: The stated objective of a medi-
cal laboratory might be to make as accurate tests as
possible. The real objective relates to the purpose for
striving for accuracy. This is to assist the physician
to arrive at the proper diagnosis of his patient's prob-
lem. A university president appears before the legisla-
ture and speaks of the quality of his institution, his
distinguished faculty, and the service faculty research
renders to the public. He speaks in prestige terms in
order to obtain as large a share of the budget as he can.
The primary purpose of his institution is not, however, to
develop quality facilities, produce distinguished faculty,
or promote faculty research. It is to educate the
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generation reaching adulthood that will replenish the pro-
fessions of the society. Fortunately, in this case, the
stated objectives are necessary to achieving the real ob-
jective; but they may not be sufficient.
He also makes an important distinction between the
real and legitimate objectives of a system. Legitimate
objectives are related to the morality and ethics of a
system's practices. For an objective to be legitimate,
it must be consistent with the welfare of the society of
which the system is but one part. Above all, the prac-
tices the objective fosters must not breach the ethical
values of that society. The formulation of legitimate
objectives, thus, requires expansion of consideration
beyond what might be considered as efficient performance
measures. Churchman regards it to be irresponsible to
limit performance measure consideration to questions of
efficiency because this fails to perceive the total im-
pact of system activities upon the society. Legitimate
objectives must be made explicit in order to achieve sat-
isfactory ways of thinking about the ramifications of the
system's activities for society in general.
The following example illustrates these concepts:
The performance measures for a freeway system are designed
in terms of the numbers of cars that may pass over spe-
cified segments of that system in a given period. While
such measures may be efficient from a quantitative point
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of view, they do not take into consideration the social
costs in a qualitative sense. These costs of achieving
the required thruput can be measured in such terms as
the number of potential accidents, the amount of poten-
tial congestion, and the ugliness of the freeway systems
per se. All are part of the social equation. These fac-
tors thus place the engineering performance measures in proper
perspective. Churchman believes it only to be a rational-
ization to state that these costs are elusive and cannot
be defined with precision. He states that they must be
considered in the calculation.
The environment
The concept of the environment might be best illus-
trated by the use of a Venn diagram from set theory as shown
in Fig. 3. The environmnet is contained by the box and
includes everything that lies outside the circle that cir-
cumscribes the particular set that represents the system
concerned, set A in this case. Thus the environment lies
outside the system. It includes not only physical charac-
teristics and properties, but also competing systems. In
this regard, the environment may be thought of as a larger
system with numerous subsystems as components. In Churchman's
terms, the environment provides the things and activities
with which the system must deal. Although these may vary in
form and degree from time to time, from the individual





Fig. 3. Systems and Their Environment
Systems thinking is expansionistic . When consider-
ing a problem, the system's analyst regards it as a com-
ponent or subsystem of a larger system. Then he expands
the scope of his inquiry to consideration of the larger
system to determine its relationship to the given sub-
system and the interrelationship among all subsystems in-
volved. In Fig. 3, the problem might be represented by
set A. This component is a subsystem of both the larger
interlocking systems represented by the intersecting sets
B and C. Logically, the inquiry could continue to be ex-
panded to the limits of the environment, perhaps the
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universe. In this case, that would include considera-
tion of sets D through H and the null set. It probably
would be sufficient, however, to limit consideration of
A's environment to that contained in sets B and C as
having the most direct influence over the structure, con-
tent and activities of A as a functioning system. The
analysis would also include examination of the components
of A, their structure, content and activities within that
system
.
Inferences concerning the environment's influence
upon the individual systems it contains also may be drawn
from Fig. 3. The aggregation of resources and activities
stemming from the numerous larger and competing systems
in the environment will always outnumber the resources
and activities that any one individual system can employ
and conduct. The greater weight of these multiple re-
sources and activities establish natural constraints upon
the individual system to act legitimately in accordance
with the goals and objectives that are prevalent within
the given environment.
Some examples of how the fixed constraints estab-
lished in the environment act to influence the structure,
content and activities of individual systems include the
following: A naval commander may have to limit the extent
of his operations due to the meteorological and sea con-
ditions forecasted for a given period. If he is conducting
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amphibious operations, the number of men and material
that; may pass over the beach in a given period will be
constrained by the physical characteristics of the beach
or harbor and its approaches. The adversary's military
system with whom the commander must compete will also
limit accomplishment of his objectives to the extent of
the number and kinds of forces that the adversary system
has allocated to defend the beach. The commander has
competed in turn with other components within his mili-
tary system for the resources he has available to him for
the operation. These resources have been allocated by
higher decision makers within that system. The amount
these decision makers had to allocate to all of their
component subsystems depended upon fixed constraints es-
tablished by the still larger political system such as
budget controls set in law for the given period.
Sys tern res ources
As noted above, the system has to compete, within
the environment for the. resources that it acquires . Once
these are obtained, however, the decision makers con-
trolling the system have discretion over how these re-
sources will be allocated to and employed by the activities
of the component subsystems. Allocation decisions are
based upon how these resources can be employed most effi-
ciently and how they can be developed to ensure expanded
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capabilities for the system. Churchman views resources
as not only the people and material available to the sys-
tem, but also as other factors that do not appear in the
balance sheets such as the educational background and
professional skill of the personnel concerned, the good-
will the system has established within the environment
over time through its activities or lack of such good-
will, and the opportunity costs of selecting various
courses of action over potential alternatives. These
other factors add or detract from the effort as the sys-
tem's basic resources are employed and developed through
its activities. In summary, to Churchman, resources are
the general reservoire out of which specific actions of
the system are shaped.
Subsystems
In discussing the components of a system, Churchman
avoids focusing on traditional organizational structure.
He prefers instead to emphasize functional definitions
of these components that relate the activities of each
part to specific missions, jobs and tasks assigned for
the pursuit of the system's goals. He believes that it
is only in such a manner that the worth of subsystem
activities can be measured. Further, he states that it
is critical to know if the activity of one component is
better than the activity of another component. The measure
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of performance mast be assessed in terms of how component
activity increases the overall performance of the system.
When performance measures of components are established
separately without due regard for their consistency with
total system objectives, this stimulates component com-
petition for system rewards at the expense of other
components and the system itself.
Management of the system
Management functions to perform three broad areas
of responsibility according to Churchman. These include
setting the system's goals , allocating its resources, and
controlling the performance of the system, to achieve its
objectives. Management establishment of subsystem goals
has to ensure consistency with the system objectives if
the subsystem goals are to be constructive ones. Since
resources are limited, they must be allocated to permit
subsystems to achieve their established goals in such a
manner that will optimize total system performance. If
the goals of the subsystem are not within the capabilities
of its allocated resources, either the resource alloca-
tion must be reassessed or the subsystem goals must be
adjusted downward to be more realistic.
Control relates to the monitoring and evaluating of
the performance of the system and its separate components.
Churchman believes this to be the most critical aspect of
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management. He points out the difficulties of devising a
plan that establishes perfectly correct objectives, takes
into account all environmental factors, precisely allo-
cates all resources, and recognizes the ultimate functions
of all components. Essential to the control function is
the cybernetic loop through which information concerning
system performance is fed. The flow of information
through this loop must be both timely and accurate for
the system to perceive and react in an optimal fashion by
implementing adjustments to the plan that may be required.
In this regard, Churchman points out that control implies
not only considering whether the system is operating
according to plan, but also, and even more critical
,
whether the plan itself remains a realistic pursuit' of
system objectives.
The manag ement system
Turning once again to another primary researcher in
the systems field, Russell L. Ackoff, management itself
is regarded as a system. Paralleling the Churchman dis-
cussion above, Ackoff asserts that the management compo-
nent of the system serves to perform four funcitons
:
(1) identify problems, (2) make decisions, (3) control the
decisions made, and (4) provide the information required
to perform the first three functions. Fig. 4 diagrams the
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Fig. 5. The Decision Cycle
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the management system and how they function. These com-
ponents include: (1) the decision-making subsystem.
(2) the information subsystem, (3) the problem-identifi-
cation subsystem, and (4) the metacontrol subsystem.
These four subsystems function to complete the pro-
cesses that are associated with the decision cycle of an
adaptive learning control system. This cycle is shown in
figure 5. The evolution of these processess is stimu-
lated by plans for pursuit of system objectives that are
formulated by the decision-making subsystem. These plans
should not only establish the milestones leading to each
objective and the performance measures associated with
each milestone, but also the expected effects of these
milestone decisions in terms of the problems anticipated
while proceeding toward each milestone.
The role of the information subsystem in these pro-
cesses is to generate performance indices and data that
will assist the identification of symptoms and pro. symptoms.
Ackoff defines a symptom as a deviation of a system's be-
havior from what is considered to be normal behavior.
See "The Components of a Management System", Appendix
in Russell L. Ackoff, Redesigning the Future, (New York:
John Wiley and Sons, 1974), pp. 229-236. Fig. 4 was taken
from p. 230
.
The author based the illustration of: the decision cycle
shown in Fig. 5 upon Ackof f ' s definition of that cycle in
Russell L. Ackoff, A Concept of Corporate Planning, (New




Presymptoms , he calls omens. These are predictors of fu-
ture symptoms . The technology that can be programmed into
the information system to detect and provide alerts to
such deviations is that of both statistical and quality
control. Other factors that may be programmed into the
system include analysis of past and current performance of
the system being controlled, the performance of other sys-
tems like it for the sake of comparison, and data con-
cerning the environment of the controlled system. \7hile
Ackoff does not hesitate to point out that the program-
ming of this technology and these factors might be within
the capability of current automated systems; this does
not imply that the selection of proper performance measures
and indices for use in symptom surveillance can be auto-
mated. This selection effort requires the application of
17
enlightened human judgment.
The identification of the problem by that management
system component is built upon the symptom/presymptom iden-
tification process. The next step in the process requires
comparison of the acuual state of affairs reported by the
information system to the anticipated state of affairs pro-
jected in the plan. This memory and comparison step is
the function of the metacontrol subsystem. Mismatches of
expectations and actual outcomes are then explained. The
symptom identification and comparison steps form the
17Ackoff, Future, p. 231
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diagnosis segment of the decision cycle.
The process of prescription, which completes that
cycle, is the responsibility of the decision-making sub-
system. This effort entails transformation of decisions
into instructions or directives that are implemented by
the components of the controlled system to deal with the
problems identified in accordance with the current diag-
nosis. The information subsystem can assist this process.
It can be employed as a device for transmitting the in-
struction, monitoring the effect of its implementation,
and providing feedback through the problem identification
and metacontrol subsystems to the decision-making subsys-
tem concerning the results of the problem solving effort.
The solution sought is the optimal. This is defined by
Ackoff as consisting of those values of the controlled
variables that, within the specified constraints and under
the relevant uncontrolled conditions, yield the best
performance of the system.
Systems involved in
international crises
Fig. 6 applies these system concepts to analysis of
nations participating in international politico-military
activities. The circles denote the systems of the nations






Fig. 6. The International Politico-Military
Environment
A - The international politico-military
activities
system
B & C - Two national politico-military
systems involved
in a crisis




these individual systems. Two basic types of sy seems are
illustrated in the figure. The large system A is the sys-
tem of international politico-military activities. Its
environment includes all the nations of the world. While
each national politico-military system and its environ-
ment is in the international politico-military environment,
the politico-military activities are divided between those
conducted within the international politico-military activ-
ities system (A) and those conducted internally within
their own national politico-military environments
.
For purposes of illustration, the Intersecting sets
B and C represent two nations involved in an international
crisis. The national politico-military systems represented
by sets D through F are not presently involved in the cri-
sis. Thus, the situation of each individual nation can be
considered a fluid one as it moves through the interna-
tional politico-military environment. At times it inter-
locks with the politico-military system of another nation
and tensions heighten. Most of the time, hopefully, such
interlock does not occur and the nations of the world par-
ticipate in international politico-military activities on
a more routine basis.
Note that not only do the systems of nations B and C
interlock when in a crisis situation, but also the environ-
ments of these national politico-military systems intersect
This fact illustrates a significant difference between the
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problem situation confronting the management: subsystem of
these two contending national politico-military systems
and the problem situation addressed by Ackof f and shown in '
Fig. 4 on page 41. The latter problem situation is appli-
cable to a closed system and its open environment. Essen-
tially the management subsystem in this case formulated a
plan of action and then controlled component activities
to conform to the plan of action. The process included
monitoring of the performance of the activities of the
controlled system and its environment to detect deviations
from the plan, diagnosing the problems they pose to sys-
tem objectives, and issuing prescriptions to components of
the controlled system to take corrective action.
In the international crisis case, the politico-
military systems of the two nations involved are closed
systems subject to the control of each nation's respective
management subsystem. Portions of each nation's national
politico-military environment during the period of the
crisis, however, include portions of both the opposing
nation's politico-military environment and politico-
military system. Since it lies in the first nation's en-
vironment, the politico-military system of the opposing
nation is not subject to the control of the first nation's
management subsystem. Further, because the system of inter-
national politico-military activities is also part of both
nations' larger environment, it is not: subject to the
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control of their respective management subsystems.
Thus, the management subsystem of a national politico-
military system operating within the system of international
politico-military activities must; monitor the performance
of the system it controls. Further, it must monitor the
performance of other nation's politico-military systems as
they operate within the system of international politico-
military activities. Finally, it must monitor other
factors and activities within the international politico-
military environment. The presympton/ symptom identifica-
tion process necessary for the detection and diagnosis of
problems associated with crises in their nascent phase is
a significantly complex effort. The management subsystems
of individual nations are confronted with the activities of
numerous uncontrolled systems rather than having only to
monitor and diagnose problems relative to their own con-




Ackoff believes that designers of management infor-
mation systems frequently make assumptions about the func-
tions of these systems that contribute to the inability of
mary to provide the support the manager needs in practice.
He outlines five erroneous assumptions as follows: (1) The
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need is for more information. (2) The manager neods what,
he wants. (3) The supplying of information improves desi-
sion making. (4) Information increases communication.
(5) The manager does not have to know how an information
19
system works, only how to use it.
The need is for more information
The manager is much more likely to suffer from an
overabundance of information that stifles his ability to
perceive and respond to the relevant . Two of the most im-
portant functions that an information system can provide
are filtration (or evaluation) and condensation. While
the information system must highlight the relevant to be
efficient, Ackoff also points out that it must be capable
of processing unsolicited information as well as Che in-
formation specifically solicited by the manager. Thus, to
provide information required to deal with the current prob-
lem, the system must also contain information relevant to
the essential context of problems with which the manager
may have to deal. This further implies that the system
be capable of sorting out information relevant to the
current problem from the data base constructed to contain
information relevant to the entire, context of problems.
With regard to crises, Holsti addresses the questions
of how to define both information needs relevant to the
1 9Ackoff, Corporat e Planning, pp. 113-122

context of problems and the information relevant to the 51
given problem. Carrying the assumption of information
overabundance one step further, he states:
"At minimum, sound judgments about intentions
1 and motives require adequate information.
.
.
The problem of information, then, is more likely
to be qualitative than quantitative ... Perhaps
even more important than raw information is a
valid theory to give it meaning and relevance;
rarely do the facts speak for themselves . A
single fact or even a set of data is usually con-
sistent with several theories. It is quite prob-
able that most international disasters can be
traced not to the inadequate information, but
rather to the absence of adequate models into
which to place the facts. "20
Holsti here is expressing the need for a framework
for analysis that assists sorting the information relevant
to the given problem from that contained in the data base.
•Such an analytical framework should be based upon the crit-
ical information requirements of the manager if it is to
be successful in contributing to effective organization of
the information within the data base. The sort process
should start with information parameters that can be at-
tributed directly to the requirements of the given problem.
This process should also include the capability to expand
upon this initial query and retrieve additional data as
new parameters of the problem are perceived and come into
play.
The manager needs what he wants






information is required until an explanatory model of the
decision process can be constructed and tested. One must
take into account the other management system components
if he is to be successful in designing an effective in-
formation system component. Thus, the development of a
valid information theory that specifies information re-
quirements and provides a framework for analysis also
requires modelling of the entire decision cycle that high-
lights the functioning of the other components of the
management system beyond addressing only the functioning
of the information system alone.
The supplying of inf ormat ion
improves decision nailing
Decision making does not automatically improve as a
result of the information supplied to the manager. The
problem is that the information provided may suggest many
alternative solutions . Even if provided with perfect and
complete information, the manager may not be able to rely
upon his judgment and intuition alone to optimize his
choices of courses of action from the many alternatives
indicated. A key to assisting the manager to perform when
faced with this kind of a dilemma is determining first how
well the particular manager uses information. The infor-
mation system should be designed to provide him feedback
concerning how well he is performing and, in particular,
how the implementation of his decision is contributing to
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resolution of the problem. If provided with such a capa-




Ackoff believes that this assumption relates to an
organizational effect of information systems. He states
that the assumption implies that more information provided
to the components of an organization will increase automat-
ically the communication among them. He extends the as-
sumption to mean that more communications means better per-
formance by the separate components. In this regard, he
warns that organizational components may have inappropriate
performance measures that stimulate competition among them
for rewards and detract from the accomplishment of organi-
zational objectives. Better communication between compo-
nents in such a case may not help overall performance. In
fact, it might well hinder it by making the components more
knowledgeable concerning the status of the competition and




es not have to know
how an information system works
,
onl y how to~use it
Ackoff believes that it is imperative that an infor-
mation system should never be installed unless the manage-
ment it serves understands how it operates well enough to
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evaluate its performance. Management must control the
computer and not be subject to control by the system.
Serving the manager
Summarizing the concepts developed to date, it can
be said that the information system that best serves man-
agement is one that generates indicators and performance
data that permit detection of problems at the symptom and
presymptom stage. Further, it provides. the capability to
compare actual performance and outcomes with that projected
in the plan. This process is accomplished by organizing
the data base on the basis of specified information require-
ments and developing information management theory that both
provides a framework for analysis and models. the function-
ing of all management system components. Such an informa-
tion system will include sort capabilities that allow focusing
on the parameters directly attributable to the current prob-
lem with additional capabilities to expand the retrieval to
capture information relevant to new parameters of the prob-
lem as they are perceived and come into play. Thus, with
regard to Ackof f ' s model, the information system serves as
management 's institutional memory and consciousness to increase
the sensitivity with which the management system can per-
ceive problems and opportunities. Further, it serves to
increase the sensibility with which management responds to
the reaction that has transformed the controlled system's
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internal state as a result of stimuli generated by both
that system's activities and activities in the environment.
21An Information System for Crisis Management
The information managemen t theory
Charles A. McClelland working at the University of
Southern California developed the relevant information
theory upon which one of his associates later based a pro-
posal for a technological solution to the crisis decision
making problem. In contrast to Allison's study of the in-
ternal characteristics of nations in crises, McClelland 's
work examined the patterns of interaction that nations
establish in their relations with one another. He ex-
pressed the view that nations responding to one another
develop a pattern of escalation that eventually leads to
situations called crises which neither of the nations
involved want or can control. McClelland theorized that
empirical indicators could be identified that would signal
when nations were preceeding down the path toward a crisis.
Thus, warning to the decision makers involved could be pro-
vided if such indicators were detected and perceived in the
nascent phase of a crisis.
Design criteria
In seeking to operationalize McClelland 's theory,
21 Ronald G. Sherwin, "A Computerized Aid for International
Crisis Management" The Journal of Technology Transfer , Vol. 5,
No. 1, Fall 1980, pp. 5I-6B.
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Ronald G. Sherwin developed and proposed a compute;' based
;te ) that could serve as a crisis monitoring and anal-
ysis aid. The McClelland-Sherwin focus on the detection
of indicators parallels the concepts expressed by Ackoff
in the form of symptoms and pre symptoms . Sherwin further
i /signed his system to support ad hoc research efforts
that analysis and managers perform while seeking to diag-
nose and resolve crisis induced problems. He also fore--
v the need for the system to function as a tool for the
policy maker to monitor and convey the impact of his de-
ion upon the resolution of the crisis.
'
owo r -'- ^or ana i
y
s J- s
Sherwin believes that c i ig with a crisis must be
I I ted to fit its individual parameters and no single
o t -
1
he- shelf theory can be relied upon to explain all the
que aspects of a given crisis situation. Therefore.,
the information system supporting crisis decision making
must contain information that is as unconstrained as pos-
iible by any apriori assumption boul the dimensions of
crisis. He relied upon the descriptions in the
die media to provide near real time information con-
ning International politico-milit Lry c Lvities . He
used threi ; • incipal sources to cross validate one another
id prevent the generation of false alarms: tie Los Angeles
Timi ;, the .', • York Times, and The Times (London).
i s his an. Lytical Era leworl >n the concept
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of the "INTERNATIONAL EVENT". This he defines as "a dis-
crete instance of an official(s) of one country doing
something to another country's official (s) in an effort to
22influence the second country's policies." lie visualizes
three other elements to be documented with the event des-
cription in each record. These were DATE, ACTOR and TAR-
GET. Actors and targets represent the nations involved in
interaction. Recording of the date allows the records to
be appended to the file sequentially on a daily basis
without disturbing any of the previously collected infor-
mation. This satisfies the design criteria for uncon-
strained storage and organization of the data. Date docu-
mentation further assists the retrieval of other records
in the same time frame that may be relevant to the event
under consideration once its parameters have been identified
The analytical framework is then completed using
coding rules that seek to render events mutually exclusive.
The completed schema, shown in Table 1, encompasses 63 dis-
tinct types of governmental interaction that can be broken
down into 22 general event categories. Qualitative data
is included in each record and takes the form of a five
line textual summary. This summary ensures that the con-
23text of the event is retained in the system.
22
Ibid., pp. 54-55
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The following illustration contrasts the concept of
quantitative analysis with the concept of qualitative
analysis. The number 10 is a quantitative measure of Bo
Derek's beauty. The significance of that measure derives
from that, imparted by the number system itself. The as-
signment of the measure 10 only implies that the actress's
beauty rates higher than a 5 or a 7 . Ten only represents
the quintessence of beauty if that number is specified as
the top of the rating scale.
A qualitative measure of beauty would be formulated
in descriptive terms limited only by the richness and sub-
tlety of the language employed and the sensitivity of
' the
describer. The qualitative measure, thus, could proceed
farther towards capturing and refining the essence of
beauty than the quantitative measure which only summarizes
that essence succinctly.
Both quantitative and qualitative analytical support
capabilities are required in information systems that sup-
port crisis decision making. As research presented in this
thesis has already pointed out, the two measures complement
one another. The significance of the quantative measure
is that it can quickly flag deviations from the normal to
include indication of both the magnitude and direction of
those deviations. It must be remembered, however, that

60
the significance of the deviation indicated is derived
from that prescribed by statistical theory alone based on
Lative values in the number system. A qualitative: mea-
sure is required to place that deviation in the context
its substantive implications. This process requires de-
: led analysis of that substance and thorough compari-
son to other qualitative measures of similar circumstances.
Quanti tat ive analytical
support capabilities
Shcrwin employs a monitoring mechanism that is ac-
/ated upon data entry and a statistical package incor-
porated in the World Event Information Summary (WEISUM)
soJ a e to provide quantitative analytical support capa-
bilities Ln sis information system. The monitoring mecha-
les three quantitative measur s >f the level,
triety and degree of tension reflected by the international
events contained in the current data base. A z-sccre c<
the most recent thirty days 1 avera ictivity level
h preceeding levels of activity. An alarm is triggered
.
i
: the comparison yields a z-score that exceeds the norm
one standard deviation. The variety of tension factor
an ui i tainty measure kne 'el". This measure
ldres;.es deviations in the patterns of activity. It rep-
r
' enl ss attempt to provide isure of McClelland's
ept of the relations between nations coming unglued
th( proceed towards crisis. Sherwin believes that
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regardless of whether these three specific quantitative
measures prove to he the most reliable indicators of
crises, they do demonstrate that techniques for transforming in-
formation about elusive social phenomena into machine
readable data and empirical indicators are feasible.
The WEISUM program is used for posing ad hoc research
questions concerning the crisis in the form of data ma-
trices. Sherwin offers two examples. First, to analyze
the patterns of physical and or verbal hostility between
two nations (i.e., measure the increases and decreases in
such hostility) ; the analyst would develop the matrix with
periods of time as its row headings and what he defines as
physically hostile, verbally hostile, neutral and friendly
events as its column headings. These events would be
taken from the types of events outlined in Table 1. A
second example relative to the analysis of relations be-
tween two conflicting parties that Sherwin offers is the
construction of a matrix with the nations as actors
forming the row headings and the nations as targets
forming the column headings . Once the matrix is designed
by the analyst concerned, he then uses the graphical and
statistical support packages associated with the WEISUM






The software program known as Textual Scan ('TEXTS CAN)
providi s the information system with a qualitative, analy-
I Lea] mpport capability. TEXTSCAN employs keyword
searches of the textual summaries included with each
record. It also allovs the analyst to create subsets from
the larger data set that are applicable to the problem of
current interest based upon the qualitative data i n the
. tern. The use of TEXTSCAN, thus, enhances the capa-
bilities of "he monitoring and WEISUM packages by pro-
Lng a qualitative look at particular issues and con-
cepl key-word-in-context query capability also
permits expanded retrieval from the data base once 1 the




tLe± ient s i
i
pport capabilities
Data management in the Sherwin system is accompli shed
ugh the ase of interactive software known as GENENTRY
.
This package is adaptable formats that combine both
Lnal codes and textual data. It employs validation
i ibles to reject illegal codes and otherwise prevent: the
i Ltry of •' 1 gal data Into the syl It also provides
ors with such information as the date of the
mosl i ipdate, the number of envenl n the i idate,
and the new size oi h • .crall data sel
The system also includes an Executive Decision Aid
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Program to provide a crisis management adaptive learning
capability. The aid serves as an institutional memory
that allows scanning of historical precedents to reveal
options taken, problems encountered, and the successes
realized in previous crises. The data base upon which
the aid relies currently contains information relevant to
some 1100 crises and quasi-crises that have occurred since
World War II. The principal crisis selection criteria is
that either the United States, the Soviet Union, or the
People's Republic of China were involved in the event
either as an actor or a target. Beyond information con-
cerning the location, participants and context of each
crisis; this interactive file provides the results of
historical analyses that indicate what were the problems
that generated and perpetuated the crisis, what actions
were taken to resolve the crisis, and what were the con-
sequences of these actions. These factors then may be
applied to the current crisis for comparison with its
parameters and to help place the impact of potential
courses of action in their proper perspective.
Fig. 7 provides a flowchart depicting Sherwin's sys-
9 /
tern as it might be employed in an intelligence environment
.
Defense Intelligence Agency information reports and em-
bassy telegrams are indicated as the primary sources of
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information rather than the news media as employed in his
initial project. Several of Sherwin's students in their
graduate research have demonstrated the feasibility of
adapting these sources to the system. As noted in the
flowchart and in the discussion, the system permits func-
tions to occur simultaneously. The monitoring package is
continually active. Analytical questions supporting ad
hoc research projects may be posed to both the TEXTSCAN
and WEISUM packages . Tabular data contained in WEISUM is
linked to the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences
(SPSS) and to a Versatic Plotter to provide data manipu-
lation and output capabilities. Information from all
these programs is then melded with that obtained from the
Executive Decision Aid to complete the analytical and de-
cision making support provided by the system.
Prospectu s on the Naval
Warfare Analysis Experiment
The Naval Warfare Analysis Experiment (NAVWARANALEX)
is a research project undertaken by the author in January
1980 to develop an information theory appropriate to both
the analysis and management of data on naval warfare activ-
ities. Additional automatic data processing support capa-
bilities for the Navy's Ocean Surveillance Information
System (OSIS) are being sought through this project.
Chapter I outlined theories and methods obtained from
relevant research in the areas of threat detection/perception,
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crisis management, systems analysis and management infor-
; ion systems. Chapter II consists of a systems analy-
sis of the naval system with particular emphasis on the
intelligence system and the role of the intelligence
officer in that system. This analysis serves as a pre-
requisite to the design of an experimental data base and
automated programs to improve the performance of the
intelligence system. Chapter III describes the develop-
ment of the Soviet naval system and its activities, which
n monitored, analyzed and reported by OS IS. This chapter
provides the flavor of the threat Soviet naval activities
pose and indicates the scope of the information require-
ments applicable to an effective naval warfare data base
and it'j automated analytical support programs. Chapters
IV and V describe the naval warfare analytical and manage-
ment theories, the data base, design, and automated capa-
bilities developed in the project. Chapter VI concludes
the thesis by outlining a perspective of how NAVWARANALEX
results might be applied to OSIS
.

II THE INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM AND
THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
The focus of the thesis is reduced in this chapter
from support of decision making at the national level to
support of decision making at the naval level of the
politico-military system. Its purpose is twofold. First,
the chapter provides background for understanding the
kinds of problems that confront both the intelligence sys-
tem and the intelligence officer as he performs within
that system. Second, it highlights the areas in which
automatic data processing support may be applied to en-
hance the effectiveness of both the intelligence system
and the intelligence officer.
The chapter covers four major topics as follows:
(1) Systems of concern to the Naval Warfare Analysis Ex-
periment and their location within the system of inter-
national politico-military activities and the national
politico-military system. (2) The Intelligence system
and the intelligence cycle. (3) The role and self image
of the intelligence officer. (4) A system's view of
naval intelligence problem solving.
Systems of Concern to the Naval
Warf are~~A~na lysi s Experiment




primarily with two major systems and their component sub-
system From the system of international politico-
military activities, it is concerned with the system oJ
international naval force interaction. From the rational
politico-military system it is concerned with support of
the nazal management system.
The System of International
Naval Force Interaction
Loca tion an d arrang eme n
t
':': presents a different more detailed view of
the international politico-military envii nt that \
25
1 Lrsl shown in Fig. 6 on page 46. Here the systems and
some of the major subsystems that are included in that
environment are shown. The system of international naval
rce interaction represented by set F, is a component of
system of international military force interaction
represented by set C, which in turn is a component of
the system of international politico-military activities,
represented by set A. Since military activities are fre-
ently joint ventures, the system of international
naval force interactions intersects with both the system
international ground force interaction (set D) and the
stem of: international air force interaction (set E) .
The analysis of the systems in this chapter is based
upon the system's concepts and theories outlined ir







;. 8. Systems Within the International
Politico-Mili tarv Environment
A - System of international politico-
ruilitary activity t
B - System of international polil
interaction
I) -
System of International military
iction
. oJ international ground rce
i i teraction
System of international air fore
i ntei action
System of inten i iva] force
interaction
70
Fig. 9. The International Naval Environment
F - System of international naval force interaction
G - System of Soviet naval force interaction
H - System of United States naval force interaction
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fact that naval Eon es have air and ground components
.1 : o contributes to the formation of these intersecting
Fin Ly, because military interaction stems from
ted by political, objectives, there is a sig-
Lca.it int trsec Lion bet the lystem oi international
iction (set B) .'mi! the system of interna-
: onal mi i L1 Lry interaction (set C) including all its
uponents tie intersecting portion of sets B and C can
said to represent operational and representational ae-
i tries of national military forces in the system of
Interna tion< 1 politico-military activities. This would
Lude • " in addition to normal peacetime operations
:! joint exercises. e portion of set C that is not
t( i ; I by set B can be said to relate to the uni-
1 teral Lties of national military forces operating
; ii.i of international politico-military activ-
Les ;uch as training and resupply
.
;. 9 depicts the international naval environment
which international naval force interaction occurs.
'I physical characteristics of this environment would be
. ical and oceanographical with the geographical,
' ogra] md hydi phica] characteristics of the
c i . tal Ln i and near shore ilso coming into play. The
i Les of a given nation's naval forces would also be
pol l tico-military competion between na-





I th of hese i Lroi lenta] factors contribut*
ignifica y to the strm i e and content Df thi: system.
The ;ystems of interest to the Naval Warfare Analy-
: Experiment are components of the system of interna-
Lonal i i J : orce in i i tel Lon (set F) . : a. subsystems
2 the astern of Soviet nav i] Eorc< interaction (set G)
,
which is described in detail in Chapter III, and the sys-
tem of United States naval force interactions (set ii) .
They are represented as intersecting sets to highlight
the advei ' relationship between these two navies.
The Naval lanagement System
at i on_ and arrang erne i
i: LO depicts the United States politico-
iry environment. structure and content of this
ew Lronm< rit ave a gre ttei normal impact upon the opera-
i Lon of the politico-military system (set A) than any
physical environmental : >rs . The figure gives a de-
tailed view of the components of a national politico-
i
.
previously shown in Fig. 6 on page 46.
Ltary activities arc conducted by the defense system
i i( wi has the following three major components:
rh< tern (set C) , the air system (set D) , and
the i tern (set E) . te politico-military manage-
i. of primary interest to the Naval Warfare








Fig. 11. The Naval Management (F)
and Intelligence (M) Systems
Notes on Figs . 10 and 11
Politico - Military Level: A-Political System,
B-Defense System, C- Ground System, D-Air
System, E-Naval System
Naval Level: E-Naval System, F-Management System,
G-Operational System, H-Material System,
I-Research and Development System.
Management Level: F-Management System, J-Planning
and Programming System, K- Command, Control and
Communications (C, ) System, L- Information System
Ocean Surveillance and OSIS - From L, the Information
System: M-Intelligence System and N-Ocean
Surveillance Information System. From G, the





Fig. 10 also illustrates the complexity of the naval
system. The legitimate goals of this system include the
development of the doctrine, strategy, tactics, force
levels, readiness posture, platforms, weapons, sensors,
countermeasures and other capabilities required to meet
potential naval threats to the nation's security and
interests. These legitimate goals apply to the compo-
nents of the naval. system in varying degrees regardless
of whether they are located within the operations (set G)
,
material (set H) , or research and development (set I)
systems
.
Factors in the environment that have the most in-
fluence upon naval system activities include the larger
defense system, the federal political system, and its con-
stituency. Constraints upon the structure and content of
the naval system imposed from the environment result from
the competition within the defense system amongst its com-
ponents for personnel resources and material systems for
operations and support. The defense system's personnel
and material resources are, in turn, fixed annually by
law. This fixed allocation of resources is dependent upon
the perception at the national level of government of both
potential threats uo the nation's security and interests
and the relevance of defense missions to national goals
and objectives. Definition of goals and objectives re-
levant to the nation's security and interests results
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from considerable interaction both within the federal po-
litical system amongst its components and between the
federal political system and its constituency.
Functional description
The naval management system (set F) functions at the
departmental, material, research and development, and op-
erational/tactical levels of the Naval Establishment. Its
purpose is to establish goals and objectives for; compete,
acquire and program resources for; and direct and control
the activities of the naval system's (set E) major com-
ponents. These subsystems include the operational sys-
tem (set G) , the material system (set H) , and the research
and development system (set I) . These three components
are represented as intersecting sets because the latter
two function to support the operational system and its
activities. The research and development system is re-
sponsible for improving the state of the art with regard
to and managing the development of platforms, weapons,
sensors, hardware, countermeasures and other capabilities.
The material system is concerned with managing the pro-
duction of these resources and their distribution to the
operational system. The. operational system is concerned
with the maintenance of force levels and readiness posture,
tactical development and exercises to test doctrine and
strategy, the deployment of forces, and command and
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control oJ naval force operations and activities.
Man 'Client system components, as shown in Fig. 11,
in c Lude : the p 1ami i ng a nd pr o g r amm i ng s y s t em (set J )
,
3
the co-nmand , control and imunications (C ) system
(set K), the information . -stem (set L) , and the person-
nel magement system (set 0). These four subsystems are
represent d as intersecting sets because of the mutual
support and nteraction that is required for performance
of the m u anient system's function:-.. The planning and
pro. ra ring system is involved in the formulation of pol-
Lc] goal: , objectives, doctrine, strategy and programs,
it fur thei functions to program and allocate personnel
t aterial resources. These activities correspond to pol-
ls formulation functions performed by the decision-making
componenl iJ the man nent system shown in Fig. 4 on
page 41.
The information system contains components that are
responsible for monitoring and generating performance
I I i and Indices that identify problem symptoms and pre-
incerning both the naval system controlled by
: and the system of international naval force
inter i I at is an uncontrolled system located with-
l the n, /stem's onment . The component of t ie
rmat j ,'stem that monitors international naval
:e nteraction is ki >wn as the intelligence system
t . Th u an Surveillance Information System (OSIS)
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(set N) is the primary subsystem of the intelligence sys-
tem that performs this function with regard to the opera-
tional activities of all nations' naval, oceanographic
research, merchant, fishing and air fleets on, over and
under the oceans of the world.
The command, control and communications system
functions to perform the diagnosis and prescriptions
phases of the decision cycle shown in Fig. 5 on page 42.
These functions correspond to those performed by the
problem identification subsystem, the metacontrol sub-
system, and correction component of the decision-making
subsystem of the management system shown in Fig. 4. The
3
communications component of the C system provides the
channels for issuing instructions to and receiving inputs
from the controlled naval system. It also provides the
channel for inputs to and outputs from the information
system
.
The personnel management system is primarily con-
cerned with the implementation of personnel programs and
the distribution of personnel resources to the components
of the naval system. In addition to the resource alloca-
tion function; it conducts recruiting, training and educa-
tional functions in support of force level, readiness pos-




The Intellig ence System
Functional Description
The functions performed by the intelligence system
may be described in terms of a cyclical process whose end
result is the production and consumption of information
termed the intelligence product. This process is illus-
trated in Fig. 12. This product is consummed by compo-
nents located at all levels of the naval system: depart-
mental, material, research and development, operational
and tactical. The prime users are participants in the
various components of the management system; planning and
programming, command and control, training component of
the personnel system, and intelligence component of the
information system. The purpose of the product is to
provide analyses of the capabilities and activities of
the naval systems of the world. Capabilities analysis is
performed by the technical intelligence components of the
system, while activities analysis is performed by the op-
erational intelligence components of the system. The
Naval Warfare Analysis Experiment is concerned primarily
with the automatic data processing support of operational
intelligence analysis and the management of information
obtained through the Ocean Surveillance System (set P)
.
This system is a component of the operational system
(set C) . The intelligence (set M) component that proc-
esses, analyzes and disseminates ocean surveillance
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Fig. 12. INTELLIGENCE CYCLE
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intelligence is the Ocean Surveillance Information System
(set N) . Thus, it is located primarily within the inter-
section of set M with set G (operational/ intelligence sys-
tem intersect) . Certain ocean surveillance data also serves
as an input to and is passed by OSIS to technical intelli-
gence components of the intelligence system.
Tasking
The goals and objectives of the intelligence system
are formulated in terms of intelligence requirements in
the tasking or initial phase of the intelligence cycle.
These requirements may be articulated as long standing
objectives or in the form of specific gaps in the infor-
mation base that need to be satisfied in a particular
time frame. At the defense level, these requirements are
institutionalized in the form of Defense Intelligence
Agency DIA manuals. These manuals are issued in several
volumes and contain collection policy and guidance in
addition to the long term objectives themselves.
The process by which requirements are- developed is
an interactive one. It occurs at all levels of command
between the intelligence officer and the commander, op-
erator, planner or other manager that he is assigned to
serve. This process is best represented by the develop-
ment and promulgation of Essential Elements of Informa-
tion (EEI) . In theory, this set of requirements reflects

82
the knowledge the commander requires about his adversary
and the operational environment in order to execute his
mission successfully.
Collection
Once the tasking has been formulated through inter-
action between various command authorities and intelli-
gence agencies, the second phase of the cycle commences.
This includes collection and reporting against targets
specified by the tasking received. It is conducted by
various intelligence resources, sensor systems, and opera-
tional forces. Collection results may be disseminated
electrically via message, through written narrative re-
ports applicable to specific collection opportunities, or
through lengthy cruise and end of mission reports. The
written reports also forward sensor and other data for
processing and analysis by the technical intelligence
components of the intelligence system.
Processing
This phase of the cycle includes the assimilation,
organization and management of the incoming data. This
must be accomplished in some rational, systematic fashion
in order to facilitate analysis of that information. First,
the incoming data is differentiated according to estab-
lished priorities. Some of the data will be time sensi-
tive. Its substance is perishable and it may have to be
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disseminated rapidly if its contents are to have an im-
pact on the planning or control of an important operation.
The significance of the bits of information that require
immediate reaction must be recognized.
This filtering and alerting step is key to the suc-
cessful performance of any intelligence organization.
There is always the danger that the volume of information
received from collectors will obliterate the significant
bit required by the commander to reach a proper decision
concerning the current operation. Thus, the problem of
noise raised by Wohlstetter is contended with on a daily
basis in the processing phase of the intelligence cycle.
The volume of information received by intelligence process-
ing agencies is indeed substantial. Both national and
naval collection resources are vast in number and output.
Processing resources are limited by comparison. This
phase of the cycle requires all the automated assistance
it can get to maintain effective performance of the fil-
tering function and thus avoid breakdown of the system.
Analysis
Once incoming data has been filtered, digested and
organized; analysis can occur. The purpose of this phase
of the cycle is to determine the meaning of each new bit
of information by relating it to other bits contained in
the data base and to specific intelligence tasking.
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Attempts are made in such a manner to reduce the level of
uncertainty concerning the adversary capabilities and/or
activities being assessed. Additional filtering and alert-
functions are performed as new insights are gleaned
through this process.
Production
The analyst is vitally involved in development of
the intelligence product. Preparation of the product
must ensure that facts are differentiated from what has
been derived or inferred from the facts. It must sub-
stantiate the basis of all assumptions made in the analy-
sis. It must detail what remains uncertain. While much
of the analytical process may have been subjective in
nature due to the measures of uncertainty involved, the
presentation of the results in a product must be as ob-
jective as possible. To do less would hinder the com-
mander in the successful performance of his functions.
One should be aware of certain pitfalls that may
occur during the preparation of the product. The ten-
dency Wohlstetter described as focusing on data con-
firming expectations of enemy behaviour should be avoided.
Current facts should not be arranged to lend support to
the claims of previously disseminated analysis . The in-
telligence problem is a dynamic one. New bits may erase
See pp. 14 - 15 above

85
completely the relevance of previous conclusions as they
acid more certainty to what previously had been unknown or
reflect change in the situation. The product can only
reflect what was known at the time of its source. The
thrust of the analysis should shift as new bits provide
a different perspective. Finally, the specific intelli-
gence that pertains to the problem concerned should not
be obscured by burying it in the details of the analysis
or overshadowing it with the style of the presentation.
The significant results should be highlighted for the com-




The product may be developed as a briefing and dis-
seminated orally using visual aids. Such a setting may
provide direct interaction with the particular decision
maker and result in immediate feedback concerning his
questions and additional requirements. Other results may
be transmitted electrically in the form of . an intelli-
gence summary message or spot report. Still other
results may be written in the form of a study or publica-
tion. Standard publications are issued on a regular
basis in accordance with an established production sched-
ule and contain updated information produced directly
from the various intelligence data bases. If the partic-
ular consumer is linked to the production agency via
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nputer, di isemination is direcl ! this channel. For
other jo: i ars, these computerized products arc pro-
Ln batch mode, miniaturized, and then disseminated
i i microfiche form.
a; Lc problei n Lnhi rent Ln the productio
dissemii U Lon process. The first is the natural lag
le Late of the information and the time of
ceipt by the consumer concerned. This lag may already
subst . in some cases due to the time consummed in
the collection, processing and unlytical phases of the
Le. If the producer is an organizational component
the consumming command, additional lag stemming from
the p] 11 phase the cycle v. i 1 I be dependent on
thi oi intelligence resources ned co that com-
and their production c Lities . As noted in the
cus . )ove, the intelligence producer may be an in-
nt organization located within the information com-
: ?. management system and separated physically
onsumming audience in the operational, mater
j
aii and developme it o of the naval sys-
h such cases, lag caused by the length of produc-
tation activities is shortened only if
27
i ction on tim< en ;i : Lvil v and perishable
pp. 10 - 12.
9 Q
See pp. 79 -81 and Fig. LI on p. 74.

87
dissemination occurs in message form via the communica-
tions system or via computer links using these same
channels. The lag is lengthened when the intelligence
product is disseminated in written form via the mail or
courier systems. It is lengenthed even further when
reproduction and /or printing of the product is accom-
plished by a component that is both physically and organ-
izationally separate from the intelligence producer.
Thus, the difference between the date of information con-
tained in an intelligence product and the time of receipt
and use by the consumer may vary from minutes to months,
and in some cases, even years. The total length of the
lag relates directly to the complexity of the collection
efforL; the means of distribution from the collector to
the processing agency; and the amount of processing, anal-
ysis and production effort required. The lag is lengthened
further dependent upon the form of the product and its
dissemination means.
The second problem is related to the diversity of
the consuming audience spread throughout all levels of
the naval system and the variety of their individual intel-
ligence interests and requirements . Like the form of
the product, the form of dissemination should be tailored
to the particular consumer. The broader and more numerous
the consuming audience of a given product is, the more
difficult it is for the organizationally independent
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intelligence producer zo know the particular interests of
all the individual cor.suniers that make up that audience.
Even when the interests of the audience are known, it is
difficult to develop a coherent product that is also
tailored to all the various interests concerned. Further,
the more numerous the audience, the more complicated and
lengthy the dissemination process becomes unless messages
or computer links can be employed.
Thus, in many intelligence products what tailoring
that can be accomplished must be to what can be estab-
lished as the general need of the consuming audience
concerned. The format developed for the product then
becomes more dependent upon the form, content and organi-
zation of the data itself. Less and less attention can
be paid to reproducing the product in a number of formats
that would be particularly useful to individual consumers
without lengthening even further the production/dissemina-
tion process. The ideal solution would be to have all
consumers on-line with the data base and to provide each
consumer with the capability for formatting his own
reports. Today, not even all intelligence consumers are
on-line with the various intelligence data bases, files
and computer systems although the intelligence community




One method that the intelligence system has tradi-
tionally employed to deal with the two problems discussed
above relates to what the author considers as the last
phase of the cycle. Consumption is rarely mentioned in
intelligence literature as being part of the intelli-
gence cycle. A considerable portion of particularly the
Naval Intelligence Community's personnel resources are
devoted to this function, however. That consumption
should be considered an integral portion of the cycle
stems directly from the concept that intelligence is a
means to an end and not the end itself. It is a service
providing direct support to command. Supporting the com-
mander's decision making process by assisting it to be
conducted on a more rational, knowledgeable bases with
regard to information acquired on the adversary, his sys-
tem, its capabilities and activities is the service that
intelligence can provide. The effective use of that
information by the operational, material, research and
development, and management systems is the ultimate goal.
The intelligence system has assisted components of
the other naval systems to complete the consumption func-
tion by assigning intelligence resources to key levels of
command and integrating them directly with the organiza-
tions they serve. These resources then extract informa-
tion from the multiple intelligence products received by
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the particular consuming organization, synthesize the
results of this extraction effort and tailor them to the
needs of the particular commander, and then inject them
into the command planning and decision making process.
Thus, it is in the consumption phase of the cycle
that the critical interface between the intelligence sys-
tem and other naval system components occurs. It is in
this phase that the greatest amount of direct interaction
with the decision maker occurs. The value of the intel-
ligence product to particular consumers is assessed and
feedback to the intelligence system concerning that value
and additional intelligence requirements of the individ-
ual commanders concerned is provided through this
interactive process.
Successful performance of this role requires a par-
ticular sensitivity to the commander's needs, both his
stated needs already articulated and his real needs
represented by understanding of the context of problems
with which the commander must contend. As discussed pre-
29
viously, these real needs may be unsolicited ones. The
intelligence officer performing such a role must learn to
anticipate them. He employs his professional knowledge
29See Churchman on stated and real objectives, p. 32;
Ackoff and Holsti on MIS design criteria and framework for
analysis, pp. 50 - 55; and the description of Sherwin's
design of an information system for crisis management on
pp. 55 - 56.
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of the kinds of data the intelligence system can provide
and marries the results to knowledge of the operational
situation and the scope of the particular problem that he
gains through interaction with the commander and his
staff to complete this anticipatory process
.
The amount of interaction with key members of the
naval community that performance of this role requres
makes such an assignment a highly visible one and a most
satisfactory task to fulfill. A danger can arise, how-
ever, should the officer performing such a role succumb
to the delights of the attention and rewards he receives
as a result of his performance. If he focuses on
securing the rewards as his primary objective without
continuing to concentrate on perfecting the service he
provides and acquiring greater understanding of the opera-
tional problem concerned, he runs the risk of emphasizing
style of performance at the expense of content. Empha-
sizing only immediate personal satisfaction serves to
dilute his perspective. It detracts from the effective-
ness of the intelligence system and his own development
as a professional intelligence officer.
The results of the consumption phase is an unfold-
ing back into the tasking portion of the cycle. This
occurs through the feedback to the intelligence system
concerning the value of the product and additional con-
sumer requirements as described above. The cycle becomes
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whole with each segment positioned within the framework
provided by the organized whole as it functions to con-
tribute to pursuit of system objectives. The position of
each segment of the cycle is co-determined by the func-
tional requirements of the intelligence system that must
be met in order for it to fulfill its objectives and the
specific attributes and properties of components having
30
capabilities that can satisfy these requirements.




The components of the naval system use the intel-
ligence product in a variety of ways to assist pursuit
of total system objectives. The research and develop-
ment system components and the material system components
employ the product to gain knowledge of adversary naval
capabilities in order to ensure that the platforms, wea-
pons, sensors and other equipment that these systems
design, develop and produce can counter the strengths and
exploit the weaknesses of adversary material systems. The
characteristics of adversary material systems required by
these components are the engineering pei"formance param-
eters derived through technical intelligence analyses.
These parameters will reflect the maximum theoretical
30See the definition of a system outline on pp. 29-31

93
limits of these systems.
Operational system
The technical intelligence products operational sys-
tem components use need to emphasize the current capa-
bilities of adversary material systems and how these
systems are employed operationally. The characteristics
of adversary systems of interest to operational compo-
nents are the effective performance parameters that have
been observed in practice in tactical situations. Effec-
tive performance parameters, being less than the theo-
retical limits indicated by engineering performance
measures, provide a better basis for the commander's
assessment of the degree of risk to his forces that he
might take when deploying them to respond to the threat.
Operational components also need to know the current
location of adversary forces, pattern of activity, and
intentions. For adversary forces to pose a potential
threat to U . S. naval forces, their systems have to be
capable of detecting the U. S. targets and moving within
effective weapons range before the targets can respond
to their presence. Then the intention to attack must be
made manifest before the actual threat materializes.
Finally, operational components use the intelligence
product: to assist the tactical development process and to





ogramm ing sy s tem
Tecl al intelligence data Ls used by the components
of t] era to document adversary capabilities that
.<: to bi countered and assist justification for U. S.
i teria] grains thai will accomplish this objective.
i I. intelligence products assessing the adversary,
hi i : ti . and activities are used to assist the develop-
it oE counter doctrine and strategy. Environmental
.s used to assist the planning of U. S. oper-
om and ; . Lvities . This data would include maps,
magery of the area of operations; descriptions
of thi m eorological, hydrographical , and oceanographical
ovailing in that area during particular sea-
s; in nmentation of the political, economic, social






imponents need to merge both technical and
opt r; ti . . itelligence data in order to determine indi-
c, l i potential threat to U. S. forces and interests
control the response of the operational system to
tht k I . ! Particular requirements include the loca-
i "ication, composition and disposition of
ces . Knowledge of the communications, sen-
and canons carried by the specific adversary forces
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concerned is also required. Patterns of activity and
intentions then come into play. The tactics these forces
employ, their capability for resunply and logistics sup-
port, their military organizational structure, and the
identification of adversary personnel and their activities,
all are part of the equation.
Personnel manag ement system
The training and education components are the primary
users of the intelligence product within this system. The
technical intelligence product is employed in training
schools to assist personnel to identify and gain knowledge
concerning adversary platforms, weapons, sensors and other
material systems. The operational intelligence product is
used in such tactical training schools as surface warfare,
submarine warfare, antisubmarine warfare, electronic war-
3fare, and C . Engineering, management, operational, plan-
ning and programming, and politico-military curricula are
all part of the programs at the Naval Academy, Naval Post-
graduate School and War Colleges. All require knowledge
of adversary system capabilities and activities to varying
degrees. Finally, the intelligence product, the intel-
ligence system, and its capabilities provide the primary
topic for the curricula of intelligence training schools,
undergraduate and graduate educational programs.
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Ma i merit of the




rhe functioning oJ th Intelligence system as a
r 'lical pr< cess has been described above. How well this
;t( 's model of a smoothly functioning cycle with each
si tge unfol ling into the next approximates the intelli-
ence system in reality depends upon the effective manage-
iit of that system.. At the macro-level, the reality of
system presents a major complication to its unified
management. While from a functional point of view the
: stem may :e described as a unified whole; from a struc-
• a] point of view many of its individual components are
parated nou only physically, but also organizationally
ucipal mai gement component of the Lntelli-
nce s\ Located within the naval system at the
level in Washington, D. C.
1 k : agement component responsible for the formula-
Intelligence system policies and objectives and
." the development and coordination of intelligence pro-
tivities includes the Director of Naval Intel-
ligence (DNI) and his staff, located within the Office of
Chief of Naval Operations, and the Commander Naval
Intelli ence Command (COMNAVINTCOM) and his staff.
'COM reports directly to the DNI. KAVINTCOM
: our major field activities. Of these, only the
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Naval Investigative Service, whose components are spread
world wide, functions outside the Washington D. C.
metropolitan area.
The components described above are the only ones that
lie strictly within the intelligence system from the
structural standpoint. All other components and resources
lie within the intersections of the intelligence system
with the operational, material and research and develop-
31
ment systems. They are subject to the direct control
and influence of the respective management components of
these systems. The organizational arrangement of the
intelligence system in such a manner is necessitated by
its primary mission to provide a product as a service to
32the other components of the naval system.
Several factors assist intelligence departmental
management to direct pursuit of system activities in
accordance with formulated objectives while maintaining
this separate organizational structure. The first is the
policy making, resource programming, and activity coor-
dinating charter of the DNI and COMNAVINTCOH. Thus, while
the separate intelligence components report via their
separate chains of command through the other naval system
components, these chains of command end with the Chief of
31 See Fig. 11 on p. Ih.
32See pp. 79 and 89-92.
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Naval Operations under v;hose authority the DNI acts. The
second tie is through cormnuni cat ions dedicated to the
intelligence system. A third major tie is the fact that
the principal resources of all intelligence components are
allocated under the intelligence program of the Navy
budget, which the DNI (assisted by COMNAVINTCOM) is respon-
sible for developing and coordinating. Fourth, the cadre
manning the intelligence components in the other naval
systems include a core of officer specialists whose assign-
ment and career development is under the direct control
of the DNI and COMNAVINTCOM. This core is expanded by a
group of officer intelligence subspecialis ts whose assign-
ments to intelligence billets and training comes under
similar influence. It also includes a large group of en-
listed intelligence specialists whose assignments and
personnel management are under DNI /COMNAVINTCOM control.
Finally, all intelligence training, undergraduate and grad-
uate education programs are sponsored by DNI /COMNAVINTCOM.
Objectives and responsibilities
Similar to the functioning of the system on the macro
level, the functioning of individual intelligence compo-
nents at the micro level can be described in terms of the
same cyclical process. (The author believes this process
to be true regardless of which segments of the intelli-
gence cycle the primary mission of the individual component
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emphasizes.) Management of components (and the system)
should emphasize two hasic concepts to ensure regular and
smooth revolution of this cycle.
The first of these concepts is that activities in
each succeeding segment of the cycle should be directed
on the basis of knowledge and continual awareness of the
institutionalized requirements and objectives of the
intelligence system established in the tasking phase of
that cycle. In this regard, it is particularly impor-
tant to focus on the commander's essential elements of
33information. In some cases, what develop as require-
ments and objectives internally within the component begin
to mix with and sometimes overshadow the institutionalized
requirements of the system and interests of the consuming
audience. There is greater potential for these cases to
arise when the intelligence component is physically and
organizationally separate from its consuming audience
rather than in the cases where the intelligence compo-
nent is integrated into the consumer's organization. Even
then it may occur when the mission of the intelligence
component emphasizes the processing, analysis and pro-
duction portions of the cycle. In such a situation, the
analyst has to contend with the tendencies to place the
information values he develops internally over the
33See pp. 81 - 82.
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institutionalized requirement and to embellish the pro-
duct with his own views and style in order to gain
personal reward. Either tendency lends more support to
objectives that are competitive with those of the system
and can detract from the relevance of the product.
The second concept relates to management emphasis on
intelligence as a service, that its product is a means to
an end. This emphasis is diluted wherever effective com-
munication between the intelligence officer and the con-
sumer he serves breaks down or barriers to that communica-
tion are established. Either of these may particularly
occur in situations where what is commonly referred to as
"the green door" syndrome is present. This is a reference
to the compartmented nature of intelligence activities and
indicates that security barriers are active between intel-
ligence participants and staff participants within the
organization to which both are assigned. In these cases,
application of the security concept of "need to know" must
be taken seriously with regard to the key players in the
given operational or technical problem. Without the appro-
priate application of this concept by intelligence parti-
cipants to other staff members, the latter may be denied
critical information that should be employed in the





serve as an effective arbitrator to ensure that this
principle is applied appropriately. Organizational bar-
riers can also be established by staff members as well.
These barriers either impede communications from intelli-
gence participants or desensitize the receptivity of staff
35
members to that communication.
Insti tut ionalized
management activities
Certain aspects of intelligence management have been
institutionalized within the system. One such formal
arrangement is the issuing of intelligence plans by various
levels of command. Such plans can be effective measures
to direct the smooth functioning of the intelligence cycle
as an integrated whole
.
The effective plans follow approximately the same for-
mat and provide similar content. First they detail the
organizational components within the command and its sub-
ordinate commands that are expected to play an intelligence
role, as well as the resources assigned to these components
which can be employed in that role. They detail mutual
intelligence support arrangements and relationships with
both senior and lateral commands. They then assess the
operational environment noting both its intelligence
potential and the constraints to intelligence activities
35See examples provided by Allison on p. 11 and




Next, they summarize the standing intelligence
requirements. These are fleshed out later through the
detailing in an appropriate annex of the commander's
essential elements of information (EEI) . The EE1 are
couched in terms of general questions relating to the
adversary's capability to practice and conduct various
aspects of naval warfare. Two detailed listings follow
each EEI. The first consists of indicators (IKD) that
provide alerts to when the enemy is practicing a given
aspect of naval warfare by documenting the symptoms of
that activity. The second list is known as specific
orders and requests (SOR) . It documents specific require-
ments, tasking and guidance for the collection and
reporting of data when the indicators alert the system to
a particular collection opportunity.
Essential to these plans is a concept of operations
that details those areas in which it. is expected that the
management attention of subordinate elements and commands
will be focused. The remainder of these plans deal with
reporting and data distribution requirements to include
the form and priority that reporting is expected to take,
how the technical data will be prepared and forwarded for
processing, and how feedback related to the results of
the collection effort will be obtained from the processing
agencies concerned. Desirable feedback concerning the

103
results of intelligence operations includes the signifi-
cance of the collection results as they relate to the
practice of naval warfare by the target adversary and any
new capabilities that the adversary demonstrated, the
intelligence requirements that were satisfied or addressed
by the particular collection effort, and lessons learned
to improve future intelligence operations.
Personnel management
Management of intelligence personnel and career
development practices have also been institutionalized
by the system. Selection by the intelligence community
of its officer specialists is normally accomplished by a
screening board designated by and conducted at the depart-
mental level of the system. In the past, officers were
not selected for the specialty until they had completed
at least their initial naval tour in one of the warfare
communities (naval aviation, surface force, or submarine
force)
. Such selection was based on the philosophy that
the intelligence community would then continue to receive
fresh injections of personnel who shared a common back-
ground and experience with the personnel of the warfare
O f
For an example of an intelligence plan that covers these
topics, see Commander, U.S. Second Fleet Intelligence Col -




which was developed by
tfhe author based upon three years
-1-
experience as a parti-
cipant in the management of operations by the ASVJ, sur-




communities they were now expected to serve for the rest
of their career as intelligence specialists. While many
officers up through the rank of lieutenant commander con-
tinue to enter the specialty via this same process, now
officers can also enter the specialty upon graduation from
Officers' Candidate School (OCS) . This fact is due to the
current number of billet requirements for the assignment
of intelligence officers as ensigns to the fleet.
In this first assignment, the young ensigns become
exposed to and conduct such intelligence functions as
targeting; mission planning; briefing and debriefing; and
ocean surveillance collection, processing and analysis.
They also become exposed to such naval warfare activities
as strike warfare, antisubmarine warfare, amphibious war-
fare, electronic warfare, and perhaps even some limited
exposure to command and control problems. This assign-
ment, thus, provides them with the opportunity to develop
common interests and share experiences with counterparts
in the warfare communities
.
From this fleet assignment, the next billet is in an
intelligence activity or on an operational staff. In the
former case, primary duties might emphasize functioning
in a specific portion of the intelligence cycle. The
assignment might be with a technical or operational intel-
ligence activity. Tvpes of operational staff duty include
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those at the air wing, task force, or naval force command
level. Alternative assignments might be even at the fleet
commander-in-chief, unified commander, or departmental
staff levels. Functions performed in any of these posi-
tions can include standing intelligence watches, devel-
oping intelligence plans, conducting capabilities and
activities analyses, producing intelligence products, and
presenting operational and technical intelligence briefs.
Ideally, postgraduate education at either the Defense
Intelligence School or at: the masters' level at the Naval
Postgraduage School would follow the initial two tours.
Officers at this point in their career normally have
reached the senior lieutenant or junior lieutenant com-
mander level. The educational experience is designed to
provide them with the opportunity to accomplish the fol-
lowing: First, they are presented with material to
increase their perspective of the intelligence system, its
functions and activities. Second, they study fields,
theories, concepts, methodology , techniques and practices
from both the academic world and their own intelligence
profession and then apply these to intelligence problems.
Third, they become exposed to the necessary skills , methods
and concepts that will prepare them to assume management
roles of increasing responsibility throughout the remainder
of their career.
In the assignment after graduation they begin to make
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the transition from performing functions at the working
level, which they accomplished in their previous tours,
to some role in and responsibility for the management of
intelligence activities. This may be supervisorial such'
as a watch team or section head. In prior tours they
may have gained supervisorial experience with regard to
the management of personnel. In this tour they become
more responsible for taking a lead in supervising signi-
ficant activities of the organization to which they are
assigned. As lieutenant commanders, they may even be the
head of a large office or department.
In follow on tours as commanders and captains, they
progress toward assuming executive management level posi-
tions. These assignments are to billets both strictly
within intelligence components and with components of the
other naval systems. They involve the direction of intel-
ligence operations and activities; policy formulation; the
development of systems, resources and programs; and direct
interaction with and support of senior naval commanders
,
program managers, and policy makers.
Education program development
The intelligence masters' program at the Naval Post-
graduate School is subjected to regular institutionalized
scrutiny by its sponsors, DNI and COMNAVINTCOM. This
process takes the form of a curriculum review, which is
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performed by a panel consisting of senior members of the
naval intelligence community interacting directly with
the faculty and staff who deliver and manage the daily
37
activities of the program. The results of the review
that are approved by the convening flag officer serve as
the policy guidance and tasking for the development of
the program and the conduct of its activities until the
next session is convened.
The takeoff point for the first review was a task
analysis of the intelligence community that had been com-
pleted by several members of the first intelligence class
under faculty supervision as their masters' thesis research
project. The principle conclusion that has been reaf-
firmed by these reviews is that the educational require-
ments of the community necessitate the maintenance and
continuing development of an interdisciplinary masters'
program that focuses on the areas of defense technology,
national security affairs, and intelligence analytical and
management problems
.
The broad education program provided as a result of
this conclusion is supported by the following disciplines:
mathematics, environmental science, physical science, elec-
trical engineering, political science, economics, history,
37 The author participated in the first through the fourth
of these reviews while serving as Curricular Officer for





public adi Lnistration and oper.!t i ms research. The core
em rses are livided into the three sequences that corre-
spond co the community ' s areas of interest. These
seqi i :es each interdisciplinary within thcmselA/es .
uns for six quarters (eighteen months)
.
j; Leers are expected to complete or validate all. courses
in these secmences (110 quarter hours) in that time frame.
They are also expected to complete a master's thesis,
which demonstrates the integration of interdisciplinary
knowledge and methods acquired from courses in at least
two of (] i I ree sequences in the program and application
of the results to a key intelligence problem. These
arch projects have been sponsored and supported by
\c±?.s within the intelligence community.
'! te ei ense technology sequence progresses from
buj Lding technical vocabulary and qualitative, under-
st; ad.ing of ,'asic science and engineering concepts to
introduction to the genera L operating principles of tech-
i military systems , Two applications courses examine
specific mi" Ltary systems such as weapons, sensors, com-
icacions and electronic warfare. The strengths,
weciknesses and trade-offs associated with ship, submarine
ami aircraft platform design are also included in these
applications courses. Finally, new technological develop-
,
weapons system acquisition and technological fore-
casi Lng are pursued through participation in advanced
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seminars and practical exercise situations.
Thi aal Lonal security affairs sequence describes and
analyzes the security objectives and interests of the
major ;n>. .:
,
assesses their capabilities, and evaluates
their Intel ions and strategies with particular emphasis
on the employment of seapo^er. The sequence synthesizes
th - political, technological, economic, social and ideo-
logical faci >rs chat motivate actors in the international
tei >dels varying scenarios of interaction between
them. It n relates these factors to the conduct of
d< liens pol in the United States, the perception of
ipecific threats, and the .responses to these threats open
i i the U.S politico-military system.
I Lytical and management sequence provides an
introduction to quantitative techniques, substantive
research methods, and the primary concepts of resource
m i iageme] From mathematical preparatory courses , the
uence ; sses to methodological surveys of various
... ns "o I u ture given problems, formulate possible
ins, organize and compile the supporting data,
ess tl - reliability of and communicate the signifi-
es: ce coin lg the re: of this effort. These meth-
odc logical i mrses include study of both systems and
cegate data analysis Mana ;ement problems explored in
I sequence include contracting, civilian personnel,





and review techniques (PERT), management by objectives
(MBO) , and organizational development (OD)
. Also
included are the management techniques applicable to
automatic data processing systems, their design, basic






Essentially, the intelligence officer may regard
himself as a pragmatic consumer of science, which he
applies to his tasks much in the same manner as the engi-
neer, who relies upon the physical sciences as he confronts
op
given technological problems. Although knowledge of the
physical sciences is a principal requirement, they are not
the exclusive reservoire of knowledge that the intelli-
gence officer needs. As demonstrated by the education
program described above, the knowledge that he requires
spans a broad spectrum of disciplines. Further, it is
more interdisciplinary in nature, rather than being
restricted along particular disciplinary lines.
Because the intelligence officer must assess hardware
o o
The author first advanced this analogy as a primary
theme of a postgraduate thesis produced in June 1966
at the Defense Intelligence School, entitled "Social
Changes and Intelligence Requirements", pp. 21 - 22.
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and technical systems; lie must acquire some knowledge as
to the phys :a] principle::, behind the operation of wea-
pons, sensor; ships, aircraft and submarine platforms.
se he assesses the a( srsary's military forces, their
;-.
[ Lon : id activities; he should know how these relate
to and evolve from the enemy's political, economic, tech-
nological, social, cultural and historical systems.
Because he also deals with the physical environment; know-
ledge of geography, topography, meteorology, oceanography,
Lphy, transportation and communications networks,
ani systems comes into play. Because he moni-
tors individual and group behavior; knowledge from the
i I.lds or psychology, sociology and anthropology is of
as; istance
.
As an analys t
Tie intelligence officer's main constraints with
re ard malytical process are that he must deal
. d; Lc situation, respond to these events in near
I time id contend continually with large measures of
uncert Lnty. The demand for his analysis may be felt even
be ( ; :al factors pertaining to the problem have
been deU ted in the environment and perceived by the sys-
tem. As events unfold, he finds himself in a speculative
tion. This situation requires the formulation of
tla hypotheses about the particular events being
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assessed. This is an entirely different problem from the
academic one for which scientists formulate general
39hypotheses about general classes of events. ' Further,
the intelligence officer cannot afford the luxury of long
contemplation about these events that his academic coun-
terpart enjoys. This is due to his dynamic problem
situation and the immediate demand for the results of his
analysis in order to assist decision makers to direct
system response to the threat posed by the unfolding events
While the intelligence officer may prefer to and is
capable of employing rational scientific models and methods
that may apply to the particular problem; intuition and
insight will always play a major role in his analytical
efforts. Several factors allow him to apply intuition and
insight with some skill to the problems with which he must
contend. As described previously, he has an intense
involvement in the monitoring of adversary activities and
the assessing of adversary capabilities throughout his
career. He develops continuity over time on these prob-
lems as a result of his involvement. Dependent upon both
whether his current assignment is as a full time analyst
and how close in time he is to the commencement of his
analytical tour, he may have continuity in abundance upon
39Klaus Knorr , "The Intelligence Function", Social Science
Research and National Security. (Washington, D.C.: Smith-
sonian Institution, 1963), p. 91.
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the particular set of problems involved having monitored
them on a daily basis for a considerable length of time.
Based upon the continuity he has accumulated and
atever institutional memory and consciousness concerning
the problem that the intelligence system can provide, he
begins to discern certain patterns of adversary activities
and developments. He also employs the intelligence
requirements of which he has internalized knowledge to
provide a framework for analysis of the activity he has
been examining. In such a manner, he becomes sensitized •
to deviations from the norm and employs this perception
to measure the contribution of each new bit of information
received to the picture that he is seeking to construct.
By assessing both those portions of the picture thac
1 iias managed to complete and the dimensions of the un-
certainty that remains, he prepares to offer his commander
bis best judgment concerning what has been detected and
perceived up to that point in time. He also must be pre-
1 red "o shift his analysis in a new direction should new
41
b t:s c; information offer contradictory evidence.
!
See discussion on career development pp. 103 - 106, and
ational program pp. 106 - 110.
See Ackoff ' s discussions of symptoms and presymptoms
or pp. 40 - 45, Holsti's framework for analysis pp. 50-51,
bi inf ; ion systems pp. 54- 55, Sherwin's design cri-






Interacting with his commander, organization plan-
ners, operators, technicians and other key personnel; the
intelligence officer next determines how his product has
satisfied the critical requirements of the problem. Then
he redirects his focus toward gaps identified in the
information base through this process. Thus, the cycle
unfolds unto its beginning. He continues attempts to
resolve the remaining uncertainties and contend with new
problem ramifications that have been revealed.
As a manager
How well the individual intelligence officer per-
forms as a manager within the intelligence system is
dependent upon the management experience and education he
receives as he progresses through his career. Acquisi-
tion of management skills is a critical career development
problem. It is complicated by the fact that early on in
an individual's career, the intelligence officer must
primarily perform working level functions and has less
opportunity than counterparts In the operational and
material components of the naval system to develop
management skills.
A young ensign on board a major combatant or sub-
marine may become a division officer fairly early in his
career. As such, he is charged with organizing and coor-
dinating the activities of the division's personnel,

115
operating and maintaining the division's; systems, and con-
cerning himself with the development and support of his
people. From division officer he progresses to department
head responsibilities. The young supply officer or civil
engineering officer also assumes significant management
functions early in his career for such activities as dis-
bursing, stores, commissaries, public works and construc-
tion. All these have similar attendant personnel and
resource management responsibilities.
The young intelligence officer at the same. stage in
his career must spend the majority of his time developing
his own professional skills, producing the intelligence
•product, and acquiring knowledge of both adversary capa-
bilities and activities. There are very few assignments
in which the intelligence officer would even have the
opportunity to gain management skills. In some intelli-
gence centers, he might be able to work up to the division
officer level. In a collection activity; he might be able
to gain some program, system and resource management expe-
rience, or at the minimum be a direct observer of the pro-
cess. Further, because he is so immersed in intelligence
professional development efforts and his time is consummed
by the demands of working level activities; he may have
little left to begin to gain an understanding of and per-
spective on the intelligence system as a whole or an
appreciation for the variety of resources and capabilities
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that the system provides.
As pointed out earlier, intelligence training and
education experiences obtained by the mid-career point
assist the transition from intelligence analyst/producer
to intelligence manager. There is always the danger that
the transition will never be made or made only with little
success. In some cases, the individual becomes too com-
fortable with the analyst/producer role and the rewards
that it can bring. Thus, he does not seek assignments
that will give him the opportunity to acquire and perfect
management skills soon enough. Thus, when he passes the
mid-career point and is assigned to billets that require
.'.him to perform in the management role, he is not ready to
provide such performance. Further, even if such an indi-
vidual is a brilliant performer in the analyst role, the
benefits he provides a given command may cease when he is
transferred. The investment he has made in such a case
has been in his own performance alone. When he departs,
the capability left the command is degraded until his
relief can build similar continuity on the problem and
acquire similar analytical skills.
In other cases, the system is the cause for the lack
of managerial performance on the part of individuals later
in their career . This is because the management components
in the intelligence organizations to which these individ-
uals were assigned during the early, and even middle
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portions of their careers, did not give them sufficient
opportunity to first observe and then gradually become
participants in the management process.
Management Precepts
There are some precepts that intelligence management
can follow that both provide examples to and assist the




With regard to the organization of an intelligence
component or activity, this should be accomplished along
.mission and functional lines. It is helpful to have the
division of labor and resource allocation to the various
components of the activity spelled out in writing. Func-
tional responsibilities assigned to the component should
be related to accomplishment of the activity's mission.
It should be demonstrated how components interrelate and
complement one another to pursue established activity
objectives. These relationships should be reinforced
during indoctrination and training sessions.
Personnel management
With regard to personnel management actions, sub-
ordinates should be encouraged to display initiative,
assume responsiblities and perform functions beyond
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that normally expected of their current grade or rank.
Effort on the part of subordinates to achieve and
sustain such performance should be rewarded on a regular,
continuing bases. The manager should convey to his sub-
ordinates that they will receive the credit when things go
right and that he will absorb the heat when things go
wrong. Further, the manager should convey to his subor-
dinates that should their initiatives not be productive
in the short run, he will give them the opportunity to
make their effort productive and provide them with the
proper guidance to achieve that end.
Resource management
Finally, with regard to resource management, sub-
ordinates should be encouraged to seek continually ways
to extend the performance of their systems beyond current
expectations. They should also be encouraged to formulate
recommendations and document requirements for improvements
to these systems and for new systems to increase the effi-
ciency of mission performance. The results of these
efforts then should be taken by management and forwarded
up the chain of command for approval, programming and
eventual implementation.
Results
Managers who follow these precepts will discover
that contributions and benefits provided the command will
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not cease when Individual subordinates are transferred.
Their contributions will endure and provide continuing
benefit to the command beyond their presence. Because
the professional development of these personnel has been
encouraged in this manner, they will have made substantial
investments in the activity beyond that investment they
made in their individual performance. As a result, the
activity's systems will be performing beyond expectation.
Its resources will provide a productive yield. More effi-
cient methods of operations will have been discovered.
Finally, the requirements for new systems and resources
will have been requested and supported with detailed docu-
mentation ensuring even greater productivity for the
activity in the future.
Academic Models to Assist the
Intelligence Problem Solving Process
Role Models from Science
Comparison of scientists
Table 2 compares role models that represent idealized
categories of scientists. It compares these categories
of scientists in terras of their world view of the status
of science as a specific field of knowledge in relation to
other fields; their beliefs as to the nature of scientific
/ 9
This table was constructed based on a composite of indi-
vidual tables found in Ian 1. Mitroff and Ralph H. Kilmann,
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knowledge; their postulation of the guarantors of scienti-
fic knowledge; their stated ultimate aim of science; their
preferred systems of logic, sociological norms, and mode
of inquiry; and the individual attributes or characteris-
tics of each type of scientist. The approaches to research
and problem solving represented by the four scientific
types compared in the table form a continuum with that of
the Analytical Scientist on one end and that of the Par-
ticular Humanist on the other.
While examination of these types reveals such a con-
tinuum, they are idealized forms. Except in rare instances
,
no one individual (much less a particular group of individ-
uals) could be expected to fit precisely into one of these
molds. Rather a composite is much more likely whether
applied to individuals or groups. The exact composition
of an integration of these role models that could be
applied would vary from individual to individual and from
group to group. What could be applied from each category
would depend upon the personal predilections of the indi-
vidual concerned, the requirements of the role that he





As noted previously, the intelligence officer is
aware and is capable of employing the methods of the
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Analytical Scientist. He too strives for precision,
accuracy, and reliability in his anlytical efforts and in
the predictions he makes. The contsraints of his problem,
however, force him to deal with large measures of uncer-
tainty. Like the Conceptual Theorist, he recognizes the
value of uncertainty and is able to respond to the chal-
lenge of assessing and incorporating its dimensions into
the problem solving process. Further, the intelligence
officer is comfortable with employing dialectical logic
to develop contrasting theories and apply them in an inno-
vative fashion to the phenomena that he has detected and
perceived. He cannot afford, however, to end his effort
with the development of the contrasting theory and to
value the theories for their own "interestingness sake",
which is the predilection of the Conceptual Theorist. He
must go beyond that point and use the theories he has
developed to construct a particular hypothesis that will
explain the event in question.
Thus, he shares the view of the Conceptual Humanist
that science's value is not in the performance of the pro-
cess, that it is not an end in itself, but that it is both
policital in nature and is a service to be used to accom-
plish the goals of humanity. There must be an action phase
to the process if the answer provided by use of the
43See pp. Ill - 114.
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scientific method is to bear fruit and serve mankind. In
the case of the intelligence officer, his bias is a fer-
vent belief that his product is useful to his commander,
that his service contributes to defending the nation's
security and interests, and that this provides the
greatest good to the greatest number by keeping his
society free from subjugation by another and allowing it
to pursue its independent development. Again, like the
Conceptual Humanist, the intelligence officer recognizes
the value of knowledge that can be obtained through the
application and integration of multiple disciplines and
seeks to become adept at this process. Any Particular
Humanist influence upon the individual intelligence offi-
cer will intensify his action oriented approach and per-
sonal fervor as he interacts with others within his own
subsystem and the management system he serves to both
contribute to and learn from the joint development of
solutions to given, immediate, particular problems. Par-
ticular Humanist characteristics can also add to the
creativity of his effort and capacity for self-expression.
The need for an intergration of these approaches
becomes apparent when considering the role of an intelli-
gence officer as a manager. The resulting model would
approximate a systems approach to problem solving. The
manager needs a holistic, systems approach if he is to
be successful in formulating activity policies that are
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consistent with and contribute to accomplishment of the
objectives of the parent system. Such an approach aids
in the establishment of objectives for components of the
activity that not only encourage efforts on the part of
each component that are mutually supportive and contri-
bute to mission accomplishment, but also are realistic
and within the capabilities of the respective components.
Finally, managers employing such an approach are con-
scious of the need for and know how to establish an
effective feedback loop that not only will convey to
them the progress the activity is making toward mission
accomplishment, but also the impact of both activity and
component management decision making upon that effort and
the contributions of these decisions to that progress. In
such a manner, problems are identified, responses can be
formulated, and subsequent effort can be controlled and
adjusted to the course that will yield the proper solution.
A Systems View of Problem Solving
Mitroff and Kilmann developed the model shown in
Fig. 13 to illustrate the systems view of problem
solving. Each inquiry normally starts with the iden-
tification and recognition of the reality situation
applicable to the problem concerned. While this is the
Mitroff, Methodological Approaches, p. 117. Discus-




Fig. 13. A Systems View of Problem Solving
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logical starting point, it may also be the ending or the
.
middle. This is because from a systems viewpoint, where
one starts and ends an inquiry results in the complicated
four-way interaction effect that is described by the model
.
Proposed solutions can lead to a new perspective of the
reality situation. Initial conceptual and scientific
models may be revealed to differ from the reality they
seek to depict or suggest that the original perception of
the reality situation was inaccurate. The solution that
evolves and is finally implemented might diverge from the
models in order to become relevant to the reality situa-
tion. The evolution of the solution might also suggest
corrections to the models that yield a new perspective of
the problem.
The conceptual model requires formulating the macro
perspective of the problem. Its formuation consists of a
selection process that chooses a particular world view of
the problem and establishes commitment to that world view
as the framework for the plan of action that will lead to
the proposed solution. The scientific model corresponds
to the micro perspective of the problem. It selects from
the particular theories and methodologies suggested by the
conceptual model and constructs testable hypotheses that
will yield exact, detailed proposals for the problem's
solution. The solution has to be fed into the reality
situation in order to complete the process. This effort
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constitutes the action oriented implementation phase des-
cribed in the model. The line in the model that rep-
resents the interaction between the reality situation and
the scientific modeling process suggests the degree of cor-
respondence that must be maintained between the scientific
model and the reality. The line between the conceptual
modeling process and the solution corresponds to the degree
to which both the solution follows from the particular con-
ceptual model and the solution affects changes in that
model
.
The remainder of the thesis applies this problem
solving process to- the problem of concern to the Naval
Warfare Analysis Experiment. Chapter III describes the
reality situation of concern. Chapter IV develops naval
warfare analytical and information management theory as
the conceptual model. Chapter V then details the scienti-
fic model by describing how the Naval Warfare Analysis
Experimental Files were programmed and employed to provide
solutions to intelligence analytical and managerial prob-
lems. Chapter VI then outlines the concept of operations
that may be implemented to provide capabilities suggested
by the results obtained through the Naval Warfare Analysis
Experiment to the Ocean Surveillance Information System.

! . THE REALITY SITUATION: EVOLUTION OF
i E SOVIET UNION SINCE WORLD WAR IT.
AS A DOMINANT MAR i TIME ROWER
Fit i i dmira] i lorshkov
Up until the recent years, the Soviet Union has been
i ught oi in the West as predominantly a land power
given that nation's straddle across the expanses of the
' Jan lard mass. As might be expected, Admiral of the
i • the Soviet Union Sergey Georgiyevich Gorshkov
e: part: ilar umbrage at the implications of this con-






atively recently, specifically on 4 August
'';. ben President of the United States Richard
xon made the statement: 'What the Soviet Union
leeds In the way of military preparations is dif-
ferent from what we require. The USSR is a land
power, and we primarily are a naval power; there-
e i ir needs are different . ' Need it be said
that Nixon's statement, which is a modern version
of earlier attempts by British politicians and
officials of the British Admiralty to prove the
ibsenc of any need for Russia to have a power-
~'ii '. y, has no connection with the real state
tirs and contradicts the history of the
development of our Navy in the past and is at ,,-
:i i; <• with the interests of our country today."
45
in Post of 5 August 19/0 as quoted in Fleet
Ada iral Sergey Gorshkov, The S eapower of the State
,




How this impression has come to be corrected in
Western eyes and particularly the views of Gorshkov , the
architect of the evolution of Soviet seapower, are the
subjects of this chapter. Starting with the works attri-
buted to Gorshkov that are available in the West, the
chapter first focuses attention on the concepts of Navy
building and employment by the state that are documented
in particular in Seapower of the State . Then it turns to
the results of the Soviet Navy building effort and the
tremendous expansion in Soviet naval activities that is
the .reality of the 1980s. It is the exercise of Soviet
naval capabilities through these increasing global acti-
vities that is the principal subject of naval warfare
analysis by the U.S. intelligence community today.
His Credentials
Who is Admiral Gorshkov? What are his credentials?
How have his views reached the West and what were his pur-
poses in giving them expression? Admiral Sergey G.
Gorshkov was ordered to Moscow in mid-1965 as Deputy
Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy. On 1 January 1956,
he formally assumed the top positions of Commander-in-
Chief and Deputy Minister of Defense at the age of 45 . y
He has exercised the authority and responsibilities of
Norman Polmar, Soviet Naval Power: Challenge for the




;hese top pi , i Lions, i co tared to a combina-
n of the U.S. Chief of Naval Operations and Secretary
the Navy, ever sine. No < tl \x. n ival leader in the
Ld iic < World War I] p< ss< ss i sin !i experience and
i the helm
.
is published one or more articles in a Soviet
mi Ltary irnal every ea since at least 1963. (See
T« bel 3 . i sample listing that may not be exhaustive
due to t c probable ui 'ability of other writings to
tern sources.) A major significant work that cap-
the attention of We: "n readers was "Navies in War
n Peace". This included some 11 articles published in
the Sovii aval Digest (Horskoy Sbor nik ) during 1972 and
). Th ls the primary journal for Soviet naval per-
Lit such a re >hip, the primary purpose of
G shko 1 rticles above lias been assessed as that of
i Lopii unified viewpoint among Soviet naval
;." One reviewer has judged Gorshkov s writings
hav in ijo ibjecti ese are justifying
ce of a navy to , eat power; enlisting and
praisinj Party's support of the Navy; and clarifying
William 1,. Thompson, "Sea Power at the State—An Inter-
nal Dei mi ?" in Paul J. Murphy, ed .
,
Naval Power in Sovie t
E om The series Studies in Communis t Affairs
,
Vol . 2,
( : isTii'iig ton , D . C . : Uni tic! States Air Force, 1978), p . 22 .
Rear Admiral Donald P. Harvey, A Review of Seapower of




ARTICLES AND BOOKS BY S. G. GORSHKOV
1. "Faithful Defender of Qui Sea Frontier," Agitator, July 1958.
2. "Concern of the Party for the Navy," Morskoy Shornik. July 1963.
3. "The Navy of Our Homeland," Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil, July
(Vol. 13), 1963.
4. "Soviet Sailors in the Battle for the Liberation of the Danube
States," Morskoy Shornik, August 1%4.
5. "The Soviet Navy in the Great Patriotic War," Voycnnaya A/v.v/',
May 1965.
6. "Honorable Awards of the Homeland," Morskoy Shornik, June 1965.
7. "The 23rd Congress of the CPSU and the Tasks of Navymen,"
Morskoy Shornik, May 1%6.
8. "The Urgent Tasks of the Naval Rear Service," Tyl i Snahzlwniye,
July 1966.
9. "The Development of Naval Art," Morskoy Shornik. February 1967.
10. "Guarding the Conquests of the Great October Revolution," Morskoy
Shornik, October 1967.
11. "The Navy of the Socialist State," Voycnnaya Mysl', January 1968.
12. "The Navy in the Cheat Patriotic War," Morskoy Shornik, May 1970.
13. "Navies in War and Peace," Morskoy Shornik, February-June 1972;
August 1972 January 1973.
14. "The Black Sea Fleet in the Battle of the Caucasus." Voycnno-
Istorhheskiy Zhurnal, March 1 ()74.
15. "Certain Questions Concerning the Development o\' the Naval Art."
Morskoy- Shornik, December 1974.
16. "Navy Did Its Duty for the Homeland Right to the Hud," Morskoy
Shornik. May 1975.
17. "Historical Experience and Present Day," Problems' Filosofri, May
1975.
18. "Oceanic Shield of the Homeland," Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil,
April (Vol. 7), 1975.
19. "Greeting the 25th Congress of the CPSU." Morskoy Shornik.
February 1976.
20. "A Most Important Factor of the Navy's Combat Readiness and
Combat Efficiency," Tyl i Snahzhcniyc. July l (>76.





./a I theory to Soviet navymen and others.
Seapower was published by the Moscow Military Pub-
lishing house in 1976 and seems intended for a much wider
tdership Its distribution of 60,000 copies has been
tbnormally large run for a military work. A
review of Seapower published under the auspices of the
Director of Naval Intelligence states:
• size of the printing clearly indicates that
the was aimed beyond the standard circle of
military readers toward an all-union-wide reader
-
tip of members of the Soviet Communist Party, of
th« iet military- Indus trial establishment, and
of other opinion makers in the Soviet Union.
Goi is, in effect, explaining to them exactly
what they are getting for their huge investment in
le area . "^^
His Concept of Seapower
ikov places the concept of seapower in the con-
51
t oi ;,,.!",] sm:
trxism considers the geographical medium, of
..i . the World Ocean is a most important element,
to among the many factors influencing the devel-
opm of human society. [t occupies almost three-
foui i the surface of our planet and possesses
colossal biological, energy and mineral resources."
!
e relates the world ocean to a definition of
1 and I te inter. • of the state:
hn G. Lts "Admiral Gorshkov s Writings: Twenty
s of hlaval Thoughts" in Naval Power in Soviet Policy,
, p . 1 .
shk< i development of the concepts of seapower des-





"There is a basis for regarding the totality of
the means for mastering the World Ocean and the
means for defending the interests of the State,
which determines the capability of one country
or another to utilize the military- economic
resources of the ocean for its own purposes."
That he views the concept of seapower is that of a
system is demonstrated by:
"The seapower of the State is rightly regarded
as a system which is characterized not only by
the relationships between its components (Naval,
transport, fishing, scientific-research fleets,
and so forth) , but also by an indivisible unity
with the environmnet, the ocean, in an inter-
relationship through which the system expresses
its own unity."
Finally, with regards to the significance of the
components, there is no doubt as to his emphasis as he
•places them in historical perspective.
"The importance of the individual components
comprising seapower is not constant. It is
determined by specific historical conditions,
however, the dominating importance of the Navy
always remains .
"
His View of Naval History
When discussing the role of the Navy vis-a-vis the
other armed forces, Gorshkov continues to draw upon the
historical perspective. He quotes Peter I as stating
graphically .-
"Every ruler who has only a land army has only
one hand, while he who has a fleet has both
hands. "52
Naval Regulations (Morskoy Ustav) , St . Petersberg, 1721,
p. 2. as quoted in Ibid., p. v.
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sees an interrelationship of factors as deter
-
Lnii th, proper role- and composition of the army and
V) at any given historical Cage:
''The importance of an army and navy, at a givenlevel or development of technology and economic
urces, has always been detenu Lned by the
emerging politico-strategic situation and bythe relative position of states or the nature
01 tne coalition. In some stages of history
e primary role has been played by groundfources, and, in others, by navies. The posi-tion and role ol each of the branches of the
aimed forces can vary in peacetime and wartimelependmg on technical changes, the enemy the'meal conditions and so forth The
experience of history attests to the fact thateach branch of the armed forces makes its own
'
individual and always weighty contribution tothe victory There have been almost no purelyland or purely naval wars . "5J J
world
notes that in the wars waged by Czarist rulers
they axled to appreciate fully these concepts and
<
inadequate attention to naval development so that
not maintained in accordance with the require-




suit or failure of peacetime policies to
Lfic goals and objectives was demonstrated. He
ci es in particular the failure of the Czar and his admin-
'
'
to learn from the experience of the Russo-
ese V
, ,
to the decisiveness of naval engagements
-
moder, naval technology. Thus, the Russian Navy
I bid
. , p. v.
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remained quite ineffectual clue to the. lack of the Czar's
concern. When the test of World War I came, it could not
begin to meet the German Navy in battle on the open sea.
He sees the Russian experience in World War II as
once again confirming the principle of coordinating the
efforts of all of the armed forces. Here strategic util-
ization of naval forces was dictated by the requirement
to tie closely their operational plans with that of the
Soviet Army and with the objective of destroying the main
enemy forces on land. Thus, the Navy served effectively
to protect the strategic flanks of the ground front as it
destroyed enemy seapower in the Barents, Baltic and Black
Seas .
Post World War I I era
He indicates that the post-World War II era has
stimulated an even more critical need for developing a
powerful Navy:
"The need for having a powerful Navy corresponding
to the geographic position of our country and her
political importance as a great power has been
obvious for a long time. However, the problem
became especially acute in the postwar years when,
as a result of changes in the alignment of forces
in the world arena, the USSR and other Socialist
countries found themselves surrounded by a hostile-
coalition of scapowers, a situation which raised
the threat of nuclear attack from the sea. "56
54
Ibid.











In the inmediate postwar yean i onflicting require-
is palled the Soviets in several direcl Ions as they
sought to contend with this new threat. The primary mis-
sion of the armed forces was defense of the Soviet State
i the nev\ I ritory that had been acquired as a result of
;. ' the same time, however, the Soviets recognized
their potential interests encompassed lands and seas
far beyond thair immediate borders and that of their satel-
Li1 Thus, on the one hand, they may have viewed the
m ; niajoi : tt:le ground as I . the land mass of Central
i!, W rn ' nope where both they and the U.S. were filling
ical, • • Miomic and military vacuums. On the other hand
i
I ed that to defend the state in this new era,
iuld in re to intercept U.S. warships and troopships
eyond territories under their control if in the
eve; ;r of a clash, U. S. forces attempted to reinforce FAirope,
the .or Asia
.
'.n the late forties and early fifties, Admiral
Kuznetsov, Gorshkov's predecessor, pursued continuation of
cy that Stalin had determined in the mid-1930s, but
.interrupted by the war. This effort called
he pr i < Lng with the construction of major capital
ship: Ln a tempt to emulate existing Western fleets. It
stood in contrast with a more pragmatic solution advocated
:hool" within the Navy of which Gorshkov was
. m<; b< . s school recommended addressing the immediate
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problem of extending Soviet defenses beyond the near shore
by relying on submarines, naval aviation, and smaller craft
to provide depth to coastal defenses.
His Approach to Navy Building
When Gorshkov assumed the leadership of the Soviet
Navy, he had the opportunity to deal with the postwar
threat in his terms. Evidently his accession to power
came to implement new decisions of the Central Committee
regarding the direction of the navy as it corresponds to a
period of intense debate at that level after Stalin's
death and Khrushchev's assumption of the premiership. Thus,
it was the political system that formulated the new direc-
tion and he was quick to reinforce ideas that may have
paralled his own. He writes in Seapower
:
"The direction of the development of our Navy was
determined by the CPSU Central Committee as early
as the mid 1950s, the establishment first and fore-
most of powerful submarine forces and naval avia-
tion, the equipping of the Navy with nuclear-missile
weaponry, and the employment of nuclear power in
submarine construction were envisioned. A definite
role was also assigned to the construction of sur-
face ships, without which the accomplishment of a
series of tasks levied on the Navy is impossible.
In this connection, the need for balanced naval
forces was taken into account . "58
For a discussion of Soviet naval initiatives in the
immediate postwar era, see Polmar, Soviet Naval Power :
Challenge for the 1970s, Chapter 2, pp. i9-30.
CO




- \£ ' ' !
: Theor : .
!;. read e adaptibility and flexible
!!
;
;, he Conceptual [heoi Lsl into his implementation
he ei Committee's >olicy direction and, indeed, to
rninn roi :i ons throughout his career. While paying
Lon o listorica] precedent
,
he has been known for
ability tppreciate changes in the methods of com-
and to tssess properly current: trends and situations.
i n p ital L( i as an Lnnova oi with a flair for creative
L< er L] c< rtainly played a role in his selection as one
of the you st officers in any navy to attain the rank of
admiral. This he accomplished when he assumed command
the Sea of Azov Flotilla in World War II at the age of
31
. ou; Li the war, he was confronted with a variety
operational problems, but none was a hinderance to his
is. He was equally effective in the cruiser destroyer
forces as i he employed small coastal and riverine craft
.
bli to direct 1 and complex amphibious opera-
ls and - i commanded large ground forces in combat,
•wing de ii ription of his approach points
furthej to ' i Conceptual Theorist underpinnings:
1 9
! otes that the contacts Gorshkov made in this
. i Lod /ith men who were later to hold key military and
political po; Li ions in the Soviet Union may have been
even more significant than the successes he realized in
f. tie. These included Khrushchev, Brezhnev, Malinovskiy





"If the Russians had followed the Western path
of naval development, they would have found
themselves in the position of the relative
novice competing with an old hand in an estab-
lished, relatively routinized trade, which did
not auger success. On the other hand, by
taking advantage of the emerging 'revolution
in military affairs' as it applied to the navy -
nuclear propulsion, nuclear warheads, ballistic
and cruise missiles, electronics - the USSR
could select the grounds of competition on which
both East and West were starting more as equals ."60
It is also his focus on the enemy and ways to coun-
teract the opponent's capabilities and strategy that rein-
forces his Marxist predilection toward dialetical thinking
In another passage, Gorshkov admits taking specific
satisfaction from such a reasoning process.
"It is interesting under present-day conditions
to follow from an historical point of view the
dialectical relationship between the development
of naval forces and the goals of that policy of
the states which they were designed to serve."
he made this comment when reflecting on Lenin's statement
that "Policy is a thought process, while war is merely a
tool, and not the reverse. Consequently, the only recourse
is to subordinate the military point of view to the
political." Gorshkov firmly believed, in this regard,
that "military operations at sea, as well as on land, are
subordinate to general, constantly functioning laws, and
they cannot be conducted in isolation from the goals of








Lnf luence oJ other scientific approach*
[is full intellectual orienl Is not limited to
that or" the Conceptual Theorist, however, it embraces
asp< ct 3 of i ther scientiJ i : approach* i. lie includes a
Lnite appreciation and application of the methods of
t;h< Analytical Scientist. lie em] s tlie.se, however, as
would the Conceptual Humanist. In this regard, his
roach bears the marks of being partisan, holistic,
Imaginative, problematic and being, based upon multiple
causation. The Conceptual. Humanist is also reflected in
hi " r ei i k lief in the navy as a legitimate, effective
a sue the goals of the state and preserve the
irity the nation. Particular Humanist influence
/ hrough In his Ideological justification for naval
:
'
! opment and activity. [1 Ls iiccentuated by
his loag , intense personal involvement with the building
of and the success of hi i action oriented
, Le to achieve his programs
-.; ,' s t
! 1L"7» hi s approach extends to that of the
'!;
I ;ystems : Include reliance on mul-
tiple i : Lines and participant interaction as the next
passage demonstra tes
.
ure the Navy's capability to carry out
onal-strategic missions, scientific
reseai ch is being, conducted to determine the
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nature of the Navy's balance, the overall quali-
tative and quantitative makeup of ships and air-
craft, and the distribution of forces by theater
and base area. Thus, the development of the Navy
requires serious and profound scientific research.
Here, a display of voluntarism or of subjective
principles is totally impermissible. The greater
the attention that leaders who are making respon-
sible decision on the development of the Navy pay
to the recommendations of the research institutes
and to the opinions of the practitioners, the
naval officers, and the more they take into account
the capabilities of industry, the more correct their
decisions will be, the less painful the process of
building a Navy will be, the fewer funds will be
needed in the final analysis to build it, and the
more powerful it will be. Such an approach to the
problems of building the Navy assumes the compre-
hensive development of- scientific methods of man-
agement. The scientific method of managing the
building of the Navy requires extensive multi-
discipline scientific research work in the area
of engineering- technical and operational- tactical
problems. It assumes a strict system of optimi-
zation, ensuring selection of the most rational
option based on quantitative analysis and military-
economic justifications, and built according to
standard criteria and close tolerances."^
Application of princ iples
of scientfif ic management
t
How then did Gorshkov apply the principles of scien-
tific management to implement the Party directives for the
Navy and pursue the concept of naval balance? He describes
the process from this by now familiar perspective:
"The manner of balancing a navy is not fixed; under
certain historical conditions it can change. The
main factors governing such change are the world
political situation (new alignment of forces, pre-
sence of military blocs , changes in the regimes of
individual countries, and so forth), economic capa-
bilities and the growth of the military-economic
62
Ibid
. , pp . 234 , 235
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potential of a country, llie development of domes-
'
' Lud foreign science and technology, and a
cl Lgf. in the missions assigned to the navy. Of
all of these factors, the main ones are the mis-
sions assigned to the navy by the political
Leai rship, and the level of the country's economy,
abo e .ill the capabilities oJ the shipbuilding,
trument makir.g , aircraft and other sectors of
ry engaged in the construction of ships, air-
. weaponry and sombal equipment . "63
His Concept oL" Naval Missions
!
!l
- G submar ine forc e
lie iv; a new and primary mission for the Navy that
i Lt to assume the strategic offensive in a
edible a; hion.
"
i Lde one oJ the must. Lmportanl and compre-
missions of the Navy - the destruction
of ei ships - a qualitatively new mission has
ap] ed: the crushing of the military-economic
>oti i Lai of the enemy through direct action from
the sea against his vitally important centers." 1
Foi orshkov, heavy emphasis on submarines became
I e means to achieve this end as rapidly as possible.
"Giving the priority to the development of the
subr arine forces made it possible in the shortest
possil Le time to increase sharply the attack
capabilities of our Navy, to pose a serious threat
to the main forces of the enemy navy in the ocean
theaters, and, at a cost of fewer resources and
less time, to intensify the growth in the maritime
might of our country, depriving the enemy of those
;er\ advantages which he could have had at his dis-
jos I Ln the event oi" war against: the Soviet. Union
and the countries of the Socialist Community."
F 1 ther , +.rongly felt that the development of the sub-






, p . Lv
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that made it possible, for our Navy to abandon its many
years of attachment to coastal areas and closed seas, to
expand considerably its sphere of operations on the oceans,
and in the event imperialists unleash war, to carry out
its own missions of an operational-strategic nature in
combat with the fleet of the aggressor in areas of the
ocean selected by us." In the sixties the development
of the submarine forces reached the stage where it included
the cruise and ballistic missile capability required for
the prosecution of strategic missions against land tar-
gets and new refinements to this strategic potential have
been added ever since.
For naval air
While submarines were relied upon to provide the
strategic offensive from the sea against enemy land tar-
gets and in the sea against the enemy's main naval forces,
Gorshkov also sought the development of long range air-
craft strike capabilities to complement the latter sub-
marine mission. He states with pride concerning the
status of the air arm when he wrote Seapower in the mid
1970s:
"Today they can direct their main efforts against
strike forces of surface ships, submarines and
transports, including those with troops and cargo







most diverse, mobile, highly maneuverable small
targets at sea."
Later he decreed that:
"The combat capabilities of Naval Aviation are
one of the main indicators of the striking
power of our modern navy. Naval Aviation has
become truly oceanic in nature, and it has been
transformed into a most important naval warfare
resource . "66
For surface forces
That the role of surface ships was seen to encom-
pass a series of tasks has already been indicated.
Gorshkov envisioned these to include many of the familiar
naval missions; operations against sea lines of communi-
cations, in closed theaters and coastal areas, gunfire
support, of ground troops, carrying out amphibious land-
ings, blockade operations, etc. The primary mission
emphasis, however, he believes to be twofold and related
to the strategic defensive. These missions demonstrate
the significant priority in the Soviet Navy on anti-
submarine Warfare. They include not only the protection
of surface forces against intruding submarines, but also
in particular, the protection of the Soviet Navy's princi
pal strike arm, its missile submarines, from surface, air
and submarine attack. The surface navy closely coordi-
nates its operations with the air arm in both these roles
The Soviet response to the Western submarine threat
66 Ibid.
, pp. 253 and 255.
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Gorshkov now calls "a national, not just a naval mission."
He returns time and again to the theme of faulting the
German Navy for their independent development of their
submarine force in the World Wars. He belives the assump-
tion of the submarine preceeding independently from its
base and remaining concealed within the ocean depths to
assure its invulnerability is a mistaken one. He points
to the fact that German submarine losses increased through-
out the war and attributes this to the intensity of the
allied ASW effort which, given the unsatisfactory combat
and operational support of their submarine force by the
German High Command, completely disrupted the unrestricted
, r .68
submarine warfare campaign.
He states that technical improvements now allow the
organizing of submarine combat operations in a completely
new manner to achieve close coordination in battle with sur-
face ships. He takes reassurance in the positive quality
of surface ships reflected in their ability to maintain
two-way communications with shore posts, which facilitates
control by ensuring the timely transmission of necessary
orders to all fleet units to include subsequent relay of
these orders to the submarines by their accompanying sur-
face protectors. Gorshkov considers this capability to be









absolutely essential in a prewar (deployment) situation.
Other modern hardware that: the Soviet Navy has
applied toward increasing the. viability and effective-
ness of its surface forces has included long range mis-
siles of various types, improved guns with accompanying
sohpisticated radar detection and fire control equipment,
and upgraded sonars so vital to the ASW effort. The air
arm has been sent to sea on board helicopter carriers and
cruisers. It now includes VSTOL aircraft on board the
KIEV class ships. Surface-effect ships and hydrofoils
also have been introduced, but Gorshkov only sees these as
a transition stage.
"Hydrofoil ships can be regarded as a transitional
stage in the development of modern surface ships
which differ in principle from displacement ships.
These ships are air cushioned vehicles and wing-
in-ground effect vehicles, whose development is
receiving a great deal of attention abroad. The
air cushioned principle is applicable to ships of
various displacement up to ocean going ships. Pos-
sessing a speed of greater than 100 knots, this
kind of ocean going ship is capable of crossing
the Atlantic Ocean in 30 to 40 hours, whereas the
conventional transport takes up to eight days or
more.... The main tactical property of air cushioned
vehicles lies in their ability to move over the
water surface and over land, even over ice cover,
and their ability to move over shallow water areas,
and move freely from water, to land, to ice covered
areas, and back again. All of this combined with
high speed and high cargo-carrying capacity, give
the new ships a series of highly significant
tactical advantages . "'0







The Soviet Employment of Seapower
Periods of Peace
It has been almost a quarter of a century since
Admiral Gorshkov assumed the watch as Soviet Commander-in-
Chief of the Navy. This period has been a time of rela-
tive peace as far as armed clashes between the Warsaw
Pact and the West is concerned. Now that his concepts of
seapower and navy building have been documented in this
chapter, how has he utilized this period to achieve his
objectives? What are the observed results? What has
happened to the scope and level of Soviet naval activity
as Gorshkov strove to implement his concepts of Seapower?
The remainder of this chater is devoted to providing docu-
mentary answers to these questions. Turning once more to
Admiral Gorshkov as he outlines the measures he has taken:
"Establishing conditions for gaining sea control
has always required lengthy periods of time and
the execution of a series of measures while still
at peace. These measures include development and
preparation of the necessary forces and material
and maintaining them in readiness to accomplish
combat missions, concentration of groupings of
forces and disposing them in groupings in a theater
in such a manner that they will have superiority of
position over the enemy, and also providing of
facilities in the sea and oceanic theaters of mili-
tary operations, the proper organization of forces
and a base system appropriate to their mission, a







While expanding the activities of his Navy far beyond
the borders of the Soviet Union's primary sphere of influ-
ence, he takes his cue frcrr. what he perceives as the main
goal of the USSR.
"For the Soviet Union, whose main goal is the
building of Communism, and a steady improvement
in the standard of living of the builders of
Communism, seapower is emerging as one of the
important factors strengthening its economy,
accelerating its scientific and technical devel-
opment, and consolidating the economic, cultural
and scientific ties between the Soviet people and
the peoples in countries friendly to them."'^
In another passage, he returns to this theme.
"The growing sea might of our country is sup-
porting the successful conduct of its foreign
policy, permits it to expand trade constantly,
transport scientific and cultural ties with
other countries, and to strengthen constructive
cooperation between states with different social
systems, and puts an important instrument in the
hands of our people for carrying out their his-
torical mission, the expansion of economic aid to
all countries which are on the path to independent
development . "73
He takes particular pride in the capacity of his Navy
to pursue such activities.
"Yet the military aspects examined by us are not the
only aspect which exert an effect on the role of
navies. Navies, while remaining a highly effective
and indispensable means of armed combat, also are
constantly being utilized as an instrument of state
policy in peacetime. The sea is a no-man's land,










activities many of the limitations that prevent
utilization of other branches of the armed forces
in peacetime for political purposes . "74
Expansion of Seapower's Auxiliary Components
The fishing industr y
The first step in the review of the documentary evi-
dence of the observed results entails an examination of
the progress made by the Soviet Union with regard to each
of the components of seapower. A substantial investment
of approximately seven billion rubles was made in ship-
building for the Soviet fishing industry between 1950 and
1976. This effort made it possible to sustain an annual
growth rate of over 13 percent making the fishing fleet the
world's largest and most modern by the end of that period.
The Soviet Union was second to Japan in terms of live
weight catch, had 38 percent of the world's "catching power"
and 85 percent of the world's carrier tonnage. Table 4
illustrates this expansion in terms of gross rate tonnage,
while Table 5 depicts the average fish catch by areas shown
in Fig. 14. Of even greater significance has been the con-
tinuing interaction with Third World nations as a result of
Soviet fishing activities. This access has provided the
foundations for further entry to these nations and is





75Primary sources included: (1) Review of Fisheries in
QECD Member Countries, 1974, (ParTs! Organization for
(Continued on p. 154)

TABLE A
Expansion of Soviet Fishing Fleet, 1950 - 1975









1955 1,379 734 18.5%
1960 2,588 1,760 17.7%
1965 3,373 3,301 12.1%
1970 4,165 5,194 8.8%
1975 4,363 6,600 5.2%
TABLE 5
USSR Fish Catch by Areas







Metric Percent Metric Percent
Tons of Oitch Tons of Catch
6,134.1 100.0 8,569.5 100.0
1,063.9 1,185.3






E. Central Atlantic 346.7






W. Indian Ocean 38.4








































































































The Soviet Merchant Marine has increased over six
times since the 1950s. While this growth is significant,
Davidchik and Mahoney assess it as following world shipping
trends in general. An improvement in the relative stand-
ings vis-a-vis other world merchant fleets has been real-
ized, but not by a substantial amount. Soviet inputs to
their fleet tend to be smaller, slower, and less techno-
logically advanced than those of Western nations. The
Soviets are beginning to build new supertankers, however,
and it appears they intend to triple their purchases of
large, automated roll-on/roll-off ships, which will en-
hance significantly their capacity to ship military and
other equipment to underdeveloped or overcrowded harbors
and drive it off in assembled condition ready for use.
Older ships have been replaced rapidly and overall 65
Economic Development and Cooperation, 1974), pp. 26, 27;
(2) Year Book of Fishery Statistics, 1975, Vol. 40 (Rome-
Office of International Fisheries, Food and Agriculture
Organization, United Nations 1976), p. 269; (3) 1970,
Vol. 30; (4) 1974, Vol. 34; (5) A.S. Bogdunov, Soviet




D.C.: National Marine Fisheries Service, National Oceano-
graphic and Aironautics Administration, U.S. Department
of Commerce, 1973). The data was compiled in this form
by Michael D. Davidchik and Robert B. Mahoney, Jr., ana-
lysts for the Center for Naval Analyses, an affiliate of
the University of Rochester under contract to the Depart-
ment of the Navy. The tables were extracted from "Soviet
Civil Fleets in the Third World", Appendix A to Bradford
Dismukes and James McConnell, eds
.
, Soviet Naval Diplomacy
,
(New York: Permagon Press, 1979), pp. 324 - 330.
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percent of their tonnage is less than ten years old. Table
8 provides trends in Soviet and world shipping. This grov;th
in the merchant marine has paralleled the expansion in
Soviet foreign trade that has occurred since 1955 as shown
in Table 9. The nations involved in this trade are
depicted in terms of merchant marine port visits in Table
10. These calls were increased some 60 percent between
1965 and 1975. Like fisheries cooperation, recent Soviet
merchant marine activities have included joint ventures
such as the creation of firms with the following countries:
Sri Lanka, Egypt, Spain, The Philippines, Iraq, and
Somalia
.
Although they average over a billion dollars a year,
arms transfers reflect a relatively small portion of this
trade, which seems to be based more on economic reasons
than politico-military. The latter flavor, however, is
conspicuous with regard to particular client states includ-
ing Cuba and certain Middle Eastern countries. It is esti-
mated that of the approximately 800 merchantmen under
Soviet flag on the high seas on any given day, only five
percent carry cargoes that can be said to be military
related. Intensive resupply efforts such as those carried
out during the October 1973 Middle East War and the Angolan
Civil War do not seem to detract significantly from this per-
centage. The tanker force, while participating primarily
in commercial ventures, also provides considerable support
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to Soviet naval units
. This has the advantage of earning
their keep while supporting the Navy and, since the com-
mercial fleet is not subject to the same restrictions as
warships, a merchantman car. also enter port freely and
purchase fuel, water and foodstuffs that later may be
transferred to the fleet. As shown in Table 10, Soviet
merchant fleet visits to Third World ports have increased
from an average of 4,550 per year in the period 1967-1970
to an average of 6,850 per year in the period 1971-1974.
This represents a percentage increase from 757o to 827o of
the total ships' calls to foreign ports made by the Soviet
merchant fleet.
7 6
Primary sources included: (1) Handbook of Economic S ta-
tistics
,
ER-77-10537, (Washington D.C.: Central Intelli-
gence Agency, 1978), pp. 152 and 159. (2) World Military





p~ 69 . Both were taken from Davidchik and




Trends in Soviet and World Shipping
USSR World USSR as % USSR World USSKasS
Year DWT DWT of Work! # Units # Units of World
1950 1.8 107.2 1.7 432 13,282 3.3
1955 2.4 130.0 1.8 604 15,148 4.0
1960 4.9 1 7 1 .9 2.8 873 17,317 5.0
1965 8.0 214.1 3.7 985 17,825 5.5
1970 11.8 325.1 3.7 1,395 19,503 7.1
1975 15.3 556.7 2.7 1,660 22,391 7.4
1976 16.5 597.1 2.8 1,707 22,920 7.4
TABLE 9
Soviet Imports Plus Exports by Groups of Nations
(Billions in U.S. $) a
Non-Communist
Year Total Communist Developed Less Developed
1955 6.5 5.1 .9 .3
1960 11.2 8.2 2.0 1.0
1965 16.2 11.2 3.0 2.0
1970 24.5 16.0 5.1 3.4
1975 70.2 39.5 21.3 9.4
1976 75.7 41.8 24.4 9.5
^Research Aid - 1977, CIA, p. 59.
"The Communist category includes the PRC, Cuba, North Korea, and Mongolia. The less
developed non-Communist category includes Spain, Portugal, and Greece.

TABLE 10
Estimated Annual Merchant Ship




























Other calls to Third
World States














































Expansion of Naval Capabilities
Major combatants and submarines
Returning to the principal component of seapower, the
Navy, the period from 1957 to 1975 (the assumption of lead-
ership by Gorshkov to his publication of Seapower) is a
direct reflection of the concepts he espoused. It can be
conceived in terms of qualitative gains over the quanti-
tative increases in large capital ships that resulted from
the Stalin-Kuznetsov directed program in the immediate post-
war era. This transformation is depicted in Table 11. While
the overall numbers of units are down, total combatant ton-
nage is increased by about 40 percent. The tonnage increase
may be attributed directly to the substantial increase in
ballistic and cruise missile submarines (from 5 to 860 dis-
placement tons). In terms of investment value, the increase
for major surface combatants is even more startling (about
600 percent - note that the figures given in the table are
in terms of 1957 values) . The 1957 submarine force was
almost totally conventional from the standpoint of both
propulsion and armament. In 1975, 65 to 70 percent were
nuclear powered and 60 to 75 percent were missile armed.
In 1957, the air arm had yet to come on board the fleet,
nor were missile launchers prevalent in the surface fleet.
In 1975, two-thirds of the cruiser/destroyer force in terras
of full load displacement had these capabilities.
77James McConnell, "Doctrine and Capabilities' in Soviet
Naval Diplomacy




Number of Units, Tonnage and Investment Value
















Combatant 1957 1975 1975
Submarine:
Ballistic-
Missile 75 5 555 176
i
Cruise-
Missile 67 305 60
Torpedo-
Attack 475± 193 500 500 27 58
Surface:
Cruisers 30b 29 480 320 18 35
Destroyers 130 82 370 305 17 40
Escorts 90 105 115 135 6 10
Total Major
Combatants 727+ 551 1470 2120 68 378
c
Minor
Combatants 325 410 32
\
Total
Combatants 1800c 2530 100 451
Note a: Investment values determined on the basis of the
basic values per ton for the respective ship cate-
gories during various construction periods given
in Stockholm International Peace Research Insti-
tute, World Armaments and Disarmaments: SIPRI
Yearbook 1975 .
Note b: Includes two battleships.






Soviet Naval Aviation also has been transformed into
the Gorshkov image. Under the Stalin program in the early
1950s, it numbered nearly 90,000 personnel and some A, 000
aircraft. Its composition, however, emphasized fighter
aircraft cover which could provide an air defense umbrella
over the fleet at only short combat ranges from the bases
ashore. A limited number of jet bombers were employed as
a small strike force, for reconnaissance, and elementary
ASW operations. Some 1,500 to 2,000 of these aircraft
were lost to the National Air Defense Command in an armed
forces reorganization carried out under Khruschev in the
late 1950s. The 1978 air order of battle is depicted in
Table 12. The aircraft involved include the subsonic
TU-16 BADGER with an operational, unfueled combat radius
of a little over 1,200 NM; the supersonic TU-16 BLINDER,
Mach 1.4, with a slightly greater combat radius; and the
recently introduced (1974) variable geometry wing bomber
BACKFIRE, Mach 2+, with a range of from 5,000 to 6,000 NM.
All of these strike aircraft are equipped with standoff
missiles and carry electronic warfare penetration pack-
ages
. The IL-38 MAY and the BE-12 MAIL are the mainstays
of shorebased ASW air. The former has a maximum range of
about 2,500 NM at 280 knots, while the latter can cruise
at 270 knots to a range of about 2,000 NM. Long range
reconnaissance is provided by the TU-95 BEAR, which can
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cruise at better than 400 knots and has an unrefueled
combat radius of over 4,000 KM. BEARs have made numerous
nonstop flights to Havana, Cuba, and Conakry, Guinea.
Some also are configured for ASW operations . Tactical
air now includes the shorebased SU-17 FITTER bomber and,
as indicated earlier, the VSTOL FORGER Is being introduced
to the fleet to upgrade seabased capabilities. Fig. 15
gives a comparison of the coverage that can be provided
7 8
by the various strike, ASU and reconnaissance aircraft.
78
Primary source: "General George S. Brown, Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, United States Military Posture
for 1979
,
(Washington, D.C.: Department of Deferise, January
1978), p . 20, as quoted in Paul J. Murphy, Morskaya Aviatsyia
(Soviet Naval Aviation): Its Development, Capabilities and
Limitations", in Naval Power in Soviet Policy , pp. 182.

TABLE 12
Soviet Naval Aviation Order of Battle


















-*£- 111 95 BEAR known rrconn-i'ssance (racks from
SNA bases and deployment areas
Radius ol TU 22 BLINDER 1 .500 nm
Radius o'TLMG BADGER 1.200 nm





Fig. 15. Ranges of Soviet Strike and Reconnaissance Aircraft
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Mi_nor combatants, auxil iaries
and service craft
The remainder of the Soviet naval order of battle is
depicted in Tables 13 through 17. Displacements for the
Coastal Patrol Fleet run up to 900 tons, while combat
ranges vary up to 800 NM. Equipped with a host of guns,
torpedoes and various kinds of missiles, they provide
potent defense in home waters. Long proponents of mine-
warfare, most combatants, submarines and the major aviation
units are capable of laying mines. In addition to the
naval minesweepers, large numbers of the fishing fleet
have been designed to double as sweepers should the situa-
tion require effort beyond the Navy's capability. Further,
helicopters are being used more and more in conjunction
with surface units in minesweeping exercises. Seven
classes of landing ships have entered service since the
1950s. The RAPUCHA class, which is built in Poland and
became operational in 1975, is assumed to have a good
troop/ tank load capacity, a roll-on/roll-of f capability,
and improved mechanical and armament features . Fast Hydro-
foils and air cushioned vehicles have been used to land
marines in Soviet combined arms exercises . The larger
wing-in-ground effect vehicle tested by the Soviets and
called the EKRANOPLAN is said to be capable of carrying
up to 900 troops from the water across the ice and marshes
as described in a previous section. The Soviets designate

165
the EKRANOPLAN as a multi-purpose vehicle that, can be used
for a variety of missions ASU, minesweeping, patrol and
fast supply. As indicated in Table 17, the auxiliary
forces are the largest component of the Soviet fleet and
they include a wide variety of support and transport
vessels. As mentioned earlier, the merchant fleet aug-
ments the services provided by these units. Of particu-
lar note are the 56 intelligence collectors, which
probably are the most active units in the Soviet Navy that
79deploy throughout the world on a regular bases.
TABLE 13
Coastal Patrol Fleet Order of Battle
(as of 1 January 1978)
Tola!
Tvpe Class Name Numbers
1
Patrol Iscorts POT I
GKISH\ 1<
Patrol Guided Missile CombatamVMissile An.uk Boats SANl'C HKA
KOVUK















Combatants Small C i*mbatants
Na\al Aviation
Aircraft Subnia incs
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79Murphy "Trends in Soviet Laval Force Structure", in
Naval Power in Soviet Policy




Minesweeper Order of Battle


















Amphibious Order of Battle
(as of 1 January 1978)
I'ype Class Name Total
1 >. pc
Bv
I arge tank'troop landing ship ALLIGATOR
K \\\K HA
Medium landing ship polnocny
kobbi:
Sm.ill vehicle hunting ship MP-
4
81






Auxiliary and Service Craft Order of Battle
(as of 1 Jaunary 1978)
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Expansion of Naval Activities
Trends in out-of-area deployments
Fig. 16 depicts the locations of the four Soviet
or.
Fleet Headquarters. When the primary mission of the
Soviet Navy in the 1950s was defense in depth of the
coastal areas of the USSR, naval units rarely ventured
from these waters. Most naval activity, thus, was con-
ducted in what Western analysts termed in-area. For the
Northern Fleet this corresponded to the Barents and White
Seas. For the other fleets these waters included the
Baltic and Black Seas, while in the Pacific operations
were limited mainly to the Sea of Japan and the Sea of
Okhotsk. Only one naval base, Petropovlosk at the south-
ern tip of the Kamchatka Penninsula had open access to the
Pacific or any major ocean.
The author's career, which commenced in the early
sixties, spans a period when if one or two Soviet com-
batants were steaming out-of-area (beyond the seas indi-
cated above) , it was regarded as a major intelligence
event; to the time when in 1973, as he was serving with the
U.S. Sixth Fleet during the October Arab-Israeli War,
his Joint Intelligence Center on board the amphibious com-
mand ship USS MOUNT WHITNEY tracked up to 99 Soviet vessels
in the Mediterranean alone. Soviet out-of-area operations
on
Charles C. Petersen, "Trends in Sovi et Naval Operations",






have thus intensified considerably since those early days.
Beginning in the early 1970s they have been conducted on a
regular basis and have become world wide in scope as docu-
mented throughout the remainder of this section.
<C2S3
S Northern Fleet
tj Baltic Sea Fleet (Severornorsk)
*4 (Kaliningrad) --,1 "^ S XT^i
C L--^^ Union of Soviet Sociali
^^7 J\~~~~ Pacific Ocean F loot
< U &&J (Vladivostok)
O Location of fleet headquarters




Surface and submarine forces
Tables 18 through 21 provide a measure of both the
flavor and extension in scope of these operations in the
Atlantic Ocean, Mediterranean Sea, Indian and Pacific
o-j
Oceans. Diesel submarines were among the earliest
units to deploy to all areas. The late sixties brought
both cruise and ballistic missile deployment on a regu-
lar basis to include stationing of ballistic missile
patrols continuously since the early seventies off both
the east and west coasts of the United States. Sur-
face unit deployments have included the major commitment
of the Fifth Eskadra to the Mediterranean (with an order
of battle comparable and many times exceeding that of the
U.S. Sixth Fleet) and the Tenth Eskadra in the Indian
Ocean, which has gradually risen from a modest commit-
ment of 14 units in 1968 to the point where it began to
exceed 30 units on a regular basis in 1973. Fig. 17 and
Tables 22 and 23 provide graphical and statistical break-
er o
downs of these deployments . Regular patrols conducted
by both intelligence collection units and combatants on
a continuous basis throughout the world are depicted in
83Figs. 18 and 19. Other areas to which the Soviets have
81
Petersen, "Trends in Soviet Naval Operations:, in
Soviet Naval Diplomacy, pp. 77 - 84.
82
Ibid.
, pp. 48, 73 and 74.
Ibid., pp. 53 and 55.
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sent regular surface deployments include Cuba, Guinea and
the Western Hump of Africa, Angola and southern Africa,
and since the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam and subsequent
North Vietnamese takeover of the South, the harbors of
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Mass Diesel Attack Deployments
to the Mediterranean, 1968-1976
178
Interval




Generally at sea from tenders1
Jan 1969
3-7 months

















10 May 1972 Submarines begin use of Al-
6 months Gabbari shipyard for major





13 Oct 1973 Submarines from the 13th
10 months deployment group
initiate regular use of
14 Sep 1974
10 months






Mean Length of Deployment in the

















1969 5 4 - 4 5
1970 3 5 4 3 2
1971 5 5 4 4 4
1972 5 4 5 4 3
1973 10 12 11 5d 14
1974 7 13 11 4 7
1975 8 4 9 6 5
a Data for 1976 not available.
^Including escort ships.
cE\cluding space operations support ships.






Fig. 18. Intelligence Collection Ship Patrols




Strait of Sicily \
Patrol





The Soviet naval air arm is also active on a regu-
lar basis over the world's oceans. Up until 1968, areas
in the northeast Atlantic and northwest Pacific were the
ones that were primarily vulnerable to reconnaissance-
flights from the Soviet land mass by the long range
TU-95 BEARs. In April of that year, six TU-16 bombers
were deployed to Egypt and they maintained a squadron
there until asked to leave by the Egyptians in 1972. Four
BE-12 MAIL ASW aircraft had reinforced the squadron in the
interim and then these were replaced by the more advanced
IL-38 MAYs . The principal object of the operations of
these aircraft during that two year period was the U.S.
Sixth Fleet. Table 24 and Figs. 20 and 21 depict other
deployments by Soviet Naval Aviation and illustrate the
coverage that the reconnaissance aircraft enjoy from their
overseas bases.
Petersen, "Trends in Soviet Naval Operations", in Soviet
Naval Diplomacy, pp. 57 - 59.
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Dute of First Number of Type of
Deployment Deployments Aircraft Deployed
April 1970 29 Tu-95D
July 1973 19 Tu-95D
April 1975 8 11-38
October 1 976 1 TU-95D
April 1975 1 An-12
Februarv 1977 1 Tu-95D
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Tu-95D unrefueled combat radiu; with
3-hour loiter: 3200 n.mi.

































Gorshkov talked not only of disposing his forces in
the various ocean theaters, but also of providing facil-
ities in the sea, the proper organization of forces and
C C
a base system appropriate to their mission. It is per-
haps in the area of logistics support to deployed forces
that the Soviet Navy has yet to reach the standards of
other modern navies. Table 25 provides a comparison of
the displacement and capacity of U.S. and Soviet oilers.
As noted in the table, all except the SOFIYA class are
considerably smaller than U.S. counterparts. Only the
DUBNA and BORIS CHILIKIN classes are capable of providing
dry stores in addition to fuel. Because most Soviet com-
batants can not make fresh v/ater on board for drinking,
provision of this necessity is also a must from the sup-
port force. Due to the limited size of the oilex's, this
results in opportunity costs as fuel is displaced by the
fresh water requirement. P'urther, most replenishment
must take place at anchorage vice underway at sea due to
the limited capabilities of the auxiliaries to supply and
the combatantants to receive stores and fuel underway.
While these deficiencies are being overcome as more
modern units become available, up into the 1980s the
See page 148.
or
Petersen, "Trends in Soviet Naval Operations" in Soviet
Naval Diplomacy, p. 62.
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Soviets have relied upon an extensive anchorage system
and access to overseas pore facilities to compensate for
these difficulties. Figs. 22 and 23 portray the anchor-
ages regularly used by the Soviets in the Mediterranean
and the Indian Ocean respectively. Table 26 outlines the
countries, degree of access and types of services per-
formed for the Soviets at port facilities around the
world. Not mentioned on this table are the base in
Cuba at Cienfuegos and the ports of Danang and Cam Ranh
Bay in Vietnam cited earlier. In addition to the regu-
lar use of facilities in the nations above, Soviet port
visit activity throughout the world has grown extensively
Op
since 1967 as indicated in Table 27. Surface combatants
and submarines normally make few purchases during these
visits. Their purpose is primarily for crew rest, limited
maintenance and showing the flag. As cited earlier, the
merchant fleet makes the bulk of the purchases for the
Soviet Navy with resupply occurring later at an anchor-





Ibid., pp. 65, 66 and 70
































































(Aveiage capacity: 63,500 barrels. F.xcluding the single unit of the Sofiya class
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1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1976
16 162 77 36 2i>] 62 87 292 24 2 65 1 ,240
14 38 17 19 14 37 28 41 66 87 361
- - 2 7 22 20 42 61 54 75 283
- - 5 4 23 5 2 36 28 27 48 223
- - - 21 22 4 5 22 48 31 25 214
13 19 8 17 26 22 28 15 17 18 183
- - 4 5 15 7 14 37 34 18 134
- -
1 11 16 13 23 22 17 15 118
- - - - - 3 - 14 20 34 71
- - 4 1 2 8 15 17 8 12 67
9 6 9 3 4 3 5 4 10 11 64
- - 2 2 10 5 14 9 10 2 54
- - 2 3 2 - 4 18 19 48
- - 3 3 1 2 8 12 4 2 35
-
1 2 1 - 6 2 5 6 6 29
-. -
1 7 1 9 1 2 2 1 24
_ -
1 6 2 3 2 4 2 20
_ - 2 3 3 6 1 - 1 3 19
- - - - 4 1 12 17
-
1 4 - - 2 4 1 - 12





- 1 4 1 3 11
- - 5 - 4 - - - - 9
-. -
1 2 - - - 1 2 3 9
_ - - - 2 - - - 6 8
4 3 - - - - - 1 8
_ -. 5 2 - - - - 1 - 8
- - 3 - - 3 - 1 1 8
- -
4 1
4 - 1 1 2 8
5














































































1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1976
55 227 161 187 374 319 339 638 587 485 3,372
Excluding visits by oceanographic research ships and space support ships. Values believed
to be representative, possibly incomplete.
bCommunist state; not treated further in this discussion.
cNo operational visits by combatants.
^U.K. colony until June 1976.
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Table 28 denotes the location to which Soviet air-
90
craft have deployed since 1968. Not shown are Cairo,
Egypt, which was the only location to have a regularly
assigned squadron (1970 - 1972) , Aden, South Yemen and
Danang in Vietnam. Aden has been the principal field in
the Indian Ocean area since the Somalians withdrew their
hospitality after the Soviets sided with Ethiopia in the
hostilities between those two nations. Fuel is usually
the only local purchase for these deployments. Spare
parts, light repair equipment, maintenance and extra
flight crews are normally brought in by accompanying
transport aircraft.






Overseas Airfields From Which




Somalia Berbera Military Airfield









09-35N/13-37W 1 1 ,000
08-51S/12-15E 12,000
a Ixnpth of primary runway, in feet.
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Trends in out-of-area operations
While deployed, the Soviet Navy regularly exer-
cises its naval warfare capabilities. In addition to port
visits to show the flag and exercise operations, the Navy
also has been actively engaged in incidents of coercive
diplomacy since 1967. Twenty of these incidents are
91documented in Table 29.
Since 1966, there have been four major superpower
naval confrontations: The June 1967 Arab-Israeli War,
the Jordanian Crisis of September 1970, the December 1971
Indo-Pakistani Crisis, and the October 1973 Arab-Israeli
92War. The conclusion reached by the author's studying
of these confrontations was as follows:
"By 1963 the Soviets had developed the capa-
bility to use their Navy to try to influence
both the course of an international crisis and
the behavior of the U.S. toward that crisis.
Events have shown that under the proper circum-
stances Soviet Crisis-management forces possess
antiship capabilities that require the serious
attention of U.S. leaders in their crisis delib-
erations. In addition, the Soviet Fleet has
shown that it can simultaneously carry out
91Abram N. Shulski, ed
.
, "Coercive Diplomacy", in Soviet
Naval Diplomacy
, pp. 116, 117.
92These confrontations are examined in detail in Stephen
S. Roberts, ed
.
, "Superpower Naval Confrontations", in
Soviet Naval Diplomac y, pp. 158 - 220. (Author's note:
The blockade during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 dis-
cussed in Chapter I involved a confrontation between
powerful U.S. ships of the line and essentially unarmed
Soviet merchantment . Although there was a potential for
a submarine threat, Soviet submarines that may have been
in the area did not intervene overtly.)

limited operations that might hay




Since 1979 and the taking of the hostages in Iran
coupled with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the
Soviet Tenth Eskadra and the U.S. Battlegroups operating
in the Indian Ocean have stood eyeball to eyeball as the
events continue to unfold. Although the leadership of
both nations have been exceedingly circumspect in their
management of naval activities in all these crises, the
potential for escalation remains as the respective forces
are maintained at the ready.
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Trends in out-of-area exercises
The largest scale exercises ever conducted by the
Soviet Navy out-of-area were what are known in the West
as the Okean series, the first in 1970 and the second in
1975. World wide in scope, both these exercises included
over 200 participating units and they were orchestrated
from Naval Headquarters in Moscow. Fig. 24 depicts the
area to which the participating units deployed for the
941975 version. Still other exercises less well known
have been conducted locally by the Soviets in the
Mediterranean, and the Indian Ocean.
94Primary source: Bruce W. Watson and Marguerite A.
Walton, "Okean-75", U.S. Naval Institute Proceeding's,
July 1976, p. 95, as extracted from Petersen, "Showing
the Flag", in Soviet Naval Diplomacy, p. 75. (Author's
note: That an Okean scale exercise did not materialize
to the extent anticipated in 1980 may be attributed to
the heightened tensions between the superpowers as an
aftermath of the Iranian Hostage Crisis and the Afghani-
stan invasion. Despite the minimum exercise activity,
Soviet out-of-area naval force levels remained high in




















Professor Donald C. Daniel, who has taught a course
titled "Soviet Naval and Maritime Strategy" at the Naval
Postgraduate School since the early seventies, has dis-
cerned several trends with regard to the conduct of these
95
exercises: Beginning in 1965, the largest out-of-area
exercises appear to be held every five years corresponding
to the terminus of one five year plan and the commencement
of the next. The exceptions include Exercise SEVER in
1968, which was a Warsaw Pact exercise with units of
other bloc nations vice being strictly Soviet. Local
exercises are held biannually by the four fleets normally
in the spring and late summer or early fall.
From 1961 onward, Anticarrier Warfare (ACW) has
been included as a principal scenario in most exercises.
Through 1971, the Soviet practice of ACW emphasized pri-
marily the strike phase. Beginning in 1974, an apparent
shift in emphasis toward the reconnaissance and surveil-
lance phase has been detected. This would include con-
centration on a "buildup of tensions" scenario with the
employment of satellites included among the ocean
surveillance assets used.
Antisubmarine Warfare (ASW) had been a feature of
most exercises prior to 1973 . In the spring of that year
95Donald C. Daniel, "Trends and Patterns in Major Soviet





it was made the major exercise theme and coordinated air,
surface and submarine assets were employed against open
ocean targets
.
Soviet amphibious maneuvers have usually been con-
ducted separately from major exercises. Evidence to date
seems to indicate that the Naval Infantry, the Soviet
counterpart to the Marine Corps, is considered to provide
the spearhead of any landing operations with regular army
ground forces following up, even being transported to the
objective area in merchant ships if necessary. Other
aspects of naval warfare practiced by the Soviets in
these exercises have included interdiction of sea lines
of communication, convoy operations and underway
replenishment
.
Professor Daniel concludes his article with the
following remarks
:
"From an exercise point of view, Soviet progress
in ACW is truly impressive, reflecting a very
strong commitment. Progress in ASW is more dif-
ficult to gauge, but the exercises, particularly
those in recent years, indicated that the Soviet
commitment to the ASW problem is just as strong
if not stronger than the commitment to ACW.
Soviet progress in amphibious warfare is also dif-
ficult to judge, but in this writer's opinion,
progress was especially marked in the sixties
through the beginning of the seventies with the
Soviets now possibly being on a plateau. The
question of progress in the ANTI-SLOC mission may
not be as important as the question of commitment
to that mission since residual Soviet capability
for strikes against SLOC exists. At-sea replen-
ishment is, I believe, the Soviets achilles heel.
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commitmeni to improve the war-
sustaining capability is there, but it does
seem less strong than Soviet determination
to improve their war-fighting posture. As
for command and control t it is enough simply
to note the following: any country which
moved from a relatively small Norwegian
Sea exercise in 1961 to worldwide 200 slop
maneuvers in 1970 and 197.') mast hove made a
strong commitment to improving C2 and









In eai-ly 1981, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admi-
ral Thomas B. Hayward, testified before the Senate Armed
Services Committee:
"We have entered a period in which any reasonable
estimate of the balance falls within the range of
uncertainty. In other words, the situation today
is so murky one cannot, with confidence, state q 7
that the U.S. possesses a margin of superiority."
The CNO continued to point out that the U.S. naval
capabilities improved throughout 1980, but the pace of
development lagged behind that of the Soviets . He com-
pared the commissioning of one U.S. attack nuclear sub-
marine in 1980 to the commissioning of 12 attack submarines
in the Soviet Union, eight of which were nuclear powered.
He indicated that from a qualitative standpoint, Soviet
naval development included launching the 22,000 ton KIROV
class nuclear powered missile cruiser. The newest U.S.
nuclear cruiser weighs only 11,000 tons. Further, the
sophisticated air defense system for this cruiser that
will be comparable to what KIROV carries today, will not
be introduced into the U.S. fleet until 1982. With regard
to submarine development; the OSCAR class introducted in
1980 is the largest cruise missile carrying submarine in
the world, while the new TYPHOON class ballistic missile
"Navy Chief Details Loss of U.S. Edge on Soviets",
Aviation Week & Space Technology, February 9, 1981, p. 35
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boat is the largest submarine ever built.
Projection to 2000
The following developments were highlighted during
a symposium sponsored by the DNI, Rear Admiral Sumner
98Shapiro, in July 1980:
"...Current surface construction includes four
ongoing cruiser programs .. .At least as many addi-
tional cruiser programs are anticipated by the end
of the century. Two additional KIEV class carriers
are expected to be launched before a new class of
CVN becomes operational later in this decade. The
IVAN ROGOV LST appears to be the beginning of
building larger amphibious ships... When coupled
with AO and CVN developments, this will dramatically
improve the Soviet Navy's ability to project power...'
"...Expanded Soviet shipyard capability will pro-
duce new classes of nuclear attack and cruise
missile submarines, diesel attack submarines, and
nuclear ballistic missile submarines ... (the latter
type), however, should represent a smaller percent-
age of submarine construction due to the Strategic
Arms Limitations Agreements..."
"...Aircraft production will see an increase in
seaborne aircraft, with a fixed wing, catapult
launched aircraft for the anticipated CVNs as well
as an improved helicopter .. .BACKFIRE production is
expected to continue through the decade, to be
replaced in the 1990' s... The BEAR will probably
have a jet powered replacement by the late 1980 's.
Additionally, continued development of Wing-in-
Ground Effect vehicles with subsequent series
production is possible..."
"...The future Soviet Navy will, therefore, have more
air power, improved targeting and surveillance
capabilities, coupled with longer range, more accu-
rate missiles. It will also have fewer, although
98Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) presentation at the
symposium on "The Soviet Navy as an Extension of Soviet
National and Military Strategy"(U) , ONI Naval Intelligence
Newsletter, October 1980, pp. 14 - 21 (Classified Reference)
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vastly more capable ships..."
"...Soviet weaknesses that will continue include
geographic constraints, open-ocean ASW...,air
defense, and the high rate of personnel turnover..."
"...It appears that the Soviet Navy has reached
a watershed. If current trends continue this
leads to the question. 'What will the Soviets d
with this vastly more capable Navy?' ..."
Application to the
Naval Warfare Analysis Experiment
That Admiral Gorshkov already has achieved many of
his objectives towards building a balanced navy cannot be
denied. The evidence also indicates the substantial naval
warfare capability that he has provided to Soviet decision
makers and confirms their will to employ that capability
aggressively in support of Soviet foreign and security
policy. Now that the reality situation has been presented,
Chapters IV and V will compare and test both the conceptual
and scientific models they develop against this reality
situation to determine the validity of these models for
providing automatic data processing support to naval
warfare analytical and managerial activities
.

IV. THE CONCEPTUAL MODEL: NAVAL WARFARE
ANALYTICAL AND INFORMATION MANAGEMENT THEORY
Purpose
This chapter addresses the problems related to the
processing, analysis, production and management of intel-
ligence concerning naval warfare activities. It applies
the threat perception, crisis management, systems analy-
sis, and management information system concepts described
in Chapter I to develop naval vzarfare analytical and infor
mation management theory. It relates this theory to both
intelligence requirements indicated as a result of the
systems analysis conducted in Chapter II and the reality
situation described in Chapter III concerning the poten-
tial threat posed by the dramatic expansion in Soviet
naval capabilities and activities that has occurred since
Admiral Gorshkov took the helm. The conceptual model
developed in this manner provides the foundation for the
detailed scientific models of automatic data processing
support capabilities outlined in Chapter V. These sup-
port capabilites are offered as proposed solutions to the
direction that the future development of OSIS should take




system to support naval decision making in response to the
Soviet threat.
The chapter covers three major topics as follows:
(1) Operational intelligence requirements. (2) Naval War-
fare Analysis Experiment Overview. (3) Naval Warfare
analytical and information management theory.
Operat ional Intelligence Requirements
Service to the Operational System
Chapter II noted that operational system components
required technical intelligence products that assess how
the adversary employs his material systems and capabilities
operationally. These components required operational
intelligence products that assess where the adversary has
deployed his naval forces, what kinds of naval activity are
these forces conducting, and what does the adversary intend
to do next. These intelligence products were used by
operational system components to justify naval programs,
develop naval doctrine and strategy, formulate contingency
and operational plans, exercise command and control func-




Key Operational Intelligence Questions
These support requirements suggest that the operational
99See discussion on p. 93-95.
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intelligence process should focus on and seek answers to
nine key questions related to the conduct of naval activ-
ity by potential adversaries. (1) Where are the adversary's
forces? (2) What is their composition and which specific
individual units do these forces include? (3) What are
they doing? (4) What are their capabilities? (5) How do
they exercise their capabilities? (6) How well can they
conduct naval warfare? (7) Where are they going and what
will they do next? (8) How will these activities affect
U.S. forces? (9) Which U.S. units need to be advised?
Of these nine questions, the answers to one and two
can be provided more easily than the remaining seven.
Recent data from even one ocean surveillance sensor will
assist resolution of the unit location and identification
questions
.
Question three requires tracking of the forces con-
cerned over time at the minimum to provide even a semblance
of an estimate of what these forces are doing. At least
periodic observation of these activities would be required
to confirm that estimate.
Initial estimate of individual unit capabilities can
be derived once the units concerned have been identified
through sensor data. Other sensor data might suggest that
new capabilities have been provided these units. Visual




Questions five through seven require the active col-
lection and reporting of friendly units from the scene of
the activity in order to assemble sufficient intelligence
that will provide a reasonable assessment of the ramifi-
cations of that activity. Continuity on the problem
concerned and familiarity with the various patterns of
adversary activity help refine this activity assessment.
The answers to questions eight and nine are the
reasons for performing the operational intelligence proc-
ess. They indicate the decisions that the commander needs
to make prior to directing response to the situation.
Intelligence analysts cannot assess the impact of adver-
sary activity if they cannot relate it to the potential
target of the activity and to the essential elements of
information required by the commander they serve. To
answer these questions, the intelligence analyst must have
friendly force information on hand. Further, he must main-
tain sensitivity to the current needs of the commander and
his key staff personnel.
Naval Warfare Analysis Experiment Overview
The Naval Warfare Analysis Experiment is concerned
See discussion on pp. 111-114.
See discussion of the tasking function on pp. 81 - 82,
the consumption function on pp. 89 - 92, and the planning
function on pp. 101 - 103.
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with the development of automatic data processing capabil-
ities that will assist formulating answers to the opera-
tional intelligence questions outlined above. It seeks to
assist resolution of these questions both with regard to
current operational activity conducted by potential adver-
saries and the long term trends and implications of
adversary activity.
Project Goals
Specific goals of the project include the following:
(1) Developing and demonstrating the utility of
a theory that defines naval warfare activities
in terms of specific variables that can be proc-
essed and manipulated quantitatively.
(2) Demonstrating the utility of organizing and
processing qualitative narrative data concerning
naval warfare activities by dividing and storing
narrative according to specific descriptive cate-
gories that apply to even the most complex naval
activity
.
(3) Designing and installing experimental auto-
mated files that will accept naval warfare data
in the forms that it is currently provided to
OSIS and permit it to be processed and manipu-
lated both quantitatively and qualitatively in
the terms described above.
(4) Demonstrating the utility that such information
capabilities would provide to the naval warfare
analytical and information management processes.
Intelligence Problems
Addressed by the Project
Processing
Project research has explored the following problems
with regard to the processing segment of the intelligence
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cycle: (1) Organization of the data base by relating it
to the standing intelligence requirements. (2) VJays to
improve the degree and variety of access to the data
base. (3) Means to preserve the level of detail pro-
vided by initial sensor inputs and collection reports.
(4) Improvements in and increases to the number of ways
that incoming bits of information can be linked to a given
activity of current interest and to specific intelligence
requirements. (5) Methods of storage that increase query
possibilities and decrease the constraints affecting ad
hoc research of current problems. (6) Techniques that can
both provide alerts to items of priority interest and high-
light significant data and relationships.
Analysis
The project has sought to develop automatic data
processing support capabilities that can enhance both
quantitative and qualitative activities analysis.
Production
The focus of the effort with regard to production has
been on means for producer/data base interaction and auto-
mated output of specific products. This has included the
development of specific programs.
Information management





Naval Warfare Analytical Terminology
Primitive term:
(1) Naval warfare event - consists of a minimum
of one surface, submarine or air unit con-
ducting a minimum of one of the aspects of





(1) Naval warfare activity - includes a minimum of
one or more naval warfare events related in
terms of their area and period; the aspects of
naval warfare being practiced; and the identi-
fication, composition, and organization of the
participating and target units.
Twelve aspects of naval warfare:
(1) Offensive operations. (2) Submarine launched
ballistic missile operations. (3) Antisubmarine
warfare. (4) Surveillance and intelligence col-
lection operations. (5) Electronic warfare
operations. (6) Cover and deception operations.
(7) Amphibious warfare. (8) Logistics support
operations. (9) Test and evaluation operations.
(10) Research operations. (11) Defensive opera-
tions. (12) General operations (the null set).
Five quantitative variables:
(1) Size. (2) Period. (3) Scope. (4) Level.
(5) Intensity.
Nine Qualitative descriptors:
(1) Force composition and disposition. (2) Communi-
cations use. (3) Sensor use. (4) Weapons employed.
(5) Tactics employed. (6) Rigs and equipment.
(7) Subordination of Units. (8) Participating
personnel. (9) Target of the activity.
Ten participating unit types:
(1) Major combatants. (2) Minor combatants. (3) Sub-
marines. (4) AGI. (5) Research vessel. (6) Auxiliary.
(7) Merchant. (8) Fishing vessel. (9) Aircraft.
(10) Friendly unit.
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research has sought to accomplish the following : (1) Pro-
vide ways to measure current data base coverage of intel-
ligence requirements. (2) Ensure means to identify
information gaps. (3) Correlate data base content to
requirements and products in the production schedule.
(4) Relate data base content at the individual record
level to specific needs of various consumers.
Naval Warfare Analytical Theory
Terms related to the concepts developed as the
results of the formulation of naval warfare analytical
theory in this section are outlined in Table 30. These
terms include the naval event as the basic unit of con-
struction of a naval activity, five discrete variables
that can be measured quantitatively relative to each
event, nine descriptors that may be applied qualitatively
to each of the twelve aspects of naval warfare, and ten
naval unit type designations.
Activity Variables
Naval activities can vary . In terms of their size,
period, scope, level and intensity. Observation and meas-
urement of these variables relative to a given activity
determine the parameters of that activity.
Size
This variable relates to the area encompassed by the
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activity. An activity that is spread over a broad area is
considered a large activity. Defining an activity primar-
ily in terms of its area is dependent upon the individual
focus of the particular analyst concerned. If the analy-
tical interest or operational problem concerned is defined
primarily in area terms, the area parameter might be
specified as including all naval events in the Indian
Ocean
.
On the other hand, if the analytical interest or
operational problem concerned emphasizes other parameters
as the primary determinants in defining the activity in
question, the area parameter of that activity would then
-correspond to the limits of the activity specified in
accordance with the other parameters. For example, the
analylitical interest or operational problem concerned
may be Soviet surveillance of U.S. battle groups in the
Indian Ocean. The size parameter would then include the
area encompassed by the disposition of Soviet forces con-
ducting that aspect of naval warfare against the U.S.
forces
. The limits of the complete geomtry of that area
would extend to the area also filled by the disposition of the
target forces that are the recipients of the interaction.
Measurement of the size parameter, thus, includes
locating both the participant forces conducting the activ-
ity and the target forces that are the recipients of that
activity. Completion of this observation and measurement
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contributes to answering operational intelligence questions
1 02 _
(1) , (8) and (9) . xnese examples also demonstrate how
answering the locatior.al questions regarding adversary and
friendly forces contributes to defining the extent of the
naval interaction taking place and why locating data is the
top priority of the ocean surveillance system.
Period
This variable relates to defining the duration of
activity. The related events that comprise a given activ-
ity will occur over a definite period of time. They may
occur continuously or intermittently. In either case, a
certain continuity with regard to the conduct of these
events will develop. In both cases, the duration of the
activity corresponds to che difference between the times
of commencement and termination. The latter time corres-
ponds to either the activity's final cessation, or the time
when a significant break in the continuity of the activity
occurs. Acquiring a sense of continuity on a given activ-
ity assists development of its patterns , which in turn con-
tributes to answering operational intelligence question (7) .
Scope
.
This variable is measured in terms of the number of




or practiced over a given period. For purposes of analy-
sis, that period is normally specif ied as one day which cor-
responds to the report period for most intelligence
summaries. This measurement permits comparison of a
given activity with the evolution of that activity over
time and with other activities both past and present.
Completion of this measurement contributes directly to
answering operational intelligence question (3)
.
Aspects of naval warfare
The theory developed in this project considers the
aspects of naval warfare to include the following: (1)
offensive operations, (2) submarine launched ballistical
missile operations, (3) antisubmarine warfare, (4) surveil-
lance and intelligence collection operations, (5) electronic
warfare operations, (6) cover and deception operations,
(7) amphibious warfare operations, (8) logistics support
operations, (9) test and evaluation operations, (10) re-
search operations, and (11) defensive operations. The
basis for this determination is that, except for the addi-
tion of the last aspect, the other ten aspects reflect what
is most often articulated in versions of the requirements
for reporting on foreign naval operations issued at various
tip i 103levels or command.
103See discussion of tasking on pp. 81 and 82, and on
intelligence collection plans in the section on institu-
tionalized management activities on pp. 101 - 103.
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It should be nc~ed that, within a given naval activ-
ity, or even a given naval event, normally several aspects
of naval warfare will be conducted either simultaneously
or within the period :f that activity under consideration.
One obvious example is the fact that all naval operations
require logistics support activities to sustain them.
Surveillance and intelligence collection operations are
a necessary prelude tc offensive operations, as well as
being the first line cf defense. Amphibious warfare most
often connotes perforz.?.nce of the power projection mis-
sion with the marines storming the beachhead. Amphibious
forces may have had tc conduct all other aspects of naval
warfare just to get the marines to the beach.
While the connotation of most of the aspects of
naval warfare may appear evident from the name of the
aspect itself, those chat may not are clarified below.
Offensive operations are intended to include strike activ-
ities conducted against naval targets. This contrasts
with submarine launched ballistic missile operations con-
ducted against strategic targets ashore. The aspect of
defensive operations is meant to include such activities
as antiair warfare, cask force and unit defense, protec-
tion of convoys, defense of sea lines of communications,
costal defense, etc.
Finally, because activity exists that does not
reflect any of the 11 aspects of naval warfare previously
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named, a twelfth aspect must be designated. This aspect
is termed general operations and it is designated to rep-
resent the null set, i.e. when none of the other aspects
of naval warfare is identified as being conducted or
practiced." An example would be units deploying from
the Soviet Pacific Fleet for service in the Indian Ocean.
As they steamed to join the Tenth Eskadra, either inde-
pendently or in groups, and as long as they do not con-
duct any of the other aspects of naval warfare; they




The level of a given naval activity is measured in
terms of the numbers of its participating units. Measure-
ment of this variable assists answering operational intel-
ligence question (2) . It should be noted that naval
units, partiularly aircraft, are highly mobile. Individ-
ual units may enter into participation in a given event
within the specified period. Then they may depart the
area to participate in other events . Later they may re-
join the activity related to the first event. In fact,
within a given period; individual units may participate
104
This concept, taken from set theory, was previously
applied to indicate the limits of the total environment
of an individual system. See pp. 34 - 37.
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Lrj several events, an< even in several activities.
ten i ty
rhis variable is defined as a combination of the
ier ;nts , types of participating units, and the
capabilities of the participating units involved in a
/en ictivity. All of these factors contribute to the
assessment of the degree of actual or potential threat
to U.S. : s represented by the activity being
( iserved. Thus, this is the first variable whose
quantitative measurement can assist addressing the more
1 ilitative operational intelligence questions (4) and (5).
i ' e to
Because all of these variables can be measured quan-
:hey contribute to the development of activity
I
tern indicating changes i n activity, direction of
I i and their magnitude. Further, they per-
erentiation of the pattern of a given activ-
i' ' s i.on and comparison between activities.
Definition of an Activity
A ii ral definition of a naval warfare activity
105
: tion of the concept of potential versus
a
I
• ia t, see d . 93 .
''See pp. • and 60.

222
was offered at the beginning of this section on analy-
tical theory. ' The sections that follow indicate how
the general definition below was derived.
A given naval warfare activity is defined to
include a minimum of one or more naval warfare
events related in terms of the area and period;
the aspects of naval warfare being practiced;
and the identification, composition, and organ-
ization of the participating and target units
.
The naval warfare event
,
a primitive term
A naval warfare event consists of a minimum of
one surface, submarine or air unit conducting a
minimum of one of the aspects of naval warfare
in a given area over a given period. 108
Construction of a
naval warfar e activity
As other units are related to the initial unit over
time in accordance with the relationships specified by the
naval warfare variables, the minimum event evolves into a
more complex event. A naval activity, then, may corre-
spond to a single event monitored over time. As the
parameters of current analytical interests broaden and/or
those of the current operational problem change; the param-
eters of the sampled activity will also broaden to include
107See pp. 214 - 215
The application of the concept of an event as the basic
unit of analysis for assessing naval warfare activity is
analogeous to Sherwin's application of the same concept as
the unit of analysis for assessing politico-military
activity. See discussion on pp. 56 - 58.
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a larger number of events, a bigger area, a longer period,
a greater number of high interest units, and additional
aspects of naval warfare. In essence, then, the param-
eters of a given naval warfare activity are defined
to correspond to those related to current analytical
interests or a given operational problem.
Activity Descriptors
To address the qualitative aspects of activity
analysis, the theory now turns to the detailing of activ-
ity descriptors. The nine descriptors of aspects of naval
warfare employed under this analytical theory include:
(1) force composition and disposition, (2) communications
use, (3) sensor use, (4) weapons employed, (5) tactics
employed, (6) rigs and equipment, (7) subordination of
units, (8) participating personnel, and (9) target of the.
activity. Like the naval warfare variables, these des-
criptors are the ones commonly used in versions of the





This primary descriptor is the only one that can be
applied to every naval warfare event. In accordance with
the definition of a naval warfare event above, it must
include at least one participating unit. The composi-
tion of the force refers to the number of each different
type of unit participating in the event. The disposition
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of the force refers to the arrangement of the partici-
pating units within the area of the event and the location
of individual units within that arrangement. Qualitative
narrative data applicable to this descriptor contributes
to answering operational intelligence questions (1) and
(2).
Communications use
The use of communications by units participating in
a given event assists ocean surveillance sensors to not
only fix the location of these units, but also to identify
the individual unit that is transmitting. Further, analy-
sis of communications patterns can reveal organizational
relationships, while decryption of participant communi-
cations can reveal both what they are doing and what they
intend to do. Thus, qualitative narrative data applicable
to this descriptor contributes to answering operational
intelligence questions (1) through (3) and (7) through
(9).
Sensor use
Like communications, the use of sensors by partici-
pating units can reveal their location and identity.
Further, detection of the employment of various sensors
by the ocean surveillance system provides clues as to what
the participating units are doing, while observation of
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and reporting concerning the use of these sensors from
friendly units at the scene of the activity can confirm
the aspect of naval warfare being conducted and indicate
how well it is being performed. Thus, all operational
intelligence questions may be addressed by qualitative
narrative data applicable to this descriptor with the
possible exception of question (7)
.
Weapons employed
Obviously reports applicable to this descriptor are
of prime interest. Unfortunately, the opportunities to
collect such data outside of actual combat conditions are
rare. Adversary security measures attempt to preclude the
possibility of such collection in peacetime. Such collec-
tion is essential to both capability analysis and threat
assessment. Operational intelligence questions (3)
through (6), (8) and (9) can be addressed by collection
reports applicable to this descriptor.
Tactics employed
Successful countering of the adversary's tactics can
preclude, or at least neutralize, his weapons employment.
Collection reports applicable to this descriptor are essen-
tial to determining both how he exercises his capabilities
and how well he conducts naval warfare. Thus, operational
intelligence questions (3) , (5) and (6) may be addressed
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by reports applicable to this descriptor.
Rigs and equipment
This descriptor refers to the use of equipment
other than communications, sensors and weapons. Normally,
the collection and reporting of friendly units at the
scene of the event is necessary to the provision of this
data. The descriptor primarily is applicable to
addressing of operational intelligence question (4)
.
Subordination of units
This descriptor refers to the organization of parti-
cipating units and the command relationships that both
'exist between them and connect them organizationally to
senior, lateral and subordinate commands that may be
located physically outside the immediate area of the event.
Operational intelligence questions (7) through (9) can
be addressed by data applicable to this descriptor.




This descriptor refers to both the identification of
key personnel attached to participating units and observa-
tion of the activities conducted by the personnel of these
units. Reports containing information relevant to person-
nel activities can fill in the flavor of what the adversary
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is doing. Examples of such information include: "As
the patrol boat passed abeam to port, her crew was noted
at general quarters with all gun mounts manned and
trained at NIHITZ. An orange flare was fired from the
patrol boat's bridge toward the carrier." "The AGI was
noted lowering a small boat. Its personnel maneuvered
the boat astern of the task force and they began to sift
through the trash which recently had been thrown over-
board. " As these examples illustrate, such reports focus
on answering operational intelligence question (5)
.
Identification of key personnel contributes to satis-
faction of the imperative necessary to the success of
military operations, which was laid down many centuries
ago by the Chinese philosopher Sun Tzu , "know thy enemy".
What the commander would like to know about his adversary
includes such factors as his training, professional edu-
cation and development, career pattern, operational experi-
ence, naval philosophy, methods of operation, tactical
preference, etc. Just beginning to draw the picture of
opposing commanders with regard to these factors requires
lengthy collection efforts involving the reporting of
every scrap of information that can be obtained on key
personnel as the collection opportunities present them-
selves. The analytical effort to construct this picture
is just as extensive. This discussion illustrates how
critical it is to collect this kind of data on opposing
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personnel at every opportnity. Information that is avail-
able that applies to this descriptor can provide answers
to operational intelligence questions (7) through (9)
.
Target of the activity
An individual event may include only one unit. Even
if more units are included, they may not be conducting any
of the aspects of naval warfare (i.e. only general opera-
109tions) . " When any of the other eleven aspects of naval
warfare are being conducted, however , naval interaction is
occurring. When interaction is occurring, there must be
a target that is the recipient of that activity in addi-
tion to the participating units that are conducting the
activity. Identification of the target, and knowledge of
both the affect of the participating unit's activity on
the target and the target's response to that stimulus are
necessary to complete the assessment of an interactive
naval event.
Thus, data applicable to this descriptor is a cri-
tical collection and reporting requirement. For the
analyst to discern that the target of the activity is U.S.
or other friendly forces, he must have knowledge of the
location, identification and current activity of these
potential targets. Relating reported adversary activity
to potential U.S. force involvement should be regarded as
the intelligence analyst's first maxim. Unfortunately,
109See definitions, pp. 210, 220 and 222
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this is not always done. In some cases, the friendly in-
formation required may not be available to the analyst.
In other cases, he may not be sensitive to this require-
ment. If after examination the analyst is unable to
determine friendly force involvement in the activity, he
should follow the second maxim that is applicable to com-
plete activity analysis: Look for and differentiate the
adversary units that are playing the role of the target
in the activity being observed and reported.
Objectives of Activity Analysis
Based upon the theory outlined above, activity analy-
sis can be considered successful if it satisfies the
following criteria:
(1) The assessment and description of the naval
warfare activity concerned is completed in
terms of the basic variables and descriptors.
(2) The analysis derives relationships both among
participating units and between events that
comprise a given activity.
(3) The analyst compares events with one another and
differentiates their content and development.
(4) Patterns of individual activities as they
evolve over time, as well as unit associa-
tions, are developed and highlighted.
(5) The analysis indicates changes in activity
in terms of its scope, level, intensity,
direction, magnitude, and both the potential
and actual threats that it implies
.
Naval Warfare Informa tion Management Theory
Given the development of this analytical theory, the
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conceptual model related to the requirements of an infor-
mation system that supports such analysis may now be
specified. The specification of these requirements is
divided into two models. The first addresses the analy-
tical framework that should be provided. The second
outlines system design criteria.
Framework for Analysis
Construction of the framework for analysis pro-
vided by the information system should be built upon and
related directly to the requirements for reporting on
foreign naval operations. These requirements have been
issued as directives by the management components of the
intelligence system. They have been implemented in a
variety of forms at many levels of command lending a cer-
tain consensus as to their value. They have been proven
by their endurance over time with substantively the same
content. That content specifies the information required
for analysis that pertain to each aspect of naval warfare
The specification is in terms of both the variables and
descriptors associated with naval warfare activity. Satis-
faction of the requirements specified answer the key
operational intelligence questions. The construction of
such an analytical framework in the information system
should then be completed by ensuring that it supports the
objectives of activity analysis. The end result will be
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an information system that not only provides direct link-
age to the tasking phase of the intelligence cycle, but
also to the requirement of the other components of the
naval system. Thus, consideration of the principal mis-
sion of intelligence will be considered in the design of
the information system. That mission is to provide a pro-
110duct that will serve the other naval system components.
System Design Criteria
Additional concepts related to the design of an
information system that supports activity analysis include:
(1) It should be capable of accepting and pro-
viding access uo a variety of data.
(2) It should provide query capabilities that
permit a variety of analysts to formulate
inquiries that are tailored to and can ex-
pand from their various specific interests.
(3) It must provide for the acceptance of data
reported to 0S1S.
(4) Its features oust be compatible with those
required by OSIS nodes.
(5) It should provide access to the data in terms
of the variables and descriptors of naval war-
fare activities
.
(6) It should provide for the preservation of
relationships made between activities, events
and participating units
.
(7) It should be capable of assisting the compari-
son of activities and the developing of activity
patterns
.
(8) It should provide the means to measure obser-
vations of naval warfare variables, indicate
110See discussion on pp. 79 - 81.
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the direction and magnitude of changes in
activity with regard to these variables,
and include capabilities for providing
alerts to potential and actual threats.
Validation of the Models
Consideration of both the results of the systems
analysis presented in Chapter II and the reality situa-
tion described in Chapter III has been the key to develop-
ment of the conceptual models in this chapter. These
models now provide the basis for the development of the
scientific models in Chapter V, which outline the details
of information system design, address the techniques for
data manipulation and statistical packages that can pro-
Vide these methods, and describe the report program
development. The solution outlined in Chapter VI will
then be related back to the models and the reality
situation to complete the validation process.

V. THE SCIENTIFIC MODEL: THE NAVAL WARFARE
ANALYSIS EXPERIMENTAL INFORMATION SYSTEM
Purpose
This chapter relates the automatic data processing
support capabilities being developed through the Naval
Warfare Analysis Experiment to improvements that could be
made to the Ocean Surveillance Information System. The
scientific model of an information system constructed in
this project is based upon the conceptual model developed
in Chapter IV concerning naval warfare analytical and in-
formation theory. Chapter VI will then assess the rele-
vance of the conceptual and scientific models to both the
intelligence system analyzed in Chapter II and the reality
situation assessed in Chapter III. The proposals for solu-
tions to the naval warfare activities analysis and threat
assessment problems will be based upon this validation
process
.
Chapter V covers two groups of topics as follows:
(1) Ocean surveillance and OSIS. (2) Naval warfare analy-
sis experimental file design, query and data manipulation,





Ocean Surveillanc e and OSI S
System Description
Requirements and fun c t i on
s
The Oce an Survei llance Master Plan defines the ocean
surveillance function as:
"The systematic observation of ocean areas to
detect, locate and classify selected high inter-
est aerospace, surface and subsurface targets
and provide this information to users in a timely
manner . "111
The plan then continues by citing the requirements
for ocean surveillance to support command and control of
operational forces, to contribute to and receive support
from the intelligence system, and to provide target acqui-
sition necessary for the support of over- the-horizon tar-
geting. The plan divides these functions into those
applicable to peacetime, crisis and wartime. It states
that the peacetime functions of the system are supporting
both capabilities, and activities analysis. In crisis,
the system contributes to the indications and warning
process that detects and assists perception of the evolu-
tion of these contingency situations. Finally, in wartime,
the system must be capable of fulfilling the stringent
This definition and the requirements cited in this sys-
tem description were extracted from the Ocean Surveillance
Master P lan, (Washington, D.C.: Antisubmarine Warfare and
Ocean Surveillance Program Office (OP-095) , Office of the
Chief of Naval Operations, September 1978), pp. 3 and 4.
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operational requirement of over- the-horizon targeting.
This wartime tactical requirement dictates that the
three highest: essential elements of information of the
operational commander, as stated in the master plan, are:
(1) identification of enemy forces, (2) enemy position,
(3) time of position. As a result, the ocean surveil-
lance product must always provide the follov/ing data:
location, accuracy, time of location, classification, con-
fidence of classification and platform designator.
Characteristics of an ideal
ocean surveillance system
Based on these requirements, the master plan delin-
eates the six primary characteristics of an ideal ocean
surveillance system as follows:
(1) Provides coverage of high interest platforms
anywhere in the ocean areas of the world.
(2) Has adequate resources to produce the ocean
surveillance product in a timely manner on all
platforms of interest.
(3) Is capable of direct tasking by users.
(4) Provides the ocean surveillance product
directly to users.
(5) Is free of functions that impair timeliness.







The ocean surveillance system and its intelligence
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Fig. Tj . Structure of Ocean Surveillance System
and OSIS Nodes
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of the operational and intelligence systems. Fig. 25 pro-
vides a detailed view of the structure of these two systems.
The ocean surveillance system includes both sensor resources
and correlation centers . The figure also shows the inter-
face between the system and the command authorities at
each level in the operational chain of command that control
the functioning of the ocean surveillance system and its
components. OSIS corresponds to the correlation centers
located ashore. While manned by intelligence resources,
these centers are under the operational control of the
respective command authorities at each level in the chain.
The task group and platform correlation centers are afloat.
While the platform correlation center is manned primarily
with operational personnel, substantial intelligence
resources in afloat intelligence centers on board carriers
and amphibious command ships function with and provide
direct support to the operational correlation centers at
112
the task group level.
The OSIS Nodes
Sources and data base content
Fig. 26 depicts the information flow between the
ocean surveillance system and an OSIS node, within the
112
Ibid., Fig. 2.1, p. 7. Compare the system description
outlined in the Master Plan and the structure illustrated
in this figure to the introductory discussion to the sec-
tion on a functional description of the intelligence system
provided on pp. 79 - 81, and Fig. 11 on p. 74.
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node itself, and from the node to operational users. It
further depicts sources of naval v/arfare activity data
113
and automated support capabilities available to OSIS.
Fig. 27 illustrates a model of node functions proposed by
Professor Paul H. Moose of the Naval Postgraduate School.
Data on naval warfare activities is provided primarily by
operational intelligence and ocean surveillance sources
.
Note that the information base also contains environmental
source data. Finally, the data base includes own force
data which is a primary input that is necessary to com-
115plete effective activity analysis. Finally, the figure
also illustrates the OSIS analytical and data base inputs
to the planning and decision making process.
FOSIF functions
Lyman's research included a thirty clay observation
period at the Fleet Ocean Surveillance Information Facility
(FOSIF), Rota, in which he measured and recorded the activ-
ities of that organization in order to develop his
Ibid., Fig. 3.1, p. 36
Rod Guy Lyman, "A Cybernetic Characterization of the
Fleet Ocean Surveillance Information Facility at Rota,
Spain", a thesis completed for the degree Master of Arts
in Naval Intelligence, (Monterey, California: U.S. Naval
Postgraduate School, March, 1979), Fig. 5, p. 15.
See discussion of target activity, pp. 228- 229.
See service to other naval system components,

























































cybernetic model of its functions. He categorized FOSIF
activities as being applicable to one or more of the six
following functions: switching, filtering, associating,
archiving, encoding, reporting and controlling. Fig. 28
depicts the FOSIF Watch area, while Fig. 29 shows the com-
plete internal geography of the FOSIF. Note that there is
a division of labor between the analytical section, which
maintains long term continuity on ocean surveillance events
and patterns of activity, and the watch section, which en-
sures continuing performance of FOSIF functions on a
twenty-four hour a day basis and provides the immediate
117intelligence support to the fleet.
Switching
This is a one-to-one transform operation in which
the inputs from collection sources are related to the
requirements of the node, annotated, and then routed to
the cognizant participant. The function is performed
primarily by the Senior Watch Officer (SWO)
.
Filtering
This function is a subset of the switching function
that provides two options . Either the information is
retained and directed into the node, or it is discarded.
Lyman, "Cybernetic Characterization of the FOSIF",
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Thus, if information is blocked by the filter, it becomes
irretrievable. Lyman estimated that forty percent of
incoming message traffic was blocked by the filter at
F0S1F Rota.
Associating
This step in the process occurs after the cognizant
participant in either the watch section or the analyst
section receives incoming information that has passed
through the switch. The difference between the functions
of switching and associating is that the former matches
the incoming bit of information with a functional role of
one of the participants in the organization, while the
latter matches the bit that has been switched to his imme-
diate concerns and to information in the data base.
Additional filtering obviously takes place in this process.
Archiving
This is primarily a storage rather than a transform
function. In some cases, the incoming bit will be decoded
in order to change its format to that more compatible with
data base requirements. Lyman observed two types of archives
at the FOSIF. The first he designated Archive I. This
related to the stacking of untranslated radio broadcasts,
raw formatted message reports, and others whose symbology
and content had not been decoded . Archive II then pertained
to that information that had been decoded into a symbology
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This function relates to the production of the FOSIF
product. It includes the subfunctions of organizing,
drafting and reviewing the outgoing message, as well as
changing the physical form of the product from the elec-
tronic image on the cathode ray tube to punched tape for
I "I o
dissemination by the communications system.
Reporting
This function refers to the dissemination segment
of the intelligence cycle. Most reporting at the FOSIF
was accomplished with the watch team acting as the encoder
.
In cases of messages encoded by other FOSIF participants,
the watch team served as a transmission channel.
Controlling
At the FOSIF, this function involved policy direc-
tion and the establishment of activity goals by the
Of f icer-in-Charge (OIC) . Feedback to the OIC from indi-
vidual participants occurred both formally and informally.
The institutionalized mechanism for this feedback was the
daily morning meeting at which progress on various
118
Lyman based his concept of encoding on that drawn by
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activities and significant items of interest were dis-
cussed. The SWO performed the controlling function for
the watch team. Lyman noted that other than the direc-
tion and supervision of the information flow, control
exercised hy the SUO would not normally be visible once
individual watch members had been trained adequately and
they had accumulated sufficient expertise and proficiency
through practice.
Partic ipant rol es
Based upon the functional description above, the
roles of individual FOSIF members can be summarized as
being applicable to the following functional roles: Data
base maintenance and quality control, data base inter-
action and analysis, report production and dissemination,
and data base management and system control. The model
that Lyman developed as a result of his research reflects
the performance of these roles. This model is shown in
Fig. 30. 119
Current OS IS ADP Support
Figs. 26 and 27 on pages 239 and 240 also showed
OSIS data sources and indicated current automatic data
119
Ibid., Fig. 11, p. 25, Fig. 13, p. 40 and Fig. 14, p. 41.
Also compare this functional and role description to the sys-
tems analysis of the intelligence cycle on pp. 81 - 92, and
the discussion of the intelligence officer as an analyst on
pp. Ill - 114.
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processing support capabilities that are available in some
form to most OSIS nodes. These support capabilities will
now be discussed as they relate to the processing, analy-
sis, production and dissemination segments of the
intelligence cycle.
Processing
While OSIS receives much of its data in automated
form, some it does not and perhaps never will. The
latter case relates primarily to communications intel-
ligence (COMINT) , human intelligence (HUMINT) , and photog-
raphic intelligence (PHOTINT) sources. Some of the
operations and intelligence reporting from the fleet also
can be included in this category. The significant por-
tion of OSIS input that is received in automated form
includes the ocean surveillance sensor data and fleet
reporting that is transmitted in the automated Navy for-
matted message system prescribed by the Chief of Naval
Operations. Even in this case, however, not every OSIS
node has the message input capability necessary to accept
all the data contained in these formatted reports.
With regard to data base files, as illustrated in
Fig. 26, these include: (1) the foreign naval platform
current status file, (2) the foreign naval platform his-
tory file, (3) foreign naval platform characteristics
file, and (A) the ocean surveillance product history
file. The first of these normally contains information
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known to U.S. intelligence concerning the operational and
readiness status of surface, air and submarine platforms.
This file would provide such indications as a given unit
is deployed out-of-area, is in a training or operational
readiness status in-area, is in overhaul, or is under con-
120
struction, etc. The second file would contain both
track data (positional, event time and unit trademark
data) and narrative information concerning the present
and past deployments of units of interest that currently
are operating out-of-area. The narrative entries normally
include short summaries and analytical comment concerning
the activities and associations of each given unit. The
extent of coverage and detail these entries provide varies
from node to node with the file at the Navy Ocean Surveil-
lance Information Center (NOSIC) being more substantial
than that at the lower levels of the system. The third
file contains characteristics of individual platforms that
can be detected and identified by ocean surveillance sen-
sors. The last file would contain the daily intelligence
summaries disseminated by the node.
Analysis
With regard to the analytical function, this section
covers the following topics: quantitative analysis, quali-
tative analysis, and analyst/system interaction.




The quantitative aids currently provided OSIS are
used primarily to support the contact identification and
correlation functions. Certain algorithms can compare
incoming sensor information to that contained in the plat-
form characteristics file to match the unit detected with
a given known unit. Other algorithms determine the prob-
ability of the possible candidates that may be associated
with a given contact report and then rank order these
candidates from likely to least likely to assist the
analyst's assessment of the proper correlation. These
algorithms use not only identification characteristics to
make this determination, but also space and time factors.
Algorithms capable of computing space and time factors can
project target movement by dead reckoning methods and
determine the time of its entry both within the sensor and
weapon's envelopes of friendly task groups and within the
detection and threat envelopes posed by the target's sen-
sors and weapons. They can also compute necessary courses,
speeds and routes to close or evade the target detected by
the over- the-horizon sensors, or project the navigational
tracks on which friendly forces are sailing.
Or.her quantitative aids provide capabilities for
graphical and tabular display. Key among these are mapping
and area displays that can both expand and contract in
scale. Including multi-color features, some of these
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The current status, mission history, and ocean sur-
veillance product files described above provide the
principal means of qualitative analytical support. The
means of access varies with each file. The first two
would be primarily by unit identifiers and perhaps by unit
type. The first file may have a home fleet or port access
capability. Track data in the second file can also be
accessed by position and time queries. The product file
is accessed primarily by the date time group of each
individual message that it contains.
Analyst/system interaction
Intelligence terminals produced by Interstate Elec-
tronic' s Corporation have been introduced into OSIS. Figs.
30 and 31 illustrate the analyst's console system and dual
121
screen presentations that these terminals provide. The
technology reflected in these terminals employs the power
of mini/micro architecture. It features an effective
hierarchy of local, in the console processing power and
memory for data sorting and inquiry/communications
121These illustrations and the comments in this section
were extracted from a marketing brochure issued by Inter-
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Fig. 32. Dual Screen Presentations
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processing, coupled uniquely with the color CRT's high
resolution. In addition to the dual color, 19 inch diag-
onal CRTs, the system's features include 512 x 483 view-
able pixels on the two CRTs with a small 0.31 mm color
dot trio spacing. Six refresh memory planes provide
eight primary display information groups for each monitor.
The graphics generator is capable of an instantaneous
write speed of 142,000 points per second for vectors and
14,200 characters per second. The keyboard is ASCII con-
versational with special function keys, 16 fixed function
keys and 160 changeable functions. Hairline graphics are
controlled by a rate sensitive trackball, while the alpha-
numeric cursor is under software control. The terminal to
computer interface is provided by a zoom keyboard for the
graphics scale factor, a DMA data bus, and interrupt paral-
lel control for keyboard and color transformation. All
system modules are written in FORTRAN- IV, to gain
independence from specific hardware requirements
.
Production and dissemination
Automated support of these segments of the intelli-
gence cycle includes report formatting, text editing, word
processing, printing and message output processing capa-
bilities. The extent to which each of these capabilities




Experimental Fil e Design
Data Base Records
This section includes five topics as follows: Tech-
nical constraints, hierarchical set organization, indexed-




Certain constraints were introduced into the design
problem due to the fact that the experimental files would
be run and tested under the analyst working file program
installed on the Naval Intelligence Command On-Line System
(NICOLS) . Some of these constraints would apply to other
programs as well as Work File. Some, however, were dic-
tated by the particular requirements of the Work File
software. The CULPRIT utility program produced by the
Cullinane Corporation as one of the principal features
of their information data base management system (IDMS)
and installed on NICOLS was found to be a highly versa-
tile and effective package. The constraints stemmed from
the fact that the Work File program included only a
limited application of CULPRIT. The limitation in the
Work File design is purposeful because it is intended to
be a simplistic program to facilitate its use by analysts
having only a layman's familiarity with and working
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knowledge of computer programs. Further, it is intended
that such analyst use be performed based on the straight-
forward guidance contained in the NICOLS manual, with
only limited intervention, if any, by data processing and
programming personnel. Thus, the requirements of the
Naval Warfare Analysis Experimental Programs far exceeded
the capabilities of Work File procedures and features. The
degree of success in the project to date in overcoming
these constraints may be attributed to the significant
versatility of the CULPRIT utility program and the pa-
tience, understanding, knowledge and professionalism of
the programming and operations personnel at the Naval
Intelligence Processing Systems Support Activity (NIPSSA)
in Washington, D.C., who have assisted the author in
various stages of the project to conduct NAVWARANALEX tests
.
The specific constraints operative in the design
process were: Record size was restricted to 500 characters
of data input. Each record consisted of ten rows with 50
characters to each row. The record identification, file
identification, and file maintenance function fields, how-
ever, were in addition to the 500 character data input.
These fields totaled 27 characters. Only one record type,
known as WORKFILE-ENTRY, was permitted under the Work File
program. Field size was limited to 132 characters due to
output considerations. Field length, however, could be
either fixed or variable and each field could recur a
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fixed or variable number of Limes. These capabilities may
be employed to a greater extent in CULPRIT than in Work
File. As indicated above, each record under Work File
must have a unique record indentif ication field. Program
processing is then accomplished sequentially in record
identification order. (Normally, CULPRIT would allow
direct path processing of the data base.)
Hierar chical set organization
The records in the experimental files are organized
hierarchically into three sets of record types as shown in
Table 31. The first set is termed the reference record
set, the second is the event narrative record set, and the
third is the unit record set. The material provided in
the first record set is for analytical support, file, docu-
mentation and management purposes . These records contain
both fixed length structured fields and variable length
narrative fields. The narrative fields are based primarily
on analytical comment. The second set corresponds to the
122descriptors of the aspects of naval warfare. These
records have fixed length fields that recur a variable
number of times and variable length narrative fields. The
content of these narrative fields is based on both collec-
tion reports and analytical comment. The third set of
122These descriptors are defined and discussed on
pp. 223 - 229.
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records form subsets in the hierarchy under each event
narrative record type. These records contain fixed fields
only. These fields may recur up to twenty times per
record. All the data contained in these records is
applicable to a specific individual track unit. Under
current OSIS, a track unit may be an individual surface
ship or submarine that Is operating out-of-area. Under
NAVWARANALEX , a track unit may also equate to a type of
aircraft flown by a specific nation. The associated
records column of the table also shows network relation-
ships between these records.
Indexed sequenti a l acces s method
As mentioned in the section on technical constraints,
the Work File program allows only one record type , WORKFILE-
ENTRY
. The system then processes these records sequentially
by the unique record identification field. The design of
the file, however, called for a hierarchy of record types
as discussed in the previous section. Because Work File
established only the one record type, test programs would
not be able to take advantage of CULPRIT' s capability for
direct path access. Work File does allow taking advantage
of CULPRIT's sort capabilities. Therefore, the solution
followed to permit the testing of data files that concep-
tually involved many different record types under a program
that established only one record type included the following




NAVAL WARFARE ANALYSIS RECORD HIERARCHY








































UNIT 21 HIGH FREQUENCY
DIRECTION FINDING
(HFDF)












AREA OF REFERENCE RECORDS
TRACK UNIT RECORDS
HFDF UNIT RECORDS
ALL - THESE RECORDS DOCUMENT
THE FIELDS APPLICABLE TO
EACH RECORD TYPE
GENERAL - THESE RECORDS DOCU-
MENT THE VALUES APPLICABLE
'
TO FIELDS IN VARIOUS RECORDS
REQREF REFERENCE RECORDS
TRACK, BRGELP, PORTAR AND
AREA UNIT RECORDS
SURFOB , SUBOOB AND AIROOB




RECORDS . TRACK UNIT RECORDS
FORCOM EVENT NARRATIVE, AREARF







































UNIT 61 SIGNALS SUMMARY
(STGSUM)
UNIT 62 RIGS (RIG)




EVENT 90 TARGET OF THE
NARRATIVE ACTIVITY (TARGET)
































experimental files were redefined on the same 500 charac-
ter WORKFILE-ENTRY record. The unique record identifica-
tion field then was structured into suhfields that would
permit the CULPRIT sort capabilities to distinguish between
the records desired for a particular test program and ex-
clude the remaining records in the data base from that
particular test run. If the system had permitted direct
access to different record types, then CULPRIT' s direct
path capability could have been employed. In such a case,
both the heirarchical and network relationships applicable
to the file could have been identified to the system as
CULPRIT paths and indexed sequential processing could have
been achieved . This method would provide OSIS with a more
effecient means of processing than can the Work File Program.
The record identification
group field
The elements of the record identification group field
in the experimental files are constructed differently in
the reference record set than those in the event narrative
and unit record sets. In the reference record set, the
first five characters of the sixteen character record iden-
tification group field arc divided into two elements as
follows: The first element consists of three numeric char-
acters and is designated the reference number (REF-NO)
field. The second element consists of two alphanumeric
characters and is designated the narrative identification
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(NARR-ID) field. Its values correspond to the descriptors
of the aspects of naval warfare. In the event narrative
and unit record sets, these five characters comprise one
numeric field. This element is designated the event number
(EVT-NO)
.
The remaining elements in the record identification
group field are the same for all three record sets. They
include the following: The next element is a six charac-
ter alphanumeric field designated the record type (RCD-TYPE).
It is followed by a two character numeric element desig-
nated the record hierarchy number (RCD-HIER-NO) . The final
element in the sixteen character record identification
"group consists of a three numeric character field desig-
nated the record number (RCD-KO) . This number provides a
network linkage between all records applicable to a given
record type that is applicable to a given event number.
The charateris tics of these elements allow CULPRIT
to distinguish and sort the records in the experimental
files in a variety of ways. Examples include the following:
The records in the event narrative and unit record sets can be
sorted in event number order, within event number by either
record type or record hierarchy number, and within that
division by record number. A similar sort for the refer-
ence record set would vary slightly. First would be the
sort by reference number, within reference number by either
record type or record hierarchy number, within that
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division by the narrative identification element, and
within that by record number. If an analyst wanted to
obtain all records in the file applicable to the same
descriptor of the aspects of naval warfare, he would first
get the event narrative records by the record type cor-
responding to the descriptor he desired. He could obtain
the unit records applicable to that descriptor by employ-
ing greater than, less than test operations in his program
to define the range of record hierarchy numbers applicable
to that descriptor. To obtain the applicable reference
records, he would request the narrative identification
element that corresponded to the descriptor he desired.
Finally, the key role played by the record hierarchy
number element in the sort should be noted. The record
type element permits the sorting of the event narrative
record set according to the descriptors of the aspects of
naval warfare as described above. Not only will a sort in
record hierarchy number order accomplish this same objec-
tive, but also it will include the unit records applicable
to each event narrative record type in the sort. The pur-
pose, of this element, then, is to sort the file in the
hierarchical order outlined in Table 31. Further, if the
primary sort on the event narrative record and unit record
sets is by event number, all the records that apply to each
given event will be in the proper hierarchical order.
Finally, this element also permits given records to be
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selected for extraction by an output program on the basis
< i numeric test operations.
Construction of
i ecord fields
The construction of the fields applicable to the
various record types v;as based upon several primary sources
in order to ensure that the data content of these records
was compatible with that required by OSIS. The first of
the sources elected to provide the found, tion for record
Li Lds was the Navy formatted message ia . This auto-
mated message system serves as a primary input to both OSIS,
described above, and to the World Wide ' Litary Con
123
rol System (WWMCCS) . The second source used was
•
I automated order of battle. This source was chosen
au ;< i ; contains fields thai are ip ble to the OSIS
]
. itform status and mission history files and indicates the
;per structure of these fields. The fields concerned are
ise that relate to platform operational and readiness
atus
,
overhaul and construd Lon, and unit trademarks or
LdentiJ Lers . These fields are applical Li to the order
of battle records in the reference record set. The third
3OPNAVINST C3431.1B, "RAINFORM Formatte Message Report-
ing System", (Washington, D.C., Office of the Chief of Naval
Operations, 1. November 1973). Also see p. 248 of this
s ! .;
.
DDB-1200-101-78, Naval U Ltle: USSR and Eastern
Washington, D ". Defense Intelligence Agency,
I
I)
, Vol I, pp. vii-x. i see fig. 26, p. 239
and discussion on pp. 248 - 24° of tl Ls thesis.
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source provided the specific format used for the incor-
poration of the requirements for reporting on foreign
naval operations into the file and for the designation of
the various essential elements of information (EE1) . This
source was the U.S. Atlantic Fleet Naval Forces Intelli-
125gence Collection Manual. Documentation of these fields
can also he found in official government publications pub-
1 Of
lished under the auspices of the Naval Electronics Command
.
Overall guidance for field construction and record design
was based upon the manuals for NOSIC analysts' use of the
S EAWATCH s y s t em l27
Event narrative records
The construction of the fields in the event narra-
tive records reflected a particular design problem. It
was intended that these records should contain not only
narrative applicable to a particular descriptor of the
125
U . S . Altan t ic Fleet Naval Forces Intelligence Collec
-
tion Manual (AFNPICM) (U)
,
(Norfolk, VA . : Commander -in-
Chief
, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, 19 March 1975), Vol. II,
pp. 11-34 through ll-34n.
J O/T
See "Description of the OSIS Baseline Correlation",
(Falls Church, VA,: CTEC, Inc., January 1979), Prepared for
the Naval Electronics System Command Also see the Operators
Handbook series prepared by the Lockheed Missile & Space
Company, Inc., Navy Tactical Data Programs, Space Systems
Division of Sunnyvale, CA
.
, for the Naval Electronics
System Command.
1 27
NIPSSA Document No. 01B001 00-UG-01, Ocean Surveillance
Information S ys tern, S EAWATCH System User ' s Guide for" NOSIC Ana-
lj/sts(U), (Washington, D.C.: Naval Intelligence Processing
System Support Act: vity , Naval Intelligence Command , 15 August
1972) , Vols. I and II.
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aspects of naval warfare; but also the numbers of each EEI
and its appropriate IN"D and SOR that were applicable to the
descriptor concerned as determined by the number of units
described in the record that were conducting each aspect
TOO
of naval warfare concerned. Thus, the numbers of EEI,
IND and SOR appropriate to an individual record _would vary
from record to record. This, in turn, would affect the
length of the narrative group fields that could be used on
given record. Total narrative length would then equal the
number of characters remaining in the record after the last
requirements field (RIQ-FLD) applicable to the EEI. The
REQ-ELDs , thus, are fixed fields that also recur a variable
number of times. The narrative group fields are variable
length fields. They vary from - 132 characters.
CULPRIT provides the capability to accomodate these
requirements both with regard to record design and to the
output program. The method it employs consists of using a
control field called the number of requirements field (NREQ-
FLD) to indicate how many REQ-FLDs are in the record. Then
the output program contains a compute statement that first
multiplies the length of a given REQ-FLD by the value of
the control field and subtracts the result from 492 to
determine the length of the narrative (492- (6 x NREQ-FLD))
where 492 is the number of characters remaining in the event
narrative record after ^REQ-FLD. Other output programs
128See pp. 102 and 21S-220
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use. a counter and a less than or equal to test operation
against the value of NREQ-FLD to determine when the last
REQ-FLD has been extracted from the record for output.
S ources of test data
Selection of a primary data set for NAVWARANALEX
input posed some difficulties. Ideal input would have
consisted of sample RAINFORM messages. Such messages that
also provided a certain continuity on given, readily iden-
tifiable Soviet naval activites were not available at the
Naval Postgraduate School where the project has been con-
ducted to date. A variety of ocean surveillance products
produced by OSIS that provided continuity on given Soviet
naval activities were available at the Naval Postgraduate
School. The one selected was the Fleet Ocean Surveillance
Information Center Pacific's (FOSICPAC) naval intelligence
summary that covered Soviet naval activities in the Indian
Ocean on a daily basis. The period of coverage for each
summary is 2300-2300Z.
Once this summary was selected, however, a different
set of problems occurred. Although the summary, like other
OSIS products, provides excellent coverage and cogent anal-
ysis of current Soviet naval activity; the format of these
products complicates the input into a file organized in a
manner such as those of NAVWARANALEX . Standard OSIS for-
mats usually include a unit table giving the latest positions
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is ot" all platforms known to the OSIS node at pub-
lication ; the product. The narrative portion of such
; uinraar ies is divided into highlights, surface, submarine
;
i ctivities sections. erefore, bits of informa-
Lon rel ited to specific events and activities that could
be identified in each summary are scattered throughout the
lit table and the respective narrative sections.
Input to NAVWARANALEX required dissecting each sum-
iry to identify and correlate the individual bits of
Formation to given events, NAVWARANALEX record types, and
.oid fields. This is a rather tedious and time consuming
roc ss. j RAINFORM messages had been available, the
process . »u] A have b< Ler because: (1) Individual
se rve as inputs to the Intelligence summary.
ius, the individual input would contain fewer bits to cor-
i late than the summary as a whole. (2) NAVWARANALEX is
:ign i to accept individual RAINFORMs directly into its
ird and record fields
.
It should be pointed out that intelligence officers
Loat who receive the OSIS product have to endure the same
't of i ction process to analyze that product if they
i c ;ire to make unit associations and activity relationships.
TJ Ls is required to determine for the task group commander
.: the forces opposing him are organized and are operating.
ii forces do not operate independently as individual




They operate jointly as task forces involving specific
senior, lateral and subordinate command relationships
in order to coordinate the missions and activities
of the participating units concerned.
While such relationships and activities are com-
mented on and may be extracted from standard OS IS pro-
ducts,- both the unit type format orientation and the
scattering of the bits of information pertaining to unit
relationships and activities do not serve to either order
and differentiate the individual activities concerned or
focus upon their individual ramifications. Automated out-
put programs based on NAVWARANALEX files could provide
intelligence summaries that would have such order and focus
.
Alternatively, NAVWARNALEX automated output programs could
be formatted to give the intelligence summary whatever
focus was deemed best for the OSIS product.
Query and Data Manipulation
This section covers five major topics relative to
the development of the experimental files . These are quan-
titative analytical support, qualitative analytical support,
information management support, and summary of network rela-
tionships and report programs
.
It must be specified that not all the query capa-
bilities discussed in this section have yet been programmed
into the experimental system. Conceptually, they are
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possible based on the file design. The report programs
that hc.ve been developed to date are indicated in the
next section in Table 33 on pages 298 - 300. Development of
otli :r programs required is dependent upon continuation of
hi project.
Qua i titative analytical support
The discussion in this section pertains to the fol-
lowing subtopics: measuring activity parameters; and pre-
symptoi . . miptoms and patterns of activity.
Measuring activity paramel ss
i 29Size.' The experimental 1 i les provide several ways
foi an an t to obtain records applicable to the param-
eters of i1 particular activity of interest. First, he might
spi i. rrea of in!' in terms of its geographic or
i 1 c< i ites. The corresponding record sort would be
or the sasis of the positional elements of the track
group Le i in the track record type lie would obtain
rec >rds applicable to all events and activities in the area
spei i :ied. .Such a sort could also be made with current 0S1S
130
cap si 1 Li os. After the OSIS sort, however, the retrieved
. w< . i
: then have to be rcviev;ed and manipulated manually
to patterns of activity, unit associations and
129, 01 -,See pp. z 1. :> - 21/
I





Under NAVWARANALEX , the basic area sort could be com-
bined with other query specifications as discussed below to
permit the system to assist in the determination of net-
work relationships. For example, once the data has been
retreived, the event numbers can be determined from the
record identification group field. This determination pro-
vides a network link to all event narrative and unit
records applicable to the specified events. If the analyst
were interested only in particular events within the area
concerned, he could have made such a specification as part
of a chain query in the initial sort. If the analyst were
interested only in unit records applicable to each track
unit operating in the area concerned, the experimental sys-
tem provides the capability to make such a link when the
track numbers are known. The to track group field contained
in all unit records provides this link.
Suppose the analyst desired to determine events and
units that could be associated with a given place name
rather than using a coordinate specification in his query.
First, he would obtain the area number applicable to that
place from the area reference records. Then he would query
the port and area unit records using the given area number
as the basis for his sort. Once these records had been ob-
tained the values for their event number field and to track
group fields would provide the link to other appropriate
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records in the data base.
Suppose the analyst knew the events that were appli-
cable to his area of interest and he wanted to determine
the current parameters of that area. His initial query
would specify obtaining the track records applicable to
these event numbers. Then he would follow the steps des-
cribed in the next paragraph.
Checking the position elements of the track records
obtained in the final sort in the cases described above
would provide the measure of the current size parameters
of the activity concerned. This could be accomplished by
a program that caused the system to list the position
elements from the track records obtained in the final sort
in coordinate order, either from east to west, or north to
s ou th , etc.
131Period. ' The primary chronological retrieval in OSIS
in the past yielded all records applicable to the period
specified. Then the analyst would have to manually review
the retrieved data to determine the event relationships
and unit associations involved in this activity just as he
had to employ the same procedure for an area retrieval as
discussed above.
Under NAVWARANALEX , the analyst would have the option
of combining his period requirement in a chain query with
131J See p. 217.

273
other analytical interests relative to events, areas, types
of units, individual units, aspects of naval warfare, des-
cripti rs of these aspects, or whatever other association
he felt was within the capabilities of the file. While
the pri ta ' chronological retrieval capability in NAVWARANALEX
is bai.ed upon the event time element of the track group
t u Id, different times are cited in additional records as
. < 11. The ports and area unit records have an occurence
date time group as one of their elements. The reaction
: ( c ords have an element that indicates the time of the
closest point of approach during incidents at sea. The
narrative records all have an event date as one of their
2lements . The requirement and area reference records all
have a date ;: informal ton. Once the records that the
red were retrieved, a measurement of the
iod of tie activity could be made using a program that
Lsted the time or date field pertinent to these records
in chr nolo ' eai order .
1 In
Scope. The number of aspects of naval warfare being
Lced tn ative to a given event can be determined from
event narrative records. Recently developed NAVWARANALEX
programs count not only each aspect reflected on a given
event narrative record; but also within each aspect, count
I32See pp. 217 - 220.
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the number applicable to each EEI and the number applicable
to each IND or SOR under each EEI. 133
13 4Level
. The number of units participating in a
given event is counted by a NAVWARANALEX program known as
event unit composition. This report counts the number of
different types of units (major combatant, minor combatant,
submarine, AG1, research vessel, auxiliary , merchant , fishing
vessel, aircraft, and friendly units). It then aggregates
the total number for each day of the units participating
in the event, concerned
.
135
Intensity . The event unit composition report pro-
vides a measure of the number and types of unit components
of the intensity variable. The number of aspects of naval
warfare are measured by another program as described above.
The capabilities of the individual units concerned can be
obtained from the order of battle reference records. The
capabilities they have been observed to demonstrate can be
obtained from the ELINT, WEAPS , REACT, SIGSUM and RIG unit
records, as well as the COMUSE, SENUSE, WEAPEM, TACEMP
,
RIGEQP, PERS and SUBORD event narrative records that
pertain to the events concerned.
Presymptoms, symptoms, and
patterns of activities
Once the variables of naval warfare have been observed
133see pp. 101 - 102.




and measured as described above, the individual activity
parameters corresponding to these variables can be estab-
lished. Given a sufficient sample of individual activities,
statistical techniques can be applied to these observa-
tions to assist determination of presymptoms, symptoms
and patterns of activities. As Ackoff indicated, tech-
nology applicable to both statistical and quality control
can be programmed into the information system. The remain-
der of this section discusses aspects of that technology
and their application to features that have been designed
into the experimental files.
Des criptive stati stics. The design features of the
experimental files facilitate the application of descrip-
tive statistics to the data they contain. Descriptive
statistics has been defined as:
"Any treatment of data which is designed to sum-
marize or describe some of their important features
without attempting to infer anything that goes
beyond them . "137
The statistical parameters that can be applied to the
observations of naval activity that are reflected in various
records are the standard ones that provide measures of both
central location and central moment. With regard to cen-
tral location, these include the mean, median and mode of
136Sec pp. A3- A3, 55- 65, 93 -95 ,102 ,111 -114 ,209- 211, 217-221, 229-232
137John E. Freund and Frank J. Williams, Elementary Bus iness





New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1977) p. 1.
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the data sampled in the particular set of records retrieved.
With regard to moments about the mean or measures of varia-
tion, these would include range, variance, standard
deviation and the coefficient of variation. Programs that
have been developed in the project to date that sample and
extract record data to measure these parameters are discussed
below.
Essential to temporal activity analysis is a program
to calculate the difference between dates. Such an algo-
rithm has been developed in the current phase of NAVWARANALEX
,
although it has not been tested fully to date. Some of the
principal applications of such an algorithm and the measure-
ments it can provide include calculating the number of ship
days in a given area (both for individual units and the
total aggregate ship days) and the number of days a given
unit has deployed out-of-area. In the past, analysts have
had to retrieve the data that provided the basis for these
determinations and then manipulated that data manually to
reach a solution. The difference in dates algorithm and
the proper program applied to the appropriate set of
NAVWARANALEX records would give them an automated assist
in reaching the solution.
Other periods of interest applicable to activity
analysis include the time since last replenishment, the
time since the last port call, time on station or patrol,
underway time, time in port or at anchor, etc. Once
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observations concerning the difference in times relative
to any of these periods have been collected, programs
from statistical packages could be applied to determine
the statistical parameters relative to central location
and central moment of the activity represented by the
sampled records. Similar statistics could be compiled
based on the fields and record sets that provided measure-
ment of observations of the area variable.
The programs developed in the current I\AVWARANALEX
phase that provide measurement of both the scope of a
given event on a given day (IND measurement) and the de-
gree of collection coverage obtained against the unit
participating in the event on that day (SOR measurement)
have already been cited. Given the repeated collection of
samples relative to each particular aspect of naval warfare,
one could begin to construct frequency distributions of the
Soviet practice of each individual aspects of naval war-




The program developed no date that applies to obser-
vations of both the level and intensity variables also has
been cited previously. This event unit composition program
bases its count of the number of different type of units
participating in a given event on a given day on two work
138See pp. 273 - 274
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matrices that it constructs with the following column
headings: Matrix A includes event number, event: time,
major combatant, minor combatant, submarine, AGI , research
vessel, auxiliary, merchant, fishing vessel, aircraft,
friendly unit, and total units. Matrix B column headings
include event number, event time and track number. The
program proeesses each of the five possible inputs in the
individual track records that comprise the data sample.
It then checks the event number, event date and track
number field related to the given input to determine if
that track unit already has been counted on the given day
and the given event, or if that track unit input repre-
sents an addition to the total corresponding to its unit
type. During this process it also determines when a new
row should be added to the matrix. After completing the
logical steps based on these determinations, the program
continues processing each individual track input in the
record until it has made the determination for all five
track inputs or whatever amount of inputs less than five
that the record contains
.
A frequency distribution based on the results con-
tained in Matrix A would reveal the pattern of unit types
participating in a given event . A second program under
development compares the results contained in these mat-
rices to construct a third matrix. Matrix C includes the
following column headings: track number, event date, and
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the unit typo and aggregate unit total described above.
A frequency distribution based on this matrix would reveal
the pattern of unit association of a given track unit over
time
.
Statistic a l inference. The exciting thing about the
automated support of quantitative activities analysis that
might be provided by programs such as those developed under
the NAVWARANALEX project is not the potential of such pro-
grams for assisting the collection of descriptive statis-
tics. More important are the implications of possible
application of the methods of statistical inference. This
branch of modern statistics is defined as:
"A generalization that goes beyond the limits of
the data. "139
Once sufficient samples of the same or like activity
have been collected and measurements of the statistical
parameters related to each of the activity variables taken,
then estimates with regard to each of the variables con-
cerning the statistical parameters of the general popula-
tion from which the samples were drawn could be
constructed using various models from both probability and
statistical theory. These parameters, once estimated and
refined, could provide the standards against which devia-
tions in current samples could be compared and tested for
their statistical significance.
139Freund and Williams, Elementary Statistics, p. 2
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It would require extensive investigation and testing
to determine the applicability of inferential techniques
to data that can be compiled by the experimental programs.
Only after such a process has been completed, V70uld it be
feasible to determine which and how specific alert measures
could be programmed into the system. This kind of effort
remains to be pursued as it has been beyond these initial
phases of the project. The ocean surveillance system, how-
ever, collects large volumes of data on a daily basis. Once
programs were installed on OSIS to compile data in such a
fashion, it would not take long before reasonable progress
could be made toward constructing refined estimates of
population parameters. Then it would be a matter of suf-
ficient programming time to develop the appropriate
detection and alarm features for the system.
A word of caution must be interjected. Care must
always be taken in th< p] Lication of statistical method:.;
to social phenomena. What one would be attempting in this
case is the testing of the substantive activities analyti-
cal theory through the use of tests that are constructed on
the basis of methodological theory. The fact that one
tests theory with theory has been one of the criticisms
leveled at applications of hypothesis testing in the social
sciences. Probability and statistical theory, like the
development of the substantive theories these methods are
used to test, is constructed using certain basic assump-
tions that must be taken as given and are beyond empirical
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proof. That: which is given is defined in the form of
primitive terms. Definitions, axioms and theorems are
deduced from these primitive terms by application of the
rules of logic to form the foundation for either the sub-
stantive or methodological theory being developed. Thus,
the criticism indicated above is usually leveled in the
form of the question, how do you test theory with theory?
The way to proceed must start with recognition of
the fact that probability models are mathematical abstrac-
tions or idealizations of the experiments they are con-
structed to represent. The basis for this construction
lies in the primitive terms, definitions, axioms and
theorems of probability. The events, which are the pri-
mary elements of probability theory, are directly paral-
lel in meaning and function to the outcomes of experiments,
which have been specified by the primitive terms , definitions,
axioms and theorems of the particular substantive theory
to which the methodology is being applied. If the appli-
cation of the methodology is to yield significant results,
one must ensure that the events to be observed and collected
as specified by the substantive theory can be measured
statistically
.
Second, the parallel between the methodological
event and the experimental event of function to outcomes
must be maintained. It if is not, the methodology may
yield results that appear statistically significant based
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on the relevance they indicate with regard to relation-
ships in the number system; but they may not have any
relevance to the relationships predicted by the substan-
tive analytical theory. Ways to ensure that this event
parallel is maintained and that the experimental event can
be measured using a probability model include specifying
the experimental events so that they are both mutually
exclusive and exhaustive with regard to the logical pos-
sible outcomes of the experiment. If one is successful
in this specification process, the basic laws of probability
should apply to the experimental outcomes. Each event
should satisfy the axiom that its probability lies between
and 1. The aggregate of all event probabilities should
equal 1
.
After the events to be collected have been specified
for the experiment, the next step represents the most cri-
tical one in the entire process. It consists of assigning
values as probabilities to the events in the model. The
most prevalent ways of assigning probability as a value are:
(1) Stating the likelihood of the outcomes occurring in the
real world based on conditions of logic, symmetry and
identity. (2) Observing the value of the frequency of
individual outcomes as the experiment is repeated an un-
limited number of times. (3) Assigning a weight to an
event that indicates the strength of expert opinion of the





After the measurements based upon the assigned
probabilities have been taken, both these and the experi-
mental outcomes must be assessed to determine if they
remain consistent with those predicted by the methodo-
logical and substantive theories respectively. If the
measurements prove inconsistent, then the methodological
theory must be revised or expanded to allow for the meas-
ures observed in the particular case. If the experimental
outcomes are judged to be inconsistent with the predicted
ones, then the primitive elements of the substantive
theory may have to be revised or expanded to allow for
these observations. Alternatively, the deductions made
in the development of the substantive theory may have to
be re-examined and revised. Thus, a recycling of the steps
in the process occurs. Then one proceeds once again with
the measurement operations. This recycling of the steps
in the process continues until all contradictions in the
theories concerned have been eliminated. The substantive
theory developed in such a manner to include the use of
the methodological theory to test and validate it will
then provide a coherent framework for the quantitative
analysis of naval activities
.
Statistical packages. The techniques and procedures
of relevant methodological theory that may be applied to
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the quantitative analysis of naval activities are found
in such powerful, commercially produced statistical pack-
ages as the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences
(SPSS) and the Biomedical Computer Programs (BMDP) . Both
these packages contain a variety of procedures that are
useful applications of both descriptive and inferential
statistics. Examples of the relevance of some of these
procedures to naval activity analysis are discussed below.
With regard to procedures relevant to applications
of descriptive statistics, frequency procedures can be used
to produce histograms and univariate plots. If genera-
tion of only the statistical estimates of population
parameters is the objective, the condescriptive procedure
in SPSS and program one in BMDP will handle this task.
Other programs contained in these packages allow the group-
ing of data to gain better analytical focus and highlight-
specific r< ! i Lonships, transformation of data in order to
standarize it or for sanitization purposes, the exclusion
of both missing and extreme values contained in the data in
order to prevent them from distorting the analysis.
With regard to statistical inference, both packages
contain procedures that permit bivariate analysis to
See Norman H. Nie et.al., Statistical Package for the
Socia l Sciences (SPSS)_, 2d, ed .
,
(New York: McGraw-Hill
Book Company, F973y and W.S. Dixon and M.B. Brown, eds
.
,
Biomedical Computer Program s P. Series (BMDP-79)
,
(Ber-
kxTrey^ CalTiTornia^- University of~Cal iforn i a Press, 1979).
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include scatter grams to produce two way plots and cross
tabulation to deal with conditional events . These and
other procedures can be extended to perform multivariate
analysis in order to explore the relationships between the
variables being examined. Multiway frequency tables can
test whether row variables are independent of the column
variables in a matrix. Regression programs can print and
plot residuals and predicted values, identify best subsets
of independent variables, identify a good set of pre-
dictor variables, and establish the degree and strength
of the correlation between multiple independent variables
.
Programs performing the analysis of variance and covarience
are also available in these packages. These procedures
permit the test of the difference between means of two or
more groups or subpopulations . Cluster analysis procedures
may be employed early on in exploratory or data analysis when
it is suspected that the data may not be homogeneous and it
is desired to reduce the data into groups. Factor analysis
procedures can be used if correlations of large numbers of
variables are required. Essentially this technique clusters
the variables into factors such that the variables within
each factor are highly correlated. Then it interprets
each factor according to the variables belonging to it and
is able to summarize many variables by employing a few
factors. The individual factor loadings should either be
very large or very small so each variable is associated
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with a minimum number of factors. Canonical correlation
analysis procedures extend regression analysis to deter-
mine a linear combination of the X variables that have





Progress made in NAVWARANALEX to date with regard to
the development of quantitative analytical support capa-
bilities is summarized as follows: Substantive analytical
theory has been conceived and formulated to permit the
specification of naval activities and events that can be
observed and collected. It has identified activity vari-
ables and established means for measuring their parameters
with regard to the events that have been sampled in the
collection process. It has suggested how inferential
statistical techniques might be applied to developing
estimates of the population parameters related to the
activity variables once a sufficient number of like or
similar events have been sampled by the ocean surveillance
system for processing by NAVWARANALEX capabilities after
they have been installed on OSIS . The desireable proper-
ties of the population estimators developed through this
process should be those that are unbiased, efficient, con-
sistent, sufficient and robust. An additional criteria for
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the development of these estimators is that it should
minimize the mean square error.
Once population parameters have been estimated and
refined, the estimates of these parameters could be used
as standards against which deviations in current samples
of naval activity obtained through the ocean surveillance
system could be compared and tested for their statistical
significance. It was emphasized that it would require
extensive investigation and testing before this process
of applying inferential statistical techniques and pro-
cedures to naval warfare data could be completed. Cau-
tion as to the care to be taken when applying statistical
methods to social phenomena such as naval activities was
also interjected. Methods of constructing probability
models to perform the empirical experiments on the naval
warfare data samples were then discussed. Assignment of
pr : ibil ities to ; Fare ild ini-
tially have to be done using either the method of weighting
expected outcomes on the basis of expert opinion or stating
the likelihood of outcomes based on logic, symmetry and
identity. As more and more naval warfare data samples
were gathered and accumulated in the data base, the esti-
mates of population paramenters could then be refined by
basing them on the frequency of observed outcomes. The
section then went on to describe the cyclical process re-
quired to develop fully a coherent analytical theory.
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Finally, techniques and procedures readily available in
commercial automated statistical packages and their
applications v.;ere briefly described.
Qualitative analytical support
This section covers two subtopics, means of access
and analyst/ system interaction.
Means of access
The means of access to naval warfare analytical data
currently available to OSIS and described previously in-
cluded the platform status, mission and characteristics
files; the ocean surveillance product file; area retrievals;
and chronological retrievals . Both platform status and
mission history files may be accessed by individual unit,
unit type, and trademark identifiers. The first file also
provides both operational and material readiness status
data. ttent of these is found primarily in the
order of battle files and the track records under NAWAR-
ANALEX as described previously. Here the similarities end,
however
.
Under OSIS , the individual track data may be sorted
and differentiated from one another. If the analyst were
interested in the unit associations acquired by a given
track unit over time, however, he has been limited in the
1A1 Sgg pp. 248 - 251 and 269
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past by the degree to which the system was able to make
such machine assisted associations. Under NAVWARANAEEX
,
once the records applicable to an individual track have
been identified, network linkage provided by the event
number element of the record identification fields of these
records permits retrieval of all other event narrative and
unit record data associated with these track records.
The to track group field network linkage also can be
employed if the analyst is only interested in other unit
record data that is associated with the track records ob-
tained in the initial retrieval. In fact, the to track group
field not only links other unit record data to a given track
unit, but also the sort based on this field will link the
other unit data to given positions and times in the given
track unit's chronological plot.
Other unit record network relationships are provided by
thi order of battle cross-reference g] Leld (00" XREF) in
the track records and the area reference fber element (AREA-
REF-NO) in the port and area group field of those unit records.
These fields link given track records to the proper order of
battle reference records and given port and area records to
the proper area reference record subset. Thus, if the ana-
lyst is interested in obtaining historical documentation con-
cerning particular units or particular areas, he may do so
by employing these networks links.
Supposing the analyst wished to study records
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applicable to aspects of naval warfare. The records in
the NAVWARANALEX files could be sorted according to each
individual EE1 . This sort process would have to extract
each record on the basis of the first REQ-FLD encountered
and then return again and again to select the record for
listing under the other REQ-FLDs it contains. The sort
process would end after all REQ-FLDs in every record of
interest had been selected. Another option would be to
simply list all event narrative records in record type
order. Another option would be to list all event narra-
tive and unit records of interest in record heirarchy or-
der. If the analyst wished to consider historical data
from the reference records, he could list that set in
NARR-ID order since this element corresponds to the various
descriptors of the aspects of naval warfare. In any of the
cases above, his query statement could specify parameters
applicable to a single descriptor of the aspects of naval
warfare. Further, his analytical interest of the moment
could be specified using a chain query. The structuring
of such chain queries theoretically would be limited only




In summary, the NAVWARANALEX system provides increased
automated assists to the qualitative analysis of naval
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activities over what has been available to OSIS in the past
as follows: It provides increased opportunities for the
analyst to formulate chain query specification tailored to
his current problem. It provides the capability to both
expand initial queries to obtain associated data by employ-
ing network linkages and to narrow query specifications to
focus on particular issues. The network linkages designed
for the files preserve previous analytical relationships
and associations and preclude these from having to be
recreated through manual review and manipulation of data by
analysts working on a current problem. If later evidence
available to the analyst studying the current problem con-
tradicts the preserved relationships and associations, they
can either be deleted from the file or the additional evi-
dence and analytical comment can be inserted into the file
in records tied to these previous records by the sequential
record number element and the value of the event number
element in the. record identification group that ai tppli-
cable to the record type and event number concerned. NAV-
WARANALEX also permits acceptance of data from the formatted
message system beyond that which has been extracted by OSIS
in the past, which primarily included only track plots,
event times, and some narrative data. Thus, the experimen-
tal system preserves a greater level of detail than has
been the case in the past with regard to OSIS files. The
hierarchical set and network relationship capabilities
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allow both the development of a variety of analytical pro-
ducts and the ability to provide linkages to bits of infor-
mation contained in all records pertaining to the same
event. This has not been the case with most ocean, surveil-
lance product files, which could be accessed only by the
date time group of each individual message contained in the
142file. Finally, the system alerts provided by NAVWARANALEX
quantitative analytical support capabilities can assist
analyst focus on the qualitative aspects of the activities
and events concerned.
Information management support
The current features designed into the file to pro-
vide information in support of management activiti.es may be
divided into two categories: those that support collection
management effort, and those that support production
management activities.
Collection management
As cited earlier, a report program similar to the
one that compiles measurements of the scope of naval activ-
ity compiles measurements of the degree of collection
coverage reflected in the OSIS data base for a given day
1 M
or over time. In addition to assessing the degree of
collection coverage given each SOR under each EEI . managers
142See pp. 251 and 267 - 269
143 See pp. 273 - 274.
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might want to analyze that coverage by area, unit type,
track unit, etc. Programs could be written based on chain
queries to provide the output desired.
The target of the activity descriptor in the event
narrative record set has been established in NAVWARANALEX
not only to insert narrative and analytical comment con-
cerning the activities of the recipient of the interaction,
but also by convention to report collection results. The
collection report narrative should record not only the
collection unit's participation in the interaction, but
also cite the sensor results that it has obtained and in-
dicate where they were forwarded for processing. Thus, a
target activity report could provide a qualitiative sense
of the collection effort. The unit record within the tar-
get activity hierarchical set is the sensor event record.
It contains data related to the various sensors employed
144by the collecting unit.
Other unit records that contain collection results
of particular interest include: The HFDF records document
the results of the high frequency direction finding net-
work. The ELINT records document the electronic intel-
ligence acquired. The weapons records indicate the
specific weapons employed by particular participating units
The SIGSUM records document the acoustical intelligence
acquired . Finally, the rig records record the profile of
144See Table 31 on pp. 259 - 260, and the discussion in





The principal assistance that NAVWARANALEX provides
production management activities relates directly to the
variety of ways in which the data base may be accessed. The
increased means of access provide the capability to locate
and identify rapidly available data that is applicable to
parcicular produces in the production schedule. Report
programs can be written to output data in the particular
format desired. Beyond the production schedule, these
capabilities can also assist the development of special
products tailored to the specific current interst of the
particular consumer concerned.
Summary of Network Relationships
and Report Programs
Throughout the discussion in this chapter particular
hierarchical set and network relationships have often been
cited as being designed into the experimental files. Table
31 on pages 259 and 260 outlined the particular hierarchi-
cal set relationships involved. Table 32 summarizes the
network relationships that have been discussed. Report pro-
grams have also been cited throughout the chapter as being
developed, under development, or requiring development.
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t;o the Reality Situation
It may appear that perhaps the design of the naval
warfare experimental information system is too extensive.
What has been presented is a consideration of what could
and should be done with regard to improvements to OSIS
.
In this regard, consideration of the cost of these devel-
opments has yet to be examined and assessed. Such con-
sideration may temper the projected development in a
particular direction. Overall, however, it does appear
that NAVWARANALEX offers incremental improvements over
past:: OSIS capabilities in the areas of quantitative
activities analysis, qualitative activities analysis, and
information management support.
Why should progress be made toward implementation of
as many of the features described as possible? The author
believes that it is sufficient to recall Admiral Gorshkov's
objectives and intentions to answer this question.
"Establishing conditions for gaining sea control
has always required lengthy periods of time and
the execution of a series of measures while still
at peace. These measures include the development
and preparation of the necessary forces and material
and maintaining them in readiness to accomplish com-
bat missions, concentration of groups of forces and
disposing them in a theater in such a manner that
they will have superiority of position over the en-
emy, and also providing of facilities in the sea and
oceanic theaters of military operations, the proper
organization of forces and a base system appropriate
to their mission, a system for controlling them,





p. 297 as quoted in Chapter III, p. 143

VI. THE SOLUTION: CONCEPT OF
OPERATIONS AND IMPLEMENTATION
The Naval Warfare Analysis
Experiment in Perspective
This perspective summarizes the results and conclu-
sions obtained through NAVWARANALEX to date and outlines
additional efforts that can be conducted in the future.
The conclusions outlined below were documented in Chapter
I based on research in the fields of threat perception,
crisis management, systems analysis and management
information systems.
A. The information system that best serves management
is one that:
(1) Generates indicators and performance data
which permit detection of problems and
opportunities at the symptom and presymptom
stage.
(2) Provides the capability to compare actual
performance and outcomes with those
projected in the plan.
(3) Employs data base organization constructed
on the basis of developed information theory
which specifies the context of problems
anticipated, provides a framework for their
analysis, and models the functioning of all
management system components.
(4) Includes query and sort capabilities which
both allow focusing on the parameters




and permit expanded search and retrieval
to capture additional information rele-
vant to new parameters as they are perceived
and come into play.
B. Such an information system, thus, serves as man-
agement's institutional consciousness and memory
to increase the sensitivity with which the man-
agement system is able to perceive problems and
opportunities. It further serves to increase the
sensibility with which management responds to the
reaction that has transformed the controlled sys-
tem's internal state as a result of stimuli
generated by both system and environmental
activities
.
C. If the problem is an international crisis, man-
agement efforts are complicated by the fact that
the nations involved in the crisis must not only
monitor
:
(1) The performance and activities of the politico-
military system that each nation controls and
(2) Activities in the international politico-
military environment, but also
(3) The performance and activities of opposing
national politico-military systems which
they can only influence, but not control.
D. Sherwin demonstrated that:
(1) These management information system concepts
can be applied to the design and construction
of a computerized information system for
crisis management.
(2) Techniques for transforming information about
such elusive social phenomena as crisis symp-
toms into machine readable data and empirical
indicators are feasible.
(3) Such an information system can support both
quantitative and qualitative activities
analysis
.
(4) An Executive Decision Aid to perform the in-
stitutional consciousness and memory function
by scanning historical precedents to reveal
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options taken, problems encountered, and
successes realized in previous crises can
be developed and implemented.
Results of the systems analysis of the intelligence
system conducted in Chapter II are indicated below.
A. The systems of concern to the intelligence sys-
tem are the system of international naval force
interaction located within the system of inter-
national politico-military activities and the
management system located within the U.S. naval
system.
B. The legitimate goals of the naval management
system include the development of the doctrine,
strategy, tactics, force levels, readiness pos-
ture, platforms, sensors, weapons, countermea-
sures, and other capabilities required to meet
potential naval threats to the nation's security
and interests
.
C. The intelligence system functions to produce
a product as a service to other components of
both the naval management system and the naval
system
.
(1) This process is cyclical in nature and has
the interjection of the intelligence pro-
duct into the command planning and decision
making process during the consumption seg-
ment of the cycle as its primary goal.
(2) The purpose of the product is to provide
capabilities and activities analysis of
the naval systems of the world which might
oppose and threaten U.S. national security
and interests
.
(3) The key to the smooth, effective functioning
of the cycle is management's performance of
the control function. Control of the intel-
ligence system should ensure that the
activities performed by participants are
based on an accumulation of knowledge con-
cerning and continual awareness of the
requirements of the system institutionalized





(4) The requirements that guide the functioning
of operational intelligence components of
the system as they perform activities analy-
sis are the national requirements for re-
porting on foreign naval operations issued
in varying forms throughout the chain of
command
.
D. The intelligence officer must be an efficient
and effective consumer of science. While he
is called upon to perform many roles within the
intelligence system the two primary ones that he
must perfect for career development purposes are
those of first analyst and then manager.
E. The systems view of problem solving offers an
analytical orientation and methodological tools
that can assist management efforts to plan,
develop, direct and control intelligence pro-
grams and activities. This conceptual model
includes consideration of the reality situation,
the conceptual model, the scientific model and
the solution, as well as the interaction that
should take place between these steps in the
problem solving process
.
The assessment of the reality situation documented
in Chapter III indicates the potential threat that the ex-
pansion of the Soviet naval system poses to U.S. national
security and interests. Principal conclusions include:
A. Admiral Gorshkov already has achieved many of his
objectives toward building a balanced navy and
maritime power of the first rank.
B. The expansion in naval capability will continue
through the year 2000 primarily in qualitative
terms of more sophisticated platforms and sys-
tems and more offensive firepower.
C. The expansion in naval development has reached
the point where the Chief of Naval Operations
has testified before Congress that one cannot
state with confidence that the U.S. Navy has a





D. The documentary evidence indicates that the
Soviet leadership has the will to employ
aggressively the naval capabilities that
Admiral Gorshkov has developed to support
their national security and foreign policy.
This employment includes extensive activity
on a world wide basis by all the components
of Soviet seapower
.
The analytical and information management theory
developed as the conceptual model in Chapter IV formulates
the specifications below:
A. The operational intelligence process should
focus on key questions suggested by the re-
quirements of the operational components of
the naval system for the intelligence product.
B. The reporting requirements on foreign naval
operations in EEI format lend an analytical
framework that provides such a focus because
they
:
(1) Identify and establish variables that can
be observed, measured and manipulated quan-
titatively to provide indications of pre-
symptoms , symptoms and patterns of activity.
(2) Identify and establish descriptors of the
aspects of naval warfare that can organize
naval warfare narrative data in a manner
that leads to the qualitative capture and
refinement of the essence of naval warfare
activities
.
C. The design of information system capabilities to
improve OSIS should increase the level of detail
of data preserved in the system and the means of
access to that data; provide the capability for
both focused and expanded queries; increase ana-
lyst/system interaction; and preserve analytical
associations made between activities, events,
participating and target units.
Progress concerning the development of the scientific
models to guide the implementation of OSIS improvements is
outlined in Chapter V. Specific results and projected
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development are indicated below:
A. Hierarchical set organization of records and
the establishment of network relationships
between particular record fields support the
variety of access and interactive query capa-
bilities desired. Such support is further
enhanced by the employment of the indexed
sequential processing method .
B. Programs have been developed to observe and
measure both activity variables and the aspects
of naval warfare quantitatively.
C. Development of OSIS should include the incorpor-
'
ation of powerful statistical packages that are
available commercially today.
D. Qualitative activities analysis is enhanced under
NAVWARANALEX by providing increased means for con-
necting current event related data with histori-
cal activities documentation; combining collection
report narratives with analytical commentary ; and
preserving the level of detail to facilitate the
development of long term activity studies in
addition to the support of current operational
intelligence analysis.
E. Specific features to support both collection and
production management efforts have been incor-
porated into the file design. Capabilities to
support information management activities should
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